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This thesis considers certain consequences following contractual failure in South
African and Scots law in comparative perspective. Three species of contractual failure
are under review: termination after breach; termination after supervening
impossibility/frustration; and termination of a contract which is voidable by reason of
improperly obtained consent. The focus is on the following: (a) the legal effect of
termination for breach on the contractual nexus between the parties; (b) the claim which
allows a party to enforce a right to a contractual performance after contractual failure;
(c) the claim for the return of a contractual performance (or the value thereof) conferred
prior to termination for breach; (d) the claim designed to redress the economic
imbalances between the parties after supervening impossibility of
performance/frustration; and (e) the claims designed to redress the economic
imbalances between the parties after termination of a contract rendered voidable by
reason of improperly obtained consent.
The central argument is that in choosing between defensible doctrinal
alternatives to regulate the consequences of contractual failure, a legal system must not
rely exclusively on abstract taxonomic arguments, historical arguments or comparative
arguments. I argue that this choice should be made after careful consideration of the
principles of recovery underpinning a particular remedy and the consequences of
imposing liability according to a particular doctrinal set of rules. The proper doctrinal
basis of a particular remedy is the one which, having due regard to the consequences of
imposing liability according to a doctrinal set of rules, most accurately reflects these
principles of recovery.
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Broadly speaking, contractual failure encompasses any premature cessation of an
intended contractual arrangement. In this sense, contractual failure includes not only
those contracts which are invalid from the outset but also those contracts which are
initially valid but have subsequently been terminated. This thesis focuses on three
species of contractual failure in the latter category: termination after breach; termination
after supervening impossibility/frustration; and termination of a contract which is
voidable by reason of improperly obtained consent.
The consequences of contractual failure in these three species are numerous and
complex. It is not intended to consider these consequences in a comprehensive way.
Instead, the focus will be on the following:
(a) The legal effect of termination for breach on the contractual nexus between the
parties.
(b) The claim which allows a party to enforce a right to a contractual performance
after contractual failure. This claim is regulated by the doctrine of accrued rights
and arises in the first two species of contractual failure.
(c) The claim for the return of a contractual performance (or the value thereof)
conferred prior to termination for breach.
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(d) The claim designed to redress the economic imbalances between the parties
after supervening impossibility of performance/frustration.
(e) The claims designed to redress the economic imbalances between the pardes
after termination of a contract rendered voidable by reason of improperly
obtained consent. The focus will be on the claim for restitutio in integrum.
A cursory glance at the contents pages reveals that the bulk of the analysis deals
with terminadon after breach. Aspects of this analysis have important implications for
the claims arising in the other two species of contractual failure. These implicadons are
considered in the final substandve chapter.
1.2 Structure
After this introducdon, this thesis contains six substandve chapters. Chapter two
considers the legal effect of termination for breach on the contractual nexus between
the parties. Chapter three considers the doctrine of accrued rights. Chapter four
considers the disparate academic views on the doctrinal basis of the duty to restore
performances (or their value) conferred prior to terminadon for breach and sets out a
theoretical framework to resolve the debate. This framework will then be used in the
remaining chapters to answer doctrinal questions about claims (c) — (e). Chapter five
considers the duty to restore money and returnable benefits. Chapter six considers the
duty to restore inherently non-returnable benefits. Chapter seven considers the claim
designed to redress the economic imbalances between the parties after termination for
supervening impossibility of performance/frustration and restitution in integrum after the
2
termination of a contract rendered voidable by improperly obtained consent.
1.3 Questions and Thesis
The questions considered in this thesis operate on two levels of generality. On
the first level, there are seven specific questions of considerable practical and theoretical
importance. First, what effect does termination for breach have on the contractual
nexus between the parties? Second, when does a right to a contractual performance
survive termination for breach and supervening impossibility of
performance/frustration? Third, when does the duty to restore performances arise after
termination for breach? Fourth, when the duty to restore arises after termination for
breach, what is its quantum? Fifth, should the duty to restore performances (or their
value) received prior to termination for breach be regulated by the law of contract, the
law of unjustified enrichment or sometimes by the law of contract and sometimes by the
law of unjustified enrichment? Sixth, is unjustified enrichment the appropriate doctrinal
basis for redressing the economic imbalances after supervening impossibility of
performance/frustration? Seventh, should restitutio in integrum be regulated by the law of
contract, the law of unjustified enrichment, or sometimes by the law of contract and
sometimes by the law of unjustified enrichment?
The second level contains wider questions which underpin questions three to
seven. The central second level question is whether the consequences of contractual
failure under review ought to be regulated by the law of contract, the law of unjustified
enrichment, or sometimes by the law of contract and sometimes by the law of
unjustified enrichment. The following analysis shows that this central question raises
one further second level question.
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The last decade of scholarship on the central second level question in South
African and Scots law has seen a proliferation of arguments for expanding the
application of unjustified enrichment. These arguments have relied primarily on the
theory that the law of obligations is divided into at least three major branches - contract,
delict and unjustified enrichment - with each branch demarcating a largely autonomous
territory. According to this theory, the classification of obligations reflects the events
which generate legal rights and duties.1 The type of event which gives rise to a
contractual right is consensus (and sometimes reliance) whereas the type of event which
gives rise to an enrichment right is the retention of a benefit sine causa (without legal
ground). This differentiation between the types of events is intended to show that the
three branches of obligations give rise to three independent causes of action.
Furthermore, underpinning each type of event is one defining or unifying principle:
contract concerns binding promises or agreements and unjustified enrichment is based
on the principle that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at another's expense.
This theory is used to support the claim that contractual remedies and
unjustified enrichment remedies ought to be distinguished from each other by
considering the alignment between the unifying principle of one of the branches of
obligations and the principle of recovery underpinning a particular remedy. If the aim of
a remedy is more closely connected to fulfilling the expectations created by the contract,
then the remedy should be contractual. However, if the aim of a remedy aligns more
1 Visser, 'Rethinking Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of the Competition between Contractual and
Enrichment Remedies' (1992) A] 203 at 209; Hutton, 'Restitution after Breach of Contract: Rethinking
the Conventional Jurisprudence' (1997) AJ 201 at 211-2. Both the preceding authors rely to some extent
on the works of Peter Birks and Andrew Burrows. See Birks, An Introduction to the Law ofRestitution (1989),
Chapter 2 and Birks, 'Restitution and the Freedom of Contract' (1983) 36 CLP 141 at 146. Birks has
subsequently changed some of his views on classification. See for example Birks, 'Misnomer' in Cornish et
al. (eds), Restitution: Vast, Present and Future-. Essays in Honour ofGareth Jones (1998), 1; Birks, 'Rights, Wrongs
and Remedies' (2000) 20 OJLS 1 and Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), chapter 1. See also Burrows,
'Dividing the Law of Obligations' in Burrows (ed), Understanding the Law ofObligations: Essays on Contract,
Tort and Restitution (1998), 1.
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closely with the principle that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at another's
expense, then the remedy should be based on the rules of unjustified enrichment.2
Those who argue for an increased application of the law of unjustified enrichment after
failed contracts consider that claims (c) — (e) fit into the latter category.
This type of scholarship focuses primarily on issues of abstract taxonomic
doctrine. Although this scholarship has successfully established that it is theoretically
possible to classify these remedies as arising in unjustified enrichment, this finding does
not preclude the theoretical possibility of classifying these remedies as contractual. It
should not come as a surprise that there are two doctrinal alternatives which could
govern these remedies since it is rare for arguments based exclusively on abstract
taxonomic doctrine to yield definitive answers to complex legal problems. This raises
the next second level question: how should a legal system choose between two
defensible doctrinal alternatives?
I will argue that this choice ought to be made after careful consideration of the
principles of recovery underpinning a particular remedy and the consequences of
imposing liability according to a particular doctrinal set of rules. In my view, the proper
doctrinal basis of a particular remedy is the one which, having due regard to the
consequences of imposing liability according to a particular set of doctrinal rules, most
accurately reflects these principles of recovery. In articulating what is meant by these
principles, I will draw on Neil MacCormick's useful explanation. A helpful way to tease
out these principles and these consequences is to consider real and hypothetical cases. It
will be demonstrated that our intuitions about the just results that ought to be reached
in these real and hypothetical cases indicate that three general factors are critical in
2 Visser, (1992) A] 208-10; Hutton, (1997) A] 211-2 and MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment and Breach
of Contract' (1994) JR 137 at 143-4.
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distilling the principles of recovery underpinning the remedies under review: the role of
the contract price in determining the quantum of recovery after contractual failure; the
contractual allocation of risk; and the incidence of fault in the circumstances leading to
contractual failure. The last of these factors is also a key feature in distinguishing
between contracts terminated for supervening impossibility of performance/frustration
and the other two species of contractual failure. This suggests that the features which
differentiate the three species of contractual failure also have an important role to play
in distilling the principles of recovery underpinning the claims under review.
In respect of the consequences of imposing liability according to a particular set
of doctrinal rules, it will be demonstrated that two considerations are critical: first, the
law of unjustified enrichment necessarily brings with it the change of position/loss of
enrichment defence and secondly, once the claimant's impoverishment is established,
unjustified enrichment law has one hand tied behind its back as it is restricted to viewing
matters exclusively from the recipient's perspective.
I will argue that the law of unjustified enrichment is in many cases insufficiently
sensitive to the principles of recovery underpinning the claims under review. This is for
two reasons. First, unjustified enrichment is tied to imposing liability according to a
single principle, namely that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at another's
expense. Secondly, where liability ought to rest on other principles, the unjustified
enrichment doctrines that buttress the general principle are often too blunt or narrow to
take these other principles into account. It will be argued that in the majority of cases
contract law is, or can be adapted to be, more sensitive to these principles of recovery
than the law of unjustified enrichment. This is because contract law is constituted by a
broader and more complex set of principles than the law of unjustified enrichment.
Furthermore, even where liability does rest on the principle that no one should be
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unjustifiably enriched at another's expense, this can often be accommodated by contract
law. Accordingly, where a legal system has a choice between a contractual solution and
an unjustified enrichment solution, contract law will often enable a more just solution
than the law of unjustified enrichment.
1.4 Scope of the Comparative Study
As Scots law and South African law are mixed legal systems, their common
heritage suggests that comparative analysis may be fruitful. In this section I will defend
the appropriateness of comparative analysis and outline the reasons that ought to guide
us when selecting which legal systems to include in the comparative study.
In defence of the importance of comparative analysis, the comparative scholar
will undoubtedly have a broader range of solutions from which draw. This reason
provides an unlimited justification for selecting any other legal system as a point of
comparison. However, there are more subtle reasons which explain why some legal
systems are likely to offer more fruitful comparison than others. The first reason is that
two legal systems are found to be similar in style, content and structure. This feature is
likely to increase the probability of a solution in one legal system being amenable to the
other. This justifies comparing South African and Scots law. Both are uncodified mixed
legal systems.3 This means that they have both been substantially influenced, albeit in
3 For the characterisation of South African law as a mixed legal system see Zimmermann and Visser,
'Introduction: South African Law as a Mixed Legal System' in Zimmermann and Visser (eds), Southern
Cross: CivilCaw and Common Caw in South Africa (1996), 1 at 10-12. For the same point about Scots law see
Reid and Zimmermann, 'The Development of Legal Doctrine in a Mixed Legal System' in Reid and
Zimmermann (eds), A History ofPrivate Caw in Scotland (2000), 1 at 6.
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varying degrees, by the civil law and common law legal traditions.4 As a result, they have
developed similar styles and have much in common, particularly in the law of
obligations.
A second reason focuses on the historical development of an area of law or a
particular legal doctrine. This reason suggests including in the comparative analysis
those legal systems which have had a major influence on a particular area of law or legal
doctrine. For example, recent historical analysis of breach of contract in South African
and Scots law has shown that the influence of English law and German law has
predominated.5 This justifies comparing both South African law and Scots law with
English law and German law.
The comparative analysis in this thesis is not intended to be systematic or
comprehensive. Rather, the comparative position will only be considered in those
instances where it is deemed particularly relevant. The focus throughout will be on a
detailed study of the South African and Scots law.
1.5 Terminology
As many legal terms and concepts have divergent meanings in different legal
systems, it is important in any comparative study to define certain key terms. Firstly,
Scots law and South African law use different terms to refer to the remedy used by the
aggrieved party to withdraw from a contract after breach. Scots law uses the term
4 Zimmermann and Visser, 'Introduction: South African Law as a Mixed Legal System' in Southern Cross:
CivilLaw and Common Law in South Africa (1996), 2. See also Evans-Jones, 'Receptions, Mixed Legal
Systems and the Myth of the Genius of Scots Private law' (1998) 114 L£)R 228.
5 Zimmermann and Visser (eds), Southern Cross: CivilLaw and Common Laiv in South Africa (1996); lteid and
Zimmermann (eds),A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000); and Zimmermann, Visser and Reid (eds),
Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and SouthAfrica (forthcoming,
2004).
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'rescission' whereas South African law labels its equivalent doctrine 'cancellation'.6
Scots law and South African law also use different terms to refer to the remedy
used by the aggrieved party to withdraw from a contract which is voidable by reason of
improperly obtained consent. South African law uses the term 'rescission' whereas Scots
law labels its equivalent doctrine 'reduction'.7 In order to avoid potential confusion, I
will use the term 'termination' to refer to the remedy used by the aggrieved party to
withdraw from a contract in both these species of contractual failure.
Contracts which fail as a result of supervening impossibility of
performance/frustration are brought to an end automatically by the operation of law.
Although no remedy is required to withdraw from contracts which fail as a result of
supervening impossibility, 'termination' will also be used to refer to the contractual
failure of these contracts.
The next potentially problematic term is 'restitution'. In South African law,
'restitution' denotes the reciprocal duty on both parties to restore performances received
prior to the termination of a contract for breach.8 In Scots law 'restitution' is the label
given to one of the specific enrichment remedies.9 Both these meanings would be
foreign to English common lawyers as 'restitution' is generally used in that jurisdiction
to describe the set of rules that constitute what civilian lawyers would regard as the law
of unjustified enrichment.10 I will use the term 'restitution' to refer to the duty to restore
6 For South African law see Van der Merwe et al., Contract: GeneralPrinciples (2003), 369. For Scots law see
McBryde, The Taw ofContract in Scotland (2001), paras 20-04 and 20-05.
7 For South African law see Van der Merwe et al., Contract: GeneralPrinciples (2003), 121. In South African
law, 'cancellation' is sometimes used instead of 'rescission' in improperly obtained consent cases. See
Davidson v Bonafede 1981 (2) SA 501 (C) at 505. For Scots law see McBryde, The Taw ofContract in Scotland
(2001), paras 14-63 and 20-05.
8 Van der Merwe et al., Contract: General Principles (2003), 373-4.
9 Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725. See also Evans-Jones and Hellwege, 'Some Observations on the
Taxonomy of Unjustified Enrichment in Scots law' (1998) 1 Edin LR 180 at 181.
10 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 1 and 5-7. See also Smith, 'The Province of the Law of
Restitution' (1992) 71 Canadian Bar Review 672. Cf Birks 'Misnomer' in Restitution: Past, Present and Future
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a contractual performance (or its value) received prior to termination in all three species
of contractual failure under review.
1.6 Material Included in the Thesis
The law is stated as at 31 December 2003. Although the same cut off date also
applies to literature in print, I have included certain articles which happened to cross my
path.
(1998), 1-2 and Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), chapter 1 where he argues that English law ought to
abandon this usage of the term 'restitution' in favour of the term 'unjust enrichment'.
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Chapter 2
The Effect of Termination for Breach on the Contractual
Nexus between the Parties
2.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to clarify the effect of termination for breach on the
contractual nexus between the parties. The key question is whether termination for
breach operates retrospectively only; retrospectively as well as prospectively;
prospectively only; or sometimes retrospectively only, sometimes retrospectively as well
prospectively and sometimes prospectively only? I will argue that there is no magic in
these formulations. They are merely legal constructs which attempt to encapsulate the
disparate doctrines that make up the overall effect of termination for breach. The real
substantive work is done by the doctrines themselves. It is thus critical that a legal
system clearly articulates these doctrines and the relationships between them.
That said, the courts and commentators frequently refer to these general
formulations to describe the overall effect of termination on the contractual nexus
between the parties. If these terms are going to be used, we should use them precisely.
This will make it possible to answer the question posed above.
After a detailed consideration of the South African and Scots law, the positions
in English law; German law; the Principles ofEuropean Contract Eaw (hereafter PECL); and
the Principles ofInternational Commercial Contracts (hereafter PICC) will be considered for
comparative purposes.
' It will be assumed in all chapters dealing with breach that the breach is material and that the contract has
been validly terminated for this breach.
11
2.2 South African Law
South African law has not answered the question relating to the effect of
termination for breach on the contractual nexus. The academic writers appear
somewhat divided on this issue. Some writers are of the view that termination for
breach operates prospectively only in all cases whilst other writers are of the view that
termination sometimes operates prospectively only and sometimes retrospectively as
well as prospectively.2
In order to give a proper account of the South African law, it is necessary to
consider the key features that have shaped legal thinking about the effect of termination
for breach on the contractual nexus between the parties.
2.2.1 Roman Law and Roman-Dutch Law: No Generalised Right to
Terminate for Breach
Recent historical studies have pointed out that Roman-Dutch law, following
Roman law, did not contain a generalised right to terminate a contract for any material
breach.3 Instead, Roman-Dutch law, like Roman law, followed a fragmented approach
in terms of which the aggrieved party could only terminate a contract for breach if there
2 For the view that termination operates prospectively only see Christie, The Taw ofContract in South Africa
(2001), 625. For the view that termination operates retrospectively as well as prospectively see Hutchison
et al., Wille's Principles ofSouthAfrican Taw (1991), 521-2; De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreek/ikheid in die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg (1987), 286 and Van der Merwe et al., Contract: General Principles (2003), 376-82.
3 Harker, 'The Nature and Scope of Rescission' (1980) A] 61 at 67 and Cockrell, 'Breach of Contract' in
Zimmermann and Visser (eds), Southern Cross-. CivilTaw and Common Taw in SouthAfrica (1996), 303 at 320.
This was one manifestation of the fact that neither Roman law nor Roman-Dutch law had a general
theory of contract in the modern law sense. See also Zimmermann, Roman Taw, Contemporary Taw and
European law: The Civilian Tradition Today (2000), 141 where it is pointed out that nineteenth century
German ius commune also lacked a generalised right to terminate a contract for breach.
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was a specific rule granting him the right to do so.4
Two of these rules are integral to our understanding of the effect that
terminadon had on the contractual nexus between the parties in Roman-Dutch law.
First, termination was permitted where there was an express lex commissoria. A lex
commissoria is a contractual clause expressly allowing the aggrieved party to terminate a
contract for specified breaches. In a chapter devoted to the lex commissoria Voet says that
'... if the seller makes it clear that he wishes to employ the benefit of this
agreement [i.e exercise his right to terminate the contract pursuant to the lex
commissoria], the contract is ipso iure dissolved, and the property goes back to the
seller with fruits and accruals, since nothing ought to be left in a man's hands ...
in respect of which he has broken faith.'5
Furthermore, in another paragraph Voet says the termination of a contract
under a lex commissoria has the same basic effect as the fulfilment of a resolutive
condition: the retrospective termination of contractual obligations ab initio.6
The second instance where the aggrieved party could terminate a contract for
breach was where the subject matter of a contract of sale contained a latent defect. In
these cases, the aggrieved party was permitted to terminate the contract with the actio
redhibitoria. When such contracts were set aside, both parties were under an obligation to
restore any performance received prior to termination. This duty to restore was said to
be aimed at returning the both parties 'to the same position as if the contract had not
been concluded.'7
4 Cockrell, 'Breach of Contract' in Southern Cross-. CivilCaw and Common Caw in SouthAfrica (1996), 320.
5 Voet, Commentarius adPandectas, 18.3.2.
6 See Voet, Commentarius ad Pandectas, 18.3.1 where it is said that the happening of the condition specified
in the lex commissoria had the effect of the 'sale being dissolved'. In articulating the effects of termination
under a lex commisoria Voet had in mind the non-payment of the purchase price by the purchaser.
7 Zimmermann, The Caw ofObligations (1990), 317. See also D 21.1.23.1; Mulligan, 'Incompatibility of
Damages and Rescission' (1950) 67 SACJ 43; and De Vos, Venykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 286.
The actio empti was also used in Roman law to effect the termination of a contract and the reciprocal
restoration of contractual performances. The texts dealing with this remedy do not shed much light on
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From these rules, two conclusions can be drawn about the effect of termination
for breach on the contractual nexus between the parties in Roman-Dutch law (and by
implication, Roman law). First, neither Roman law nor Roman-Dutch law had a
coherent theory explaining the effect of termination for breach. This is unsurprising as
Roman-Dutch jurists were hardly likely to think in abstract terms about the effects of
termination for breach in the absence of a generalised right to terminate a contract for
breach.
Secondly, when termination for breach was permitted, Roman-Dutch jurists
regarded this as having retrospective effect in the sense that the contract was treated as
if it never came into existence. As a result, termination completely extinguished the
contractual nexus between the parties.
2.2.2 Modern Law
Since the turn of the century, five factors have shaped legal thinking on the
effect of termination for breach in modern South African law: (i) the development of a
generalised right to terminate a contract for material breach beyond the specific
instances recognised in Roman law and Roman-Dutch law; (ii) the development of the
rule requiring both contracting parties to restore performances received prior to
termination for breach; (iii) the development of the accrued rights doctrine; (iv) the use
of the interesse theory to calculate contractual damages; and (v) the use of the distinction
between primary and secondary obligations to explain contractual damages.
the effect of termination for breach on the contractual nexus between the parties. See Bodenstein, 'A Few
Aspects of the Actio Empti and the Aedilition Actions' (1914) 31 SAL.J 18, 152, 276 and 393 and (1915)
32 SALJ 34.
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(i) Development of a General Right to Terminate a Contract for Breach
The South African courts, under the influence of English law and Pothier,
developed a generalised right to terminate a contract for any material breach.8 This
paved the way for jurists to begin thinking in a more abstract and conceptual way not
only about the specific consequences of termination for breach but also about the effect
of termination for breach on the contractual nexus between the parties.
(ii) Restitution
One doctrine that received specific recognition in the wake of the above
development was the duty to restore any benefit received prior to termination. As
Cockrell has pointed out, the duty to restore
'... has been developed with reference to the Roman-Dutch learning on the
consequences which attached to cancellation in three analogous contexts: on the
basis of an express lex commissoria\ on the basis of the actio redhibitoria\ and restitutio
in integrum ... '9
Restitutio in integrum is the remedy used to recover benefits conferred prior to the
termination of a voidable contract. It is settled law that when such voidable contracts
are terminated, they are treated as if they never came into existence. Accordingly,
termination operates retrospectively when restitutio in integrum is applicable.
8 For judicial statements recognising this generalised right see Stewart Wrightson (Pty) Ltd v Thorpe 1977 (2)
SA 943 (A) at 953; Goldberg v Buytendag Boerdey Beleggings (Edms) Bpk 1980 (4) SA 775 (A) at 791 and Spies v
Lombard 1950 (3) SA 469 (A) at 487. Regarding the influence of English law and Pothier see Cockrell,
'Breach of Contract' in Southern Cross-. Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996), 320; Harker, (1980)
AJ 69-70 and Zimmermann, Toman Law, Contemporary Law andEuropean law (2000), 141-3.
9 Cockrell, 'Breach of Contract' in Southern Cross-. Civil Law and Common Law in South Africa (1996), 323.
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As the same was historically true when a lex commissoria and the actio rhedibitoria
were used to terminate a contract, restitution in South African law developed with
reference to three doctrines which pointed towards termination operating
retrospectively. This meant that termination extinguished the contractual nexus between
the parties in the sense that it was treated as if it never came into existence. It will be
demonstrated in subsequent sections that this is not the only possible interpretation of
the retrospective effect of termination for breach. Whatever meaning is attributed to the
retrospective effect of termination, it is implicit in these cases that termination also
operates prospectively in the sense that all unperformed obligations are also
extinguished.
(iii) Accrued Rights
The doctrine of accrued rights determines which rights to contractual
performances survive termination for breach. It is now settled law that a right to a
contractual performance survives termination for breach if it is, immediately prior to
termination, 'accrued, due and enforceable as well as independent of the executor)' part
of the contract.'10 The following example illustrates the operation of this rule.
Assume that A lets a flat to B on 1 January for one year. B is to pay a deposit of
R2000 immediately and a monthly rental of R1000 on the last day of each month. At the
end ofApril B justifiably terminates the contract for A's breach, vacates the premises and
demands the return of his deposit and the rent paid for the first three months. A refuses to
repay the rent received and contends that despite the termination, B owes him the rent for
10 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 515 and
Shelagatha Property Investments CC v KeUywood Homes (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 187 (A).
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April. For reasons which will be explained in chapter three, A's right to claim rent for April
survives termination. Furthermore, A does not have to return the rent received. In this case
the contractual nexus remains intact after termination for breach in so far as this nexus is
represented by the obligations whose correlative rights (i) fall under the doctrine of accrued
rights and/or (ii) would have fallen under the doctrine of accrued rights but for the fact
that these obligations have been validly discharged by performance. The contractual nexus
not represented by either (i) or (ii) is severed by termination.11 This is what is meant by the
prospective effect of termination. Termination for breach operates prospectively only if all
rights to contractual performances whose correlative obligations have been discharged
by performance fall under (ii) and if all rights to contractual performances due and
enforceable fall under (i). Both these conditions are met in the above example.12
Interestingly, Holmes JA in Crest Enterprises (Pty) Etd v Ryckloft Beleggings (Edms) Bpk13
justified introducing the accrued rights doctrine into South African law on the basis that it
accorded with the principles of English law. As we shall see in section 2.4.2, termination
for breach in English law is regarded as operating prospectively in all cases. Given that
termination also appears to operate prospectively in cases involving accrued rights, this
explains the reference to English law.
This had led one South African author to conclude that termination for breach
does not operate retrospectively.14 This view has rightly been criticised on the basis that it
overlooks cases involving restitution where termination operates retrospectively as well
11 This refers only to the contractual nexus represented by the primary performance obligations. See
section 2.2.2(iv)(c).
12 These descriptions clearly depend on a deeper understanding of accrued rights and if they appear
elliptical, this will be rectified in the following chapter when the accrued rights doctrine is explained.
13 1972 (2) SA 863 (A).
14 Christie, The Taw ofContract in South Africa (2001), 625.
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as prospectively.15
The analysis in this section and the previous section establishes that termination for
breach sometimes operates retrospectively as well as prospectively and sometimes
prospectively only. The doctrines that regulate the consequences of termination for breach
must, amongst other things, be capable of defining the dividing line between these two
types of cases.
(iv) Damages: The Differenztheorie and the Effect of Termination on the
Contractual Nexus between the Parties
Two questions encountered in the South African law of damages have had a
material impact on legal thinking about the effect of termination on the contractual
nexus: first, can the aggrieved party claim damages based exclusively on his negative
interesse and secondly, what is the theoretical justification for claiming damages according
to the aggrieved party's positive interesse?
(a) Basic Structure of Damages in South African Law
The general principle underlying damages claims in South African law is that the
aggrieved party is entitled to a financial award that will place him, as far as possible, in
the position he would have occupied had there been no breach of contract (i.e. had the
contract been properly performed). This requires a comparison between (i) the
aggrieved party's actual financial position now that the damage causing event (the
15 De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 286 and 158; Hutchison et at, Wille's Principles (1991), 522 and
Harker, The Nature and Scope ofRescission as a Remedyfor Breach ofContract (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis,
University of Natal, 1981), 473.
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breach of contract) has occurred and (ii) the hypothetical position the aggrieved party
would have occupied had the damage causing event not occurred (i.e had contract been
properly performed). The quantum of damages is the difference between these two
positions.16 This is essentially the Differen^theorie of German law.17
The terms 'positive interesse' and 'negative interesse' are used in South African law
to articulate this general principle. The precise relationship between these two terms and
the general principle has caused considerable collateral damage to legal thinking about
the effect of termination for breach on the contractual nexus between the parties.
(b) Pitfalls of Negative Interesse Damages
Nienaber J's analysis in Probert v Baket*8 will be used to illustrate the above claim.
According to Nienaber J, positive and negative interesse damages are different in two
respects. First, they have different aims. Positive interesse damages are said to be forward
looking and are calculated by comparing the aggrieved party's actual financial position
now that the breach has occurred with the hypothetical financial position that he would
have been in presently had the contract been fulfilled. By way of contrast, negative
interesse damages are said to be backward looking and aim, '.. .to place the injured party
(as well as the party in default), so far as it is feasible to do so, in the position in which
he would have been had no contract been made.'19 It was held the aggrieved party has
an election whether to claim damages according to the positive or negative interesse
16 Lubbe, 'The Assessment of Loss upon Cancellation for Breach of Contract' (1984) 101 SALJ 616 at
619.
17 Hutchison, 'Back to Basics: Reliance Damages for Breach of Contract Revisited' (2004) 121 SALJ 51 at
52-3.
18 1983 (3) SA 229 (D). The facts are unimportant for present purposes.
19 Probert v Baker 1983 (3) SA 229 (D) at 234. See also Harker, 'Damages for Breach of Contract: Negative
or Positive Interesse' (1994) 111 SALJ 5 at 7.
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measure.
Secondly, Nienaber J held that positive and negative interesse damages are
intrinsically connected to different types of losses. Positive interesse damages are said to
consist of lost profits whereas negative interesse damages are said to consist of 'out of
pocket expenses.'20
If this picture stands up to scrutiny, then termination for breach coupled with a
negative interesse damages claim will lead to treating the contract as if it never came into
existence. In my view, this does not hold. The following example illustrates the point.
Assume that A and B enter into a contract whereby A agrees to build a yacht for B
according to B's particular design specifications. The purchase price of R5,000 is
payable on delivery of the completed yacht. Before the yacht is complete, B repudiates
the contract. A terminates for this breach. When the contract was terminated, A had
spent R1,000 making preparations to build B's yacht. Assume that A can establish that
he would at least have broken even on the contract. Ifwe compare A's financial
position now that the breach has occurred with the hypothetical position he would have
been in presently had there been no breach, then it becomes clear that he is entitled to
claim R1,000 from B. This establishes that the recovery of wasted expenses can be
accommodated within the definition of positive interesse damages. However, what of the
fact that A's claim can equally be accommodated within the definition of negative
interesse damages? On close inspection, it turns out that this is only a matter of factual
coincidence.21 This is because the two measures happen to yield the same result in all
20 Probert v Baker 1983 (3) SA 229 (D) at 234. For a similar association see Rangers v Wykerd 1977 (2) SA
976 (A) at 991; 986 and 989 and Davidson v Bonafede 1981 (2) SA 501 (C) at 505.
21 From a theoretical point of view, this coincidence does not detract from the point that such damages
are nothing more than an application of the positive interesse principle. For judicial recognition of this
point see Farlam J in Mainline Carriers (P/yj Ltd v]aad Investments CC1998 (2) SA 468 (C) at 483 citing
Commonwealth vAmann Aviation (Ptyj Ltd (1991) 104 ALR 1 (HC) at 130-1.
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cases where the aggrieved party would have broken even had the contract run its course.
However, in all cases where the aggrieved party would have made a loss on the contract,
the negative interesse measure will yield a higher sum than the positive interesse measure.22
Accordingly, from the twin facts that the principle underlying damages claims in South
African law is identical to the definition of positive interesse damages and that the
definitions of positive and negative interesse damages are not identical (and as a result,
can lead to different outcomes) it follows that the negative interesse measure of damages
(as defined above) is incompatible with the established principle underlying damages
claims in South African law.23 This leads to the conclusion that unless the principle
underlying contractual damages is changed, negative interesse damages ought to be
expunged from South African law.24 If this is true, then it follows that it is conceptually
flawed to see termination for breach coupled with a damages claim as winding the clock
back so as to restore the aggrieved party to his pre-contractual position.
One final point about Nienaber J's judgment is noteworthy. Despite the fact
that Nienaber J clearly regards termination for breach as operating retrospectively when
damages are awarded according to the negative interesse measure, it is surprising that he
also states that 'cancellation for breach, unlike rescission for misrepresentation and the
like, operates ex nunc and not ex tunc.,2S These statements are irreconcilable. Nienaber J
22 The extent of the difference between the two measures depends on the extent of the difference
between the quantum of wasted expenses and the quantum of the overall loss that the aggrieved party
would have suffered had the contract been completed.
23 Of course it would be possible to adopt a rule which favours the negative interesse measure, but this is
not the South African law.
24 After spending much of his judgment stating that reliance losses are actually part of the aggrieved
party's positive interesse, it seems inconsistent to retain, as Farlam J does, the traditional (but mistaken)
association of reliance losses and negative interesse damages. See Mainline Carriers (Pty) Ltd vJaad Investments
CC 1998 (2) SA 468 (C) at 486. See also Hamer v WaltlWi (1) SA 235 (T); Tweedie v Park TravelAgency
(Pty) Ltd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W); Masters v Thain t/a Inhaca Safaris 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) at 473;
Lubbe, (1984) 101 SAL] 622; Harker, (1994) 111 SAL] 7; and Reinecke and O' Brien, 'Mora Debitoris en
Negative Interesse' (1998) 3 TSAR 587. For an excellent note clarifying these issues see Hutchison, 'Back
to Basics: Reliance Damages for Breach of Contract Revisited' (2004) 121 SAL] 51.
25 Probert v Baker 1983 (3) SA 229 (D) at 235.
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was probably anxious to avoid the following doctrinal difficulty. If termination
retrospectively extinguishes the contractual nexus in the sense that it is treated as if it
never came into existence, then this makes it difficult to find a doctrinal justification for
awarding damages according to the positive interesse measure which, by definition, looks
to the aggrieved party's future fulfilment position. The solution suggested by Nienaber J
is unsatisfactory because it is inconsistent with the fact, established in section 2.2.2(ii),
that termination for breach operates retrospectively in cases when the right to
restitution arises.
This leads naturally to the next question: how have questions concerning the
doctrinal justification for claiming contractual damages in South African law impacted
on legal thinking about the effect of termination for breach on contractual nexus
between the parties?
(c) Doctrinal Justification for Damages
Theorists in South African law first thought that it was logically inconsistent to
combine the termination of a contract (coupled with the duty to restore performances
received) with a claim for contractual damages. This view rested on two assumptions:
first, that termination retrospectively extinguished the contractual nexus between the
parties in the sense that the contract was treated as if it never came into existence and
secondly, that a claim for contractual damages sought to enforce the contract and hence
presupposed its valid existence.26 The logical difficulty of combining these two claims
arose because of the obvious incompatibility between the two assumptions.
26 See Mulligan, (1950) 67 SAL.J 39; Hahlo and Kahn, The Union ofSouth Africa-The Development ofits Laws
and Constitution (1960), 499; and Kahn, Contract andMercantile Taw Through the Cases (1971), 299. This
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Today, it is unanimously accepted that the aggrieved party in South African law
can terminate a contract for breach, claim restitution of benefits already conferred and if
he is still financially worse off as a result of the breach, claim damages to compensate
him for his loss.27 One explanation of this approach is based on the transformation
theory. According to this theory, termination for breach extinguishes only the parties'
primary obligations to perform and replaces these with secondary obligations to restore
performances received and to pay damages in appropriate cases.28 The idea is that
termination does not extinguish the contractual nexus but merely transforms its content.
The transformation theory is clearly incompatible with both assumptions underlying the
old approach. If this is true, the retrospective effect of terminating a contract for breach
must mean something other than treating a contract as if it never came into existence.
According to the transformation theory, the retrospective effect of termination means
that only the parties' primary performance obligations are treated as if they never came
into existence. The contractual nexus thus continues to exist but is now represented by
secondary obligations to restore performances received and to pay damages.
Does the transformation stand up to scrutiny? Although there appears to be no
Roman-Dutch authority for the distinction between primary and secondary obligations,
it has recently been endorsed by two Appellate Division cases and accordingly,
represents the current law.29
position is not defended in the 1988 edition of the latter work. For a discussion of these views see Harker,
(1994) 111 SALJ1.
27 See for example, Hutchison et al., Wil/e's Principles (1991), 521-2. See also Treitel, Remediesfor Breach of
Contract (1988), 383 where it is said that it should not be assumed that the aggrieved party's liability for
damages is extinguished merely because termination operates retrospectively. For a general discussion on
combining termination and damages see Treitel, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (1988), 392-6.
28 Lubbe, (1984) 101 SAT] 637. See also Harker, The Nature and Scope ofRescission as a RemedjforBreach of
Contract (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University ofNatal, 1981), 477.
29 Cockrell, 'Breach of Contract' in Southern Cross-. CivilTaw and Common Taw in SouthAfrica (1996), 324.
The two cases are Attridgeville Town Council andAnother v Uvanos 1/a Tivanos Bothers Electrical 1992 (1) SA
296 (A) at 304 and Commissionerfor Inland Revenue v Collins 1992 (3) SA 698 (A) at 711. See also TTA
Construction vMinister ofPublic Works 1992 (1) 837 (C) at 850. For the use of this distinction in English law
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Although a number of South African academic writers support the
transformation theory, only Gerhard Lubbe and his chief critic, Sally Hutton, explore
the theory in any depth.30 According to Lubbe, the fact that South African law awards
damages according to the 'positive interesse' measure 'serves as a strong indication that
the contractual nexus and the interests generated by it survive cancellation.'31 In his
view, termination 'complemented where necessary by an award of damages, is to be
seen as an alternative method of achieving the economic results contemplated by the
contract ...'32 Lubbe's essential point is that the continuation of the contractual nexus
between the parties provides the theoretical justification for referring to the terms of the
contract when awarding damages after termination for breach.
This explanation of the transformation theory has been attacked by Hutton on
two grounds. First, she argues that
'... the positive interesse measure is not the only possible way of assessing the
loss resulting from a breach of contract: a legal system could just as easily
choose to award damages on the basis of negative interesse.'33
The analysis in section 2.2.2(iv)(b) established that the distinction between positive and
see C Csprnikow Ltd v Koufos, The Heron II [1966] 2 QB 695 at 731; Ward (RH) v Bignall 1967 1 QB 534 at
534; Moschi vHEPAir Services 1973 AC 331 and Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827.
For the possible origins of the distinction see Dickson, 'The Contribution of Lord Diplock to the General
Law of Contract' (1989) 9 OJLS 441 at 448-51 and Rudden, 'Correspondence' (1990) 10 OJLS 288.
30 For other authors who support this theory see De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreek/ikheid (1987), 158; Hutchison
et al., Wtile's Principles (1991), 522; Christie, 'Contract' in The Law ofSouth Africa (vol. 5, first reissue, part 1,
1994), para. 255 and Lasky, 'Terugtrede Weens Kontrakbreuk-is dit Slegs 'n Halwe Tree Terug' Responsa
Meridiana (1980) 73 at 76. These authors do little more than state that termination only extinguishes the
primary obligations under the contract and replaces these primary obligations with secondary obligations
to restore performances received and to pay damages in appropriate cases. Little by way of theoretical
justification is provided to support this claim.
31 Lubbe, (1984) 101 SAL] 637. See also Lambiris, 'Restitutio in Integrum on Grounds of Breach of
Contract' (1989) 106 SAL] 457 and Harker, (1994) 111 SAL] 10.
32 Lubbe, (1984) 101 SAL] 636. See also Lubbe and Murray, Tarlam and Hathaway-Contract: Cases, Materials
and Commentary (1988), 593 n4.
33 Hutton, 'Restitution after Breach of Contract: Rethinking the Conventional Jurisprudence' (1997) A]
201 at 220. See also Van der Merwe et al., Contract: GeneralPrinciples (2003), 377.
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negative interesse damages collapses into a choice between a rule which takes account of
the aggrieved party's fulfilment position and a rule which is designed to restore the
aggrieved party to the position he would have occupied prior to the conclusion of the
contract. In this light, Hutton's point reduces to the claim that if a legal system awards
damages in order to return the aggrieved party to the position he would have occupied
prior to the conclusion of the contract, then the measure of damages does not support
the transformation theory. Although Hutton is undoubtedly correct, this is irrelevant as
a counter to the argument that the transformation theory is supported by the fact that
South African law does look to the fulfilment position of the aggrieved party when
calculating contractual damages.
Hutton's second criticism is that 'contractual damages do not enforce the
contract but compensate a loss: the only real enforcement remedy in this context is
specific performance.'34 Although an award of damages will frequently result in the
economic equivalent of specific performance, this is merely a factual coincidence.35
From a conceptual point of view, Hutton's criticism of this justification of the
transformation theory is valid. This is not, however, significant as the transformation
theory is sufficiently supported by view that the continuation of the contractual nexus
explains referring to the terms of the contract when awarding contractual damages in
South African law.
As an alternative theoretical explanation, Hutton suggests that the duty to pay
damages is imposed ex lege.36 Hutton provides little clarification of the theoretical
34 Hutton, (1997)H/220.
35 This will not be the case where the aggrieved party terminates a losing bargain for the contract breaker's
(somewhat fortuitous) breach.
36 This argument is directly connected to Hutton's claim that the duty to restore performances after
termination for breach is best seen as resting on the principles of unjustified enrichment rather than on
the principles of contract. As such, she is understandably set against a theory which suggests that the law
of contract ought to regulate the consequences of termination for breach. For a complete analysis of this
argument see section 4.4.2(v).
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consequences of this view. It would appear to follow that if the right to claim damages
according to the aggrieved party's posidve interesse is simply imposed as a matter of law,
then it is not strictly necessary for the contractual nexus to survive termination for
breach. This is less attractive than the transformation theory as the latter provides a
clearer theoretical explanation for referring to the terms of the contract when awarding
damages for breach.
2.2.3 The Effect of Termination for Breach: A Set of Rules
South African law does not have a coherent theory explaining the disparate
doctrines that make up the effect of termination for breach. Analysis demonstrated that
in respect of the effect on the contractual nexus, these disparate doctrines pull in
different directions. This has led to divergent academic views about the effect of
termination for breach on the contractual nexus. As the substantive work is done by the
doctrines themselves, the lack of a coherent theory describing their cumulative effect
has not caused problems in South African law.37
What is essential is that these doctrines and the relationships between them are
clearly articulated. The following six rules, supplemented by one definition, perform this
task.
Rule One
A.nyperformance obligation which is unpeformed at the time of terminationfor breach is
extinguished by termination if the right which is correlative to this unpeformed obligation
does notfall within the doctrine ofaccrued rights.
37 For the deficiencies of using abstract generalisations describing the overall effect of contractual failure
to justify substantive legal rules see Hellwege, 'Unwinding Mutual Contracts: 'Restitutio in Integrum v. The
Defence ofChange ofPosition' in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in
Comparative Perspective (2002), 243 at 263-5.
26
Rule Two [the corollary of rule one]
Anyperformance obligation which is unperformed at the time of terminationfor breach
survives terminationfor breach if the right which is correlative to this unpeformed
obligationfalls within the doctrine ofaccrued rights.
Rule Three
A contractingparty (X) has a duty to restore to the other contractingparty (Y) any
contractualpeformance (or its value) receivedprior to terminationfor breach unless Y's
right to demand the exact reciprocalpeformancefrom X would havefallen under the
doctrine ofaccrued rights butfor thefact that X has alreadyfulfilled the obligation that is
correlative to Y's right.
Rule Four
A contractingparty (X) also has a duty to restore to the other contractingparty (Y) any
contractualpeformance (or its value) receivedprior to terminationfor breach unless Y's
right to demand the exact reciprocalpeformancefromX survives terminationfor breach
because itfalls within the doctrine ofaccrued rights
Rule Five
All clauses designed to have effect after terminationfor breach are enforceable after
terminationfor breach subject to the restrictions relating topublicpolity and liquidate
damages clauses.
Rule Six
Ifthe aggrievedparty has suffered a loss as a result ofa breach ofcontract, he is entitled to
an award ofcontractual damages to place him in theposition he would have occupied
presently had there been no breach.
Definition of an Accrued Right
An accrued right is a right to a contractualpeformance that survives terminationfor
breach. [See chapter three for a comprehensive analysis of when this occurs].
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The following table depicts the first four rules:
UNACCRUED ACCRUED
UNPERFORMED Rule 1 Rule 2
PERFORMED Rule 3 Rule 4
It remains to clarify the overall effect of termination on the contractual nexus
between the parties. It was stated in the introduction that in order to work out this
effect, the key question is whether termination for breach operates retrospectively only;
retrospectively as well as prospectively; prospectively only; or sometimes retrospectively
only, sometimes retrospectively as well as prospectively and sometimes prospectively
only? The following analysis will demonstrate that it is the latter. In other words,
termination for breach has three distinct types of effect.
It is important to bear in mind that the retrospective and prospective effect of
termination carry the meanings established above. The three types of effect of
termination are as follows. First, there are cases where termination operates
retrospectively only. This will occur when the requirements of rule three are met without
the requirements of rule one or rule two being met. For example, assume that A sells a
car to B for RIO, 000. After B has paid the purchase price in full, he discovers a defect in
the car and terminates the contract. As there are no unperformed performance
obligations, rule one and rule two are excluded. As a result of termination for breach
operating retrospectively only, rule three dictates that both A and B are obliged to return
to each other the purchase price and the car respectively. In addition, A will be obliged
to pay contractual damages to B if the requirement of rule five is met.
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Secondly, termination can simultaneously operate prospectively and
retrospectively. This will occur in cases where the requirements of rule three and rule
one are met simultaneously. Assume that the facts are identical to the above example
except that instead ofmaking payment for the car in full, it was agreed that B would
make payment by monthly instalments. Assume that these instalments were payable on
the last day of every month and that termination took place on the last day of the third
month. In this case, rule three dictates that A must return all three instalments to B and
that B must return the car to A. The requirements of rule three are met because A's
rights to B's first three instalments would not have fallen under the accrued rights
doctrine if these payment obligations remained unperformed. Whereas rule one is
excluded in cases where termination for breach operates retrospectively only, rule one in
this case dictates that B's obligation to pay the remaining seven instalments is
extinguished by termination. As a result of the combination of rules one, three and four
termination operates both retrospectively and prospectively. In these cases, termination
completely severs the contractual nexus in so far as this nexus is represented by the
unperformed obligations that do not fall under the accrued rights doctrine or would not
have fallen under the doctrine but for the fact that such obligations have been
performed.
Thirdly, termination can sometimes operate prospectively only. This will occur in
cases where the requirements of rule one and/or the requirements of rule two are met
without the requirements of rule three or rule four being met. For example, assume that
A lets a flat out to B for one year and that B is obliged to pay rent on the last day of each
month. Assume also that A commits a breach on the last day of the fourth month and as
a result, B terminates the contract. In this case, rule one dictates that B is released from
the eight remaining payments obligations. If B has not yet paid rent for the fourth
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month, rule two dictates that this payment obligation survives termination for breach. '8
This is because A's correlative right to B's payment obligation falls under the accrued
rights doctrine. As neither rule three or rule four applies on these facts, termination for
breach operates prospectively only.
2.3 Scots Law
The academic writers in Scotland are unanimous in stating that termination for
breach operates prospectively only.39 In order to give a proper account of the Scots law,
it is necessary to consider the key features that have shaped legal thinking about the
effect of termination on the contractual nexus between the parties.
2.3.1 Roman Law and the Institutional Writers
The Scottish institutional writers, like their Roman-Dutch counterparts, relied
heavily on Roman law for their legal theory. It was pointed out in section 2.2.1 that
Roman law was unhelpful in clarifying the effect of termination for breach on the
contractual nexus between the parties. Accordingly, it is unsurprising to find that the
institutional writers, much like their Roman-Dutch contemporaries, hardly mentioned
the right to terminate a contract for breach much less developed a coherent theory
articulating the general effect of termination for breach on the contractual nexus
between the parties.40 The Scottish institutional writers adopted a fragmented approach
38 The same holds true if B had not paid rent in any of the three preceding months.
39 See for example McBryde, The Taw ofContract in Scotland (2001), para. 20-109; MacQueen and Thomson,
Contract Taw in Scotland (2000), paras 5.24 and 5.46; Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract
(Discussion Paper No. 109, 1999), paras 4.38-42 and Gloag, The Taw ofContract (1929), 621-2.
40 Johnston, 'Breach of Contract' in Reid and Zimmermann (eds),v4 Histoty ofPrivate Taw in Scotland
(2000), 175 at 178 and 193.
30
to breach in terms of which termination was only permitted in a limited number of
narrowly defined circumstances.41 For example, termination was permitted where there
was a defect in the quality of the subject matter of the sale; an irritancy of a feu; or a lex
commissoria,42 Where mention is made of the effect of termination for breach, it appears
that the institutional writers regarded termination as having retrospective effect in the
same way that this was understood in Roman-Dutch law and in modern South African
law prior to the transformation theory. Thus Stair, speaking about the effects of
exercising an irritancy clause, says that the contract 'should be null and void, as if it had
never been made.'43
2.3.2 Modern Law
Since the late nineteenth century, four features have influenced Scottish legal
thinking about the effect of termination on the contractual nexus between the parties: (i)
the development of a generalised right to terminate a contract beyond the specific
instances recognised by the institutional writers; (ii) the question whether an arbitration
clause survives termination for breach; (iii) the lack of clarity surrounding accrued rights
and restitution; and (iv) the view in Scots law, largely influenced by English law, that
termination has prospective effect.
41 Johnston, 'Breach of Contract' in A Histoiy ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000), 182.
42 See for example Stair, Institutions ofthe haw ofScotland (1681), 14,5; Bankton, An Institute of the Laws of
Scotland (1751-3), 17,5 and 9,31-2; and Erskine, An Institute ofthe Law ofScotland (1871), 1,11.
43 Stair, Institutions ofthe Law ofScotland (1681), 14,5. See also Bankton, An Institiute ofthe Laws ofScotland
(1751-3) and Bell, Principles of the Law ofScotland (1899), s71.
31
(i) Development of a General Right to Terminate a Contract for Breach
The Scottish courts, like their South African counterparts, were responsible for
developing a generalised right to terminate a contract for breach beyond the
circumscribed instances recognised by the institutional writers. As was the case in South
African law, English law was the predominant influence.44 Turnbull v McLean45 marked
the turning point.46 There it was said that
'... where one party has refused or failed to perform his part of the contract in
any material respect the other is entitled either to insist for implement, claiming
damages for the breach, or to rescind [terminate] the contract altogether, except
in so far as it has been performed.'47
As Johnston has noted, the introduction of a generalised right to terminate a
contract for breach meant that Scots law made the same break with Roman law that had
occurred in other civilian systems.48 This development has not paved the way to
thinking in abstract terms about the effects of termination for breach to the same extent
as the parallel development in South African law.
44
This emerges from the fact that the Lord-Justice Clerk in Turnbull vMcLean (1874) 1 It 730 justified the
introduction of a rule allowing the aggrieved party to terminate a contract for breach on the basis that
Scots law and English law were essentially identical in this respect. It was pointed out in section 2.3.1 that
prior to Turnbull vMcLean, Scots law did not have a generalised right to terminate a contract for breach.
Accordingly, Scots law and English law were in fact at odds in this regard and this reinforces the view that
the development of this generalised right in Scots law was largely due to English law influence. See
Johnston, 'Breach of Contract' in A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000), 182-3. See also MacQueen,
'Scots Law and English Law: The Case of Contract' (2001) 54 CLP 205 at 220-1 and McBryde, 'Scots Law
of Breach of Contract: Mixed Legal Systems in Operation' (2002) 6 Edin LR 5 at 11.
45 (1874) 1 R 730.
46 Johnston, 'Breach of Contract' inA History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000), 182-3. See also McBryde,
The Law ofContract in Scotland (2001), para. 20-92 and MacQueen, (2001) 54 CLP 220 where he points out
that although Turnbull vMcLean was the key case in this development, there were forerunners pointing in
this direction since the 1850s.
47 (1874) 1 11 730 at 738. This was reinforced in Wade v Waldon 1909 SC 571 at 576.
48 Johnston, 'Breach of Contract' in A History ofPrivate Law in Scotland (2000), 194. See also McBryde,
(2002) 6 Edin LRll.
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(ii) Arbitration Clauses
Scots law has grappled with the effect of termination for breach on the
contractual nexus between the parties in the context of the question whether an
arbitration clause survives such termination. The line of cases begins with Municipal
Council ofJohannesburg v D Stewart & Co. (1902) where it was held that
'[i]t does not appear to me to be sound law to permit a person to repudiate a
contract and thereupon specifically to found upon a term in that contract which
he has thus repudiated.'49
Similarly, Lord MacKenzie in Hegarty <& Kelly v Cosmopolitan Insurance Corporation Ktd held
that when a contract is terminated, then the 'contract with all its clauses goes, and
amongst them the clause providing for a reference to arbiters.'50 It is clear that
termination for breach was viewed in these cases as operating retrospectively in the
sense that the contractual nexus was treated as if it never came into existence.
Subsequent cases have overturned these decisions and it is now settled law that
an arbitration clause will survive termination for breach if this is what the parties
intended.31
Although these subsequent cases did not consider the effect of termination for
breach on the contractual nexus between the parties, it is clear that they cannot be
reconciled with the view that termination for breach operates retrospectively in the
sense that this was understood by the earlier cases.
4!> 1909 SC (HL) 53 at 56.
50 1913 SC 377 at 384.
51 Alexander Stephen (Forth) Ltd v]] Riley (UK) Ltd 1976 SC 151 at 159 and Highland Leasing Ltd v Lyburn




Whereas the development of the generalised right to terminate a contract for
breach in South African law led directly to the specific recognition of the right to
restitution, the same is not true in Scots law. Although academic commentators have
recently stated that restitution is one of the necessary consequences of termination for
breach, this clarity, as will be demonstrated in chapters five and six, is not as clearly
reflected in the case law as it might be. Indeed, the Scottish Law Commission has
recently pointed out that a major difficulty in this area is 'that there are few, if any,
decisive authorities but a number of conflicting statements.'52
It was pointed out in section 2.2.2(ii) that South African law originally developed
the right to restitution with reference to the three doctrines (the Iex commissoria\ the actio
redhibitoria and restitutio in integrum) which pointed towards termination retrospectively
extinguishing the contractual nexus between the parties in the sense that this nexus was
treated as if it never came into existence. Subsequently, this understanding of the
retrospective effect of termination was modified by the transformation theory. As the
right to restitution has not undergone a similar historical development in Scots law,
neither the courts nor the commentators have realised that termination for breach
operates retrospectively in cases where the right to restitution arises. This is one possible
explanation why commentators view termination as having prospective effect only.53
52 Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 109, 1999), para. 4.36.
This claim is based primarily on the problems associated with Connelly v Simpson 1993 SC 391. This case is
discussed in detail in chapters 3 and 5.
53 Another explanation is that this protects the post termination applicability of arbitration, limitation and
exemption clauses. See Hellwege, 'Unwinding Mutual Contracts: Restitutio in Integrum v. The Defence of
Change ofPosition' in Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 263.
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(iv) Accrued Rights
Unlike South African law, accrued rights remain relatively unexplored by the
Scottish courts. The clearest judicial statement is found in Lloyds Bankpic v Bamberger
where the following principle from English law was cited with apparent approval:
'[ajlthough rescission [termination] absolves both pardes from future
performance of their primary obligations under the contract, they are not
absolved from primary obligations already due at the time of rescission. Thus
claims for debts or arrears ofmoney unconditionally due under the contract may
still be enforced. Examples are arrears of rent due under a lease, or instalments
of price due prior to rescission.'54
This dictum points clearly towards termination operating prospectively only. This
accords with the position in South African law in certain accrued rights cases.
This connection between South African and Scots law is unsurprising given the
twin facts that the accrued rights doctrine in both legal systems has developed with
reference to English law and that English law regards termination for breach as
operating prospectively only. This provides another explanation for the unanimous view
in Scots law that termination for breach operates prospectively only. Indeed, such was
the influence of English law that the Lord Justice-Clerk in Lloyds Bank pic v Bamberger
stated that Scots law and English law are indistinguishable in respect of the effect that
termination for breach has on the contractual nexus between the parties.55
(v) Damages and the Prospective Effect of Termination
The general principle underlying damages claims in Scots law is that the
54 1993 SC 570 at 573. See also Tumbull vMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 738 where it is stated that a contract is
rescinded "... except in so far as it has been performed.' For further analysis of both cases see respectively
sections 3.3.1 (iii) and (ii).
55 1993 SC 570 at 573.
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aggrieved party is entitled to a financial award that will place him in the position he
would have occupied had the contract been duly performed.56 Scots law does not adopt
an 'over-technical' approach to the assessment of loss following breach of contract in
the sense that there is no specific model for calculating damages.57
Two points about damages in Scots law are noteworthy. First, unlike South
African law, Scots law has recognised the conceptual and doctrinal incompatibility
between awarding damages based on the above general principle and awarding damages
designed to return the aggrieved party to his pre-contractual position. This is clear from
Damon Internationalpic v Coats Patonpic"8 where Lord Prosser explicitly rejected an
approach which allowed the aggrieved party an election between expectation interest
damages and reliance interest damages. Lord Prosser explained that damages were
designed to place the aggrieved party in the position it would have been in had the
contract been fulfilled and that if the aggrieved party had chosen to claim merely for
wasted expenditure, it had to show that this expenditure would have been recovered or,
put another way, that the contract was not a losing one.59 This has prevented Scots law
from entertaining the idea, mistakenly put forward in South African law, that awarding
reliance loss damages after termination for breach turns the clock backwards so as to
restore the aggrieved party to his pre-contractual position.
Secondly, the Scottish commentators have justified awarding contractual
damages according to the general principle on the basis that termination for breach does
not retrospectively extinguish the contract in the sense that it is rendered null and void
56 See for example Houldsivorth v Brand's Trs (1877) 4 R 369 at 374; Marshall& Co. vNicol & Son 1919 SLT
88 at 90; and Karlshamns Oliefabriker vMonarch Steamship Co. 1949 SC (HL) 1 at 18.
57 Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 109, 1999), para. 8.13.
58 1993 SLT 90 at 99-100.
59 The fact that there was no breach in this case means that Lord Prosser's statements regarding the
election between reliance loss damages and expectation interest damages are technically obiter. See also
McGregor, 'The Expectation, Reliance and Restitution Interest in Contractual Damages' (1996) JR 227 at
238-9.
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ab initio. In order to ensure that some form of the contractual nexus remains intact to
justify referring to the contractual terms when calculating damages claims, the
commentators have stated that termination operates prospectively only.60
2.3.3 Theoretical Lessons for Scots Law
In broad terms, the development of a general right to terminate a contract for
breach has not led Scots law to think in abstract terms about the effect of termination
for breach in the same way as the parallel development in South African law.
Although the view that termination operates prospectively only has not caused
Scots law any significant problems, it is less theoretically satisfactory than the view
describing the overall effect of termination for breach put forward in section 2.2.3. By
adopting this view, Scots law would be able to account for the disparate doctrines that
make up the effect of termination for breach.
2.4 Comparative Excursus
In line with the scope of this comparative study the position in German law;
English law; the PECL; and the PICC will now be considered.
2.4.1 German Law
Riicktritt is the term used to describe the termination of a contract for breach in
60 See for example McBryde, The Taw ofContract in Scotland (2001), para. 20-109 and MacQueen and
Thomson, Contract Taw in Scotland (2000), para. 5.45.
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German law. It also regulates the process of restitution following such termination.61
The doctrinal basis of Riicktritt originally caused considerable difficulty in German law.
It was first thought that Riicktritt had retrospective effect in the sense that when a
contract was terminated for breach, it was treated as if it never came into existence. It
follows logically from this that restitution ought to be an enrichment remedy. The
doctrinal problem was that there were some instances in German law where restitution
was not regulated by the law of unjustified enrichment. This called into question
whether Riicktritt operated retrospectively in the sense described above. It is now
generally accepted that the retrospective effect of termination does not mean that the
contract is avoided ab initio. Rather, Riicktritt is said to transform 'a [contractual]
relationship aiming at the implementation of the contractual programme originally
agreed upon into a contractual winding-up relationship.'62 Thus termination only
extinguishes the parties' primary performance obligations and replaces these with
secondary obligations to restore performances received and to pay damages. This is
essentially the transformation theory found in South African law. Although it has not
been expressly acknowledged, it is likely that South African academics have drawn on
this German theory. From my comments in section 2.2.2(iv)(c), it is clear that I support
this approach.
2.4.2 English Law
Termination for breach in English law is said to extinguish the parties'
61 For more precise description see Markesinis et at., The German Taw ofObligations (vol. 1, The Taw of
Contracts and "Restitution: A Comparative Introduction, 1997), 642-5.
62 Zimmermann, 'Remedies for Non-Performance: The revised German law of obligations viewed against
the background of the Principles of European Contract Law' (2002) 6 Edin TR 271 at 306.
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unperformed future primary performance obligations.63 Thereafter the contract breaker
is said to be under a secondary obligation to pay damages. Although English law uses
the distinction between primary and secondary obligations to explain the right to claim
damages after termination for breach, this distinction is not used to explain the right to
restitution. As restitution points towards termination operating retrospectively, this
omission explains why academic commentators in English law are unanimous in stating
that termination for breach operates prospectively only.
2.4.3 International Models: The Principles of European Contract Law
(PECL) and The Principles of International Commercial Contracts
(PICC)
Both sets of international principles have adopted similar schemes to regulate
the effects of termination for breach. Although packaged slightly differently, both codes
require the parties to restore performances received prior to termination.64 It is also
clearly stated that neither accrued rights nor clauses designed to operate post
termination are affected by termination. Furthermore, the aggrieved party is not
prevented by termination from claiming damages according to his expectation interest.
In order to explain the survival of accrued rights, the survival of clauses
designed to have post-termination effect and the right to claim damages, the compilers
of the PECL expressly state that termination operates prospectively only, as opposed to
retrospectively as well as prospectively. It is clear that the compilers wanted to avoid the
problems that occur if termination for breach operates retrospectively in the sense that
63 Heyman v Darwins [1942] AC 356 at 399; Photo Production Ltd v Securicor Transport Ltd [1980] AC 827 and
Johnson vAgnew [1980] AC 367 at 392-3.
64 PECL Art 9:306-8 and PICC Art 7.3.6(1).
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the contractual nexus is treated as if it never came into existence.63 It was pointed out
above that according to the transformation theory, the retrospective effect of
termination does not necessarily carry the meaning ascribed to it by the compilers of the
PECL.
2.5 Conclusions
There is an interesting historical connection between English law, German law,
Scots law and South African law regarding the effect of termination for breach on the
contractual nexus between the parties. Both Scots law and South African law developed
out of Roman law. As Roman law did not recognise a general right to terminate a
contract for breach, jurists never worked out a coherent theory explaining the effects of
termination for breach. There was little improvement made by either the Roman-Dutch
scholars or the Scottish institutional writers. In the early modern period, both South
African and Scots law, under the influence of English law, developed a general right to
terminate a contract for any breach. This facilitated a clarification of the specific effects
of termination for breach (restitution in Scots law being a notable exception) and
enabled scholars to think in more abstract terms about the effects of termination for
breach on the contractual nexus between the parties.
In developing its theory, Scots law tracked English law by using the distinction
between primary and secondary obligations to explain that not all aspects of the contract
are extinguished by termination for breach. In line with English law, Scots law maintains
that termination for breach operates prospectively only. Although South African law
also uses the distinction between primary and secondary obligations, it developed the
65 Lando and Beale (eds), Principles ofEuropean Contract Eaw (2000), notes to Art 9:305.
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transformation theory to account for the right to restitution and to damages. In this
way, the theory in South African law resembles German law. As the transformation
theory incorporates the right to restitution, South African law rightly acknowledges that
termination for breach sometimes operates retrospectively.
1 argued that the real substantive work in this area is done by the disparate
doctrines that collectively make up the effect of termination for breach rather than by
abstract generalisations about this overall effect. This is borne out by the fact that
although different legal systems articulate this general effect in different ways, there is
commonality regarding the doctrines that make up this effect. It is accordingly critical
that Scots law and South African law clearly articulate these doctrines and the
relationships between them. I suggested that it was necessary to formulate six rules,
supplemented by one definition, to achieve this aim.
As the commentators and courts do refer to the overall effect of termination on
the contractual nexus between the parties, we should be precise. It was established that
termination sometimes operates retrospectively only; sometimes retrospectively as well
as prospectively; and sometimes prospectively only. In other words, termination has
three distinct types of effect. The facts of individual cases determine which rule or rules
govern the consequences of termination for breach in that case. This, in turn,
determines the precise effect of termination on the contractual nexus between the
parties.
It was also established that the retrospective effect does not mean that the
contractual nexus is treated as if it never came into being. According to the
transformation theory, it means that only the primary performance obligations are
annulled by termination. These are replaced by secondary obligations to restore
performances received and to pay damages. Finally, the prospective effect of
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termination means that the contractual nexus is severed only in so far as this nexus is
not represented by obligations whose correlative rights (i) fall under the doctrine of
accrued rights and/or (ii) would have fallen under the doctrine of accrued rights but for the
fact that these obligations have been validly discharged by performance. Termination for
breach operates prospectively only if all rights to contractual performances whose
correlative obligations have been discharged by performance fall under (ii) and if all





This chapter considers the doctrine of accrued contractual rights in South
African and Scots law. This doctrine determines which contractual rights survive
termination for breach. A comprehensive understanding of this doctrine is necessary as
it can be of considerable importance to establish that a right to receive a performance is
an accrued contractual right. For example, it will be easier (and sometimes
advantageous) for a contractant claiming money to rely on a contractual term rather
than having to institute a restitution claim.
After this introduction, the respective positions in South African and Scots law
will be considered. It will be demonstrated that although there is a similarity between the
doctrines in two jurisdictions, South African law is conceptually more sophisticated and
has much to teach Scots law.
3.2 South African Law
The leading case on accrued rights in South African law is Thomas Construction
(Pty) Ttd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ftd} In this case, Nienaber J stated that
contractual rights survive termination for breach if the right to a performance is, prior
to termination, accrued, due and enforceable and independent of the executory part of
1 1986 (4) SA 510 (N).
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the contract.2 This dictum is the key to understanding accrued rights in South African
law. In order to appreciate its full import, and to provide a comprehensive study of the
South African law, it is necessary to consider the case law chronologically. This case law
can be divided into three phases: (a) the cases before Walker's Fruit Farm v Sumner5; (b)
the cases from Walker's Fruit Farm v Sumner to Crest Enterprises (Pty) Etd v Ryckloft
Beleggings(Edms) BpkA\ and (c) the case of Thomas Construction. It will be shown that
although South African law has clarified accrued rights from a conceptual point of view,
some residual difficulties remain in applying the doctrine.
3.2.1 Cases before Walker's Fruit Farm v Sumner
(i) Webster v Varley5, Bloch v MichaP and Hall v Cox7
These cases involved contracts of sale where the purchase price was payable in
instalments and the purchaser, in breach of these payment obligations, failed to pay one
or more of the instalments. The question was whether the aggrieved seller could, despite
having terminated the contract, claim an instalment that was due but not yet paid. The
courts refused the claim on the grounds that it would be inconsistent to allow a claim on
the contract after the contract was terminated for breach.8
It is now well established that there is no logical or theoretical inconsistency in
combining a claim for contractual damages with the termination of a contract. Provided
the requirements of the accrued rights doctrine are met, the same is true in respect of
2 Thomas Construction (Pty) lJd v Grafton Purniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 515.
3 1930 TPD 394.
4 1972 (2) SA 863 (A).
5 1915 WLD 79.
6 1924 TPD 54.
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combining a claim for a contractual performance with the termination of a contract.
Accordingly, these decisions rest on a theoretically unsound foundation and do not
contribute to our understanding of accrued rights. It will be demonstrated in subsequent
sections that a proper application of the current accrued rights doctrine would have
yielded the same result reached in these cases.
(ii) Spenser v Gostelow*
In Spenser v Gostelow an employment contract stipulated that an employee's salary
was to be paid monthly. On the eleventh of the month the employer terminated the
contract as a result of the employee's breach. The employee instituted a claim for
remuneration for the eleven days he had worked in that month.10 Innes CJ held that if
an employer dismisses an employee for serious misconduct, then:
'... he is not bound to pay his wages for the remainder of the contract term. But
he is not entitled to enrich himself at the expense of the servant by refusing to
pay for those services in so far as they have benefited him.'11
Accordingly, Innes CJ allowed the employee an enrichment claim for the amount
sought.12
At this time, the courts were labouring under the misapprehension that it was
inconsistent to allow a claim on a contract after termination for breach. This was
7 1926 CPD 228.
8 See Webster v Varley 1915 WLD 79 at 80 which was cited with approval in B/och vMicha/1924 TPD 54 at 58.
9 1920 AD 617.
10 Spenser v Gostelow 1920 AD 617 at 626.
11 Spenser v Gostelow 1920 AD 617 at 631.
12 For an application of the Spenser v Gostelow 1920 AD 617 dictum in a lease context see Seligson vAlley 1928
TPD 259.
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because termination was thought to extinguish the contractual nexus retrospectively in
the sense that it was treated as if it never came into existence. This explains why the
court looked to the law of unjustified enrichment to find a doctrinal peg on which to
hang the contract breaker's claim. Because of this misapprehension, the decision does
not contribute greatly to our understanding of accrued rights.
Once again, it will be demonstration that the contract breaker's right to claim
remuneradon under the contract would not survive termination under the current
accrued rights doctrine. Today, the contract breaker's claim, whatever its true nature,
would be a claim for restitution.
3.2.2 Walker's Fruit Farm v Sumner13
In Walker's Fruit Farm an employment contract stipulated that an employee would
receive a guaranteed minimum payment if he did not earn a specified amount by way of
commission. The employer breached the contract and the employee claimed an amount due
under the contract.14 The court upheld the employee's claim. In so doing, the court stated
that where one party validly elects to terminate a contract, they cannot in the same breath
enforce that contract. Importantly, this statement was qualified in the following way:
'[b]ut it appears to me that this only applies to the executory portion of the contract;
but where a right has accrued to the one party before the election, such right is not
affected after the election. He treats the contract as at an end as from the date when
he makes his election; up to that date the rights have come into existence and can
be enforced.'15
Walker's Fruit Farm is important primarily because it marks the turning point
whereby it first became possible to terminate a contract and simultaneously claim a
13 1930 TPD 394.
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performance due under the contract (i.e. ex contractu). With this development, the accrued
rights doctrine was born.
Despite the advance made by Walkers Fruit Farm, the case is conceptually flawed.
The flaw is that the above dictum is over inclusive in that it does not accurately describe the
dividing line between cases where termination for breach operates prospectively only and
cases where termination operates retrospectively as well as prospectively. In other words, it
allows some claims to survive termination for breach that should not do so. The following
example illustrates the point. Assume that A sells a car to B for R5,000 and that B is obliged
to pay the purchase price in five monthly instalments payable on the first day of each
month. Assume also that B discovered a defect in the car on the fifth day of the second
month and that he had not yet paid the second instalment. B justifiably terminates the
contract for A's breach and institutes a claim for restitution of the first instalment.
Termination in this type of case operates retrospectively as well as prospectively. This
means that both A and B must return to each other any performance received prior to
termination for breach and that both parties are released from any unperformed
obligations.16 Accordingly, A's right to claim the second instalment does not survive
termination for breach. The problem with the dictum in Walker's Fruit Farm is that A's right
to the second instalment falls within its ambit and is hence incorrectly earmarked as a right
which survives termination for breach.17
Although Radiotronics (Pty) Ltd v Scott Lindberg <& Co. Ltd18 did not have to decide
the issue, the court raised doubts about the dictum in Walker's F'ruit Farm. These doubts
14 The amount claimed was £35. Although it is not clear from the judgment how this amount was calculated,
the court expressly stated that 'the claim in the present case is a claim for a payment in terms of the contract'.
Walker's Fruit Farm v Sumner 1930 TPD 394 at 401.
15 Ibid.
16 This case is regulated by rule one and rule three. Rule two does not apply in this instance as the second
instalment does not fall under the accrued rights doctrine.
17 For an example of this over inclusiveness problem sae. Arnold v Vitjoen 1954 (3) SA 322 (C) especially at
331.
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led direcdy to a significant refinement of the theory in Crest Enterprises (Pty) Etd v Ryckloft
Beleggings (Edms) BpkP
3.2.3 Crest Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v Ryckloft Beleggings(Edms) Bpk
In Crest Enterprises a property developer wanted to develop shopping centres in
order to let them out to a supermarket chain. The developer entered into a contract with
Crest Enterprises in terms of which Crest Enterprises was to procure options to purchase
sites for the developer. The contract provided that if an option to purchase a particular site
had been obtained and the developer, for whatever reason, failed to conclude a lease with
the supermarket, then the developer was obliged to cede (assign) the option to purchase the
site to Crest Enterprises. On one occasion, Crest Enterprises procured an option for the
developer who, having exercised the option, failed to let the site to the supermarket chain.
The developer refused to transfer the property to Crest Enterprises. Crest Enterprises
terminated the contract for the breach and claimed that the land should be ceded to it.
Holmes JA, commenting on Walker's Fruit Farm, said that it is clear that when
GreenbergJ used the word 'accrued' he meant accrued, due and enforceable.20
Furthermore, Holmes JA qualified the rule in Walker's Fruit Farm by holding that it is
confined to situations where, prior to the termination of a contract, there exists a right
which is accrued, due and enforceable as a cause of action independent ofanj executorypart ofthe
contract,21
The question before the court was whether Crest Enterprises' claim to have the
land ceded to them fell within the modified Walker's Fruit Farm mle. The court held that it
181951 (1) SA 312 (C) at 320.
19 1972 (2) SA 863 (A).
20 Crest Enterprises (Pty) Etd v Ryckloft Belepgings (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 863 (A) at 870.
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did not. This was because Crest Enterprises were only contractually entided to the cession
of the option to purchase the property. In order for the right to claim the land to survive
termination, it was necessary for Crest Enterprises to have exercised the option to purchase
the land prior to the termination for breach. As they had not done this, their case failed
because their claim was not 'accrued, due and enforceable' prior to termination for breach.22
The case is important for two reasons. First, it stresses the importance of the first
leg of the accrued rights doctrine. Secondly, the court added an important gloss to the rule
in Walker's Fruit Farm. Although nothing actually turned on this gloss, Crest Enterprises paved
the way for Thomas Construction (Ptyj Ftd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd13 to
introduce this gloss into South African law.24
3.2.4 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers
(Pty) Ltd
(i) Natal Provincial Division25
Thomas Construction, a building contractor, was engaged by an employer (a
property developer) to carry out construction work. The contract provided for interim
certificates to be issued periodically on the basis ofwhich the employer was obliged to pay
the amounts certified therein to the contractor. Two such certificates had been issued but
were unpaid when the contract was validly terminated by the employer. The contractor
21 Ibid.
22 Ibid. In fact, as the developer had already exercised the option to purchase the land by the time Crest
Enterprises had terminated the contract, there was no option left for the developers to cede after
termination and thus no question of this right surviving termination.
23 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) and 1988 (2) SA 546 (A).
24 Crest Enterprises was referred to with approval in Nash v Golden Dumps (Pty) Ltd 1985 (3) 1 SA (A). Nothing,
however, turned on the gloss.
25 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N).
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argued that their right to receive payment for certified work survived termination for breach
by being an accrued contractual right.26
As the right to payment on the interim certificate was clearly accrued, due and
enforceable, the court had to consider for the first time the independent ofthe executorypart of
the contract requirement.27
The court held that a contractor's right to payment was not independent of the
executory part of the contract and accordingly did not survive termination for breach. Two
reasons were given to justify the decision. First, the amounts due under the interim
certificates were not intended to be compensation for a completed segment of the work but
rather to supply the contractor with working capital to complete the work.28 Secondly, the
contractor's right to payment is counter-balanced by and dependent upon his obligation to
deliver the finished product.29 In elaborating on the second reason, Nienaber J states that it
is implicit in a scheme which contemplates the exchange of the contract price for the
completed construction work that the contractor indicates a willingness and ability to
complete and fulfil its contractual obligations.30
It is clear from this analysis that the contractor's right to receive payment is not
independent of the unperformed or executory part of the contract but is rather directly
dependent thereon. As a result, the contractor's right to receive payment is excluded from
the accrued rights doctrine and is accordingly extinguished by termination.31
26 Thomas Construction (Pty) LJd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 514.
27 Ibid.
28 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 517.
29 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton FurnitureManufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 516-7 and 518.
The court stated that the fact that adjustments to such advances are contemplated by subsequent certificates
implies that the contractants contemplated that the contract sum will eventually become payable on
completion of the work.
30 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 517.-
31 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 519.
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(ii) Appellate Division32
The contractors appealed against Nienaber J's decision on two grounds. Firstly,
they argued that the right to payment under the interim certificates was not to be regarded
as reciprocal to the obligation to deliver the completed construction work but rather as
compensation for a completed segment of the work. Botha JA gave this argument short
shrift on the basis that it did violence to the fundamental nature of a building contract.33
The contractor's second argument was that the words 'prior to' in the phrase 'prior
to the termination of the contract' in Crest Enterprises were of decisive importance and meant
that the ascertainment of the existence of an accrued and enforceable cause of action was to
be isolated entirely from the fact and consequence of termination.34 According to this
argument, a right survives termination for breach if there was a right to receive that
performance prior to termination. If this were true, a right would survive termination
simply by being accrued, due and enforceable. Botha JA rejected this argument by way of
the following example. Suppose that A and B conclude a contract of sale for A's property.
B is obligated to pay the purchase price of R20,000 on or before 30 September and A is
obligated to transfer the property7 not later than 30 November. B fails to pay. On 26
November A justifiably terminates the contract for a reason other than B's failure to pay.
Botha JA then notes, correctly in my view, that if the contractor's argument was correct,
then A would be able to claim the R20,000 without having to transfer the property since
prior to termination, A had an accrued, due and enforceable right to claim the payment.35
32 Thomas Construction (Pty) lJd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A).
33 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) at 563.
34 Counsel argued that this was in fact the way the court applied the rule in the Crest Enterprises (Pty) Ltd v
Ryckioft Be/eggings (Edms) Bpk 1972 (2) SA 863 (A). See Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) at 564 for this argument.
35 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) at 564. See also
Lasky, 'Terugtrede Weens Kontrakbreuk-is dit Slegs 'n Halwe Tree Terug' Pesponsa Meridiana (1980) 73 at
79.
This result is clearly undesirable and indicates that the contractor's interpretation of the
dictum set out in Crest Enterprises - and applied by the court of first instance in Thomas
Construction - is incorrect.36
Indeed, Botha JA held that words 'prior to the recession of the contract' only
qualify the terms 'accrual of a due and enforceable right' and do not impact on the
application of the 'independent of the executory part of the contract' requirement.37 This
must be correct since the effect of the words 'independent of the executory part of the
contract' would be rendered nugatory if the contractor's second argument was upheld.
On Nienaber J's interpretation of the 'independent of the executory part of the
contract' requirement, the undesirable result in the example given by Botha JA is avoided
since the seller's right to claim the purchase price would not survive termination for breach.
This is because B's obligation to pay purchase price is reciprocal to A's obligation to deliver
the house and there can be no question of the right to claim the purchase price being
independent of the unperformed or executory part of the contract, even though it was
accrued, due and enforceable.38
3.2.5 Lessons from Crest Enterprises and Thomas Construction
(i) Conceptual Clarity: Two Limbs of the Accrued Rights Doctrine
Crest Enterprises and Thomas Construction are critically important because they clarified
the formulation of the accrued rights doctrine in South African law. As a result, it is now
36 Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) at 564.
37 Thomas Construction (Ptyj Ltd v Grafton FurnitureManufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1988 (2) SA 546 (A) at 566.
38 Thomas Construction has been cited with approval and applied in a number of cases. See for example Graham
NO v Williams Flunt (Pty) Ltd 1995 (1) SA 371 (D) and PBL Management (PTY) v Telekom SA Ltd 2001 (2) SA
313 (T).
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clear that the doctrine of accrued rights has two components. First, in order for a right to
survive termination for breach it must be, prior to termination, accrued, due and
enforceable. This means that the holder of this right must, prior to termination for breach,
have been able to insist that the other contracting party perform that right's correlative
obligation. It will be demonstrated in section 3.3.2(i) that the 'enforceable' requirement of
this component requires further clarification in South African law.
Secondly, in addition to the first requirement, a right will only survive termination
for breach if it is also 'independent of the executory part of the contract.' This will occur if
that right and the reciprocal obligation to that right's correlative obligation form a couplet
capable of standing independently of any similar unperformed couplets. Two simple
examples illustrate the point. The first example is the sale of a car on instalments. On 1
January A sells B a car for R12, 000. B pays a deposit of R2,000 and agrees to pay the
balance in 10 monthly instalments of R1,000. Each instalment is due on the last day of the
month. By prior arrangement B had not yet paid the April instalment. On 1 May, B
discovers a serious defect in the car. He terminates the contract and demands the return of
his deposit and the three instalments paid. The duty to restore requires both parties to
return to each other any performances received under the contract. Accordingly, A must
return the deposit and the first three instalments to B and B must return the defective car to
A. Does A's right to the fourth (April) instalment survive termination for breach? A's right
to this instalment meets the first requirement of the accrued rights doctrine because he
could have insisted, immediately prior to the termination, that B pay the April instalment.
This right does not, however, meet the second requirement of the accrued rights doctrine.
In this case, it is clear that A's right to the overall contract price is reciprocal to B's right to
delivery of the car free from defects. It is equally clear that there is no question of A's right
to the April instalment being independent of his obligation to deliver the car free from
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defects. This is because B's obligation to pay April's instalment is not part of a couplet
capable of being severed from a similar unperformed obligation couplet. Accordingly, the
right does not survive termination for breach. It is irrelevant to this finding that B's
obligation to pay the overall contract price is divided into a number of discrete payment
obligations.39 This is because the division ofB's payment obligation does not alter the
analysis of the reciprocal obligations under the contract. The point is that the divisibility of
an obligation is not by itself an indicator that there are severable couplets of rights or
obligations as required by the second leg of the accrued rights test.
In order for A's right to April's instalment to survive termination we would have to
say that B was buying the car in eleven different segments. This would mean that when the
contract was terminated, A could keep the deposit and the instalments paid and that B
would be able to keep the parts of the car that corresponded to these payments. This is
clearly contrary to the logical and ordinary interpretation of these types of contracts. B
contracted for the entire defect free car and if he is entitled to terminate the contract, he
should be entitled to return the entire car and reclaim all payments.
By way of contrast, consider a contract of lease. A lets a flat to B on 1 January for
one year. B is to pay a deposit of R2000 immediately and a monthly rental of R1000. Rent is
due on the last day of each month. By prior arrangement, B has not yet paid April's rent. As
a result of the landlord's breach on 1 May, B terminates the contract, vacates the premises
and demands the return not only of his deposit but also of the rent paid for the first three
months. In addition to refusing to repay the rent received, A claims the outstanding rent for
April. In this case termination does not affect A's right to claim rent for April because both
requirements of the accrued rights doctrine are met. First, it is clear that immediately prior
39 Motor Racing Enterprises vNPS (Electronicsj Etd 1996 (4) SA 950 (A) at 961. On the issue of divisibility of
contractual performances and of contracts see Van der Merwe et al, Contract: GeneralPrinciples (2003), 287-
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to termination for breach A could have insisted that B pay rent for April. Secondly, B's
obligation to pay rent for April and A's reciprocal obligation to provide accommodation for
April are independent of the future (and by definition, unperformed) obligation couplets to
pay rent and to provide accommodation. Accordingly, A's right to rent for April survives
termination.40 IfB had not paid any rent due under the contract, then, for the same
reasons, A's claim for this outstanding rent would likewise survive termination.
It follows from the above analysis that ifB had paid rent for the first three months,
he would not be able to claim restitution of this rent.41
(ii) Rationale underlying Accrued Rights
The parties' contractual intentions are the key to understanding accrued rights.
When the aggrieved purchaser in the car example received the defective car, it is evident
that he did not get what he bargained for. By paying in instalments it is clear that B was not
agreeing to purchase part of the car with each instalment. It would, accordingly, be contrary
to the parties' contractual intentions if the right to an instalment of the purchase price
survived termination for breach or if the seller did not have to return all the instalments
paid prior to termination (subject to the purchaser's obligation to restore the defective car).
Thus the parties' contractual intentions dictate that termination operates retrospectively as
well as prospectively in these circumstances.
One glaring difference between this example and the lease example is that the latter
is a continuous or running contract. This is important. In the context of an employment
292. See also Bob's Shoe Centre v Hentvajs Freight Services (Pty) Ltd 1995 (2) SA 421 (A) and Cash Co?iverters
Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v Rosebud Western Province Franchise (Pty) Ltd 2002 (5) SA 494 (SCA).
40 On the issue of reciprocity ofmutual obligations see also GrandMines (Pty) Ltd v Giddej NO 1999 (1) SA
960 (A).
41 He would, however, be able to reclaim his deposit.
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contract, Van Zyl J in Maw v Grant., made the following pertinent observation:
'[t]his kind of contract is frequently referred to as an executory contract. I have
often wondered whether it would not have been better to refer to such contracts as
running contracts because during the period they run they generally create a
succession of rights and obligations that are - if the contracts are carried out
normally - successively extinguished by fulfilment and generally before the next set
of rights and obligations arise. In a contract of this nature there are, therefore,
executed portions of the contract and executor}- portions of the contract.'42
This indicates that in some partially performed contracts it is possible to say that each party
received precisely what they had bargained for in respect of the part performance. If both
parties have performed their side of the severable obligation couplet, then the fact that both
parties have received what they bargained for justifies excluding restitution. If only one
party has performed their side of the obligation couplet, then the same rationale explains
why the performer's right to claim the reciprocal counter-performance survives termination
for breach.
When termination takes place in the middle of an obligation couplet, say, on the
15th of a particular month in a lease contract, then it is no longer possible to say that the
tenant has received what he bargained for in that month. Accordingly, the tenant has the
right to restitution of rent paid for that month. Logically, if rent had not yet been paid, the
landlord would not be able to claim that his right to this rent survived termination as an
accrued right.
(iii) Doctrinal Basis ofAccrued Rights
Given that the survival of an accrued right is rationalised on the basis of the parties'
contractual intentions, it is clear that these rights survive termination as enforceable primary
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contractual rights.
It is necessary to stress this point as Sally Hutton has recently argued that the
survival of accrued rights is best explained by the principles of unjustified enrichment.43
According to Hutton, there are two possible constructions of the causa for a contractual
performance for the purpose of determining whether the sine causa requirement of an
enrichment action is met in South African law. According to the first construction, a party
makes a performance because of a valid contractual obligation to do so. As termination
does not extinguish the correlative primary performance obligations of rights that
survive termination, this means that termination does not eliminate the causa for these
performances. Accordingly, if that performance had been rendered, then the retention
of that benefit would be justified according to the principles of unjustified enrichment.44
The second construction of the causa sees the purpose of making a contractual
performance as the assumption, relating to the future, that the contract will be duly
completed (i.e that proper counter-performance will be forthcoming). When a right
survives termination for breach, it is clear that the assumption that counter-performance
will be duly forthcoming has not failed. The retention of this benefit will thus be
justified according to the principles of unjustified enrichment.
This analysis demonstrates that as a matter of unjustified enrichment doctrine, it
is possible to rationalise accrued rights according to the principles of unjustified
enrichment. In my view, the law of unjustified enrichment does no useful work
explaining accrued rights. Accrued rights are primary contractual rights and unjustified
enrichment is superfluous for the same reason that it is unnecessary to turn to the law of
42 1966 (4) SA 83 (C) at 87.




unjustified enrichment to explain why a recipient of a contractual performance under a
valid and subsisting contract can retain that performance.
3.2.6 Residual Difficulties
After Thomas Construction, accrued rights in South African law reached conceptual
maturity. Despite this, subsequent cases have demonstrated that some residual
difficulties remain in applying this doctrine.
(i) Frost Building CC v Swift Housing (Pty) Ltcf5
Frost Building, like Thomas Construction, involved a building contract with the
provision for progress payments by way of interim certificates. Certain sums had become
due under these certificates. Unlike Thomas Construction, however, it was the employer
(developer) rather than the contractor who had breached the contract. The contractor
validly terminated the contract for this breach and applied to have the employer liquidated.
In opposing the application the developers argued, relying on Thomas Construction, that
although the certified progress payments had become accrued, due and enforceable, they
were not independent of the executory part of the contract and as a result, did not survive
termination for breach. If this was true, these payment obligations could not be used to
support the liquidation application.46 De Klerk J rejected the employer's argument and held
that the amounts due on the interim certificates did survive termination for breach and
could be used to support the liquidation application.
45 1991 (3) SA 318 (W).
46 Frost Building CC v Swift Housing (Pty) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 318 (W) at 320.
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De Klerk J considered that the exceptio non adimpleti contractus (or some remnant
thereof or something akin to it) was the true basis of the decision in Thomas Construction not
to allow the breaching contractor to claim the sums due under the interim certificates.47
According to De Klerk J it followed logically that while the defence was successful in
Thomas Construction where the contractor was in breach, this defence did not survive
termination where the employer was in breach.48
De Klerk J probably turned to the exceptio non adimp/eti contractus because reciprocity
lies at the heart of this defence in a similar way that it underpins the second limb of the
accrued rights doctrine. Frost Building rightly highlights that the decisions on the exceptio can
be of assistance in the potentially troublesome task ofworking out which obligations in a
contractual relationship are reciprocal to each other.
We must, however, tread cautiously. The exceptio allows the aggrieved party to repel
a claim for performance from the contract breaker if the reciprocal obligation due by the
latter has not been performed in full. The aim of the defence is to put pressure on the
contract breaker to perform his side of the bargain. Clearly the defence only has currency
while the contract is on-going. Once the contract has been terminated, however, the basis
of the defence disappears as it is clear at that moment that the aggrieved party no longer
wants performance from the contract breaker. This makes De Klerk J's interpretation of
Thomas Construction theoretically problematic as it is doctrinally inconsistent to allow the
aggrieved party to terminate the contract and simultaneously raise the exceptio.49
47 Frost Building CC v Swift Housing (Pty) Ltd 1991 (3) SA 318 (W) at 321.
48 Ibid.
49 In addition to this problem of principle, there is also no authority for using the exceptio in this context. Van
der Merwe et at. argue that Frost Building incorrectly used the exceptio non adimpleti contractus to explain Thomas
Construction. This is because, the authors argue, 'the simple truth is that an obligation extinguished by
termination cannot be enforced.' Van der Merwc et al., Contract: GeneralPrinciples (2003), 376 nl61 and 378
nl75.
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(ii) Shelagatha Property Investments CC v Kellywood Homes (Pty) Ltd; Shelfaerie
Property Holdings CC v Midrand Shopping Centre (Pty) Ltd50
The question before the court was once again whether a contractor's right to
enforce payment in terms of an architect's interim certificate survived termination for
breach.51 The facts resembled Frost Building in that the employer was in breach. There was
nothing to distinguish the contract in Shelagatha Property Investments from the contract in
either Frost Building or Thomas Construction,52
In contradistinction to Thomas Construction, the court held that the contractor's right
to payment under the interim certificates was independent of the executory part of the
contract and therefore survived termination for breach. The court placed great store in the
fact that the employer was the party who had breached the contract.53 This was said to be
important because in cases where the contractor is in breach, his right to remuneration is
uncertain and can only be determined after a third party has completed the work. This was
said to contrast with cases where the employer is in breach since the aggrieved contractor is
released from his obligation to finish the work and the employer has no further claim
against him in this regard.54 In order to justify this decision in terms of accrued rights, the
court identified the reciprocal obligations as follows: the employer's obligation to make
payment under the interim certificates was reciprocal not only to the contractor's obligation
to carry out the work but also to the contractor's willingness and ability to complete the
work. There are two areas of concern with the court's reasoning.
50 1995 (3) SA 187 (A).
51 Shelagatha Property Investments CC v Kellywood Homes (Pty) Ltd, Shelfaerie Property Holdings CC vMidrand Shopping
Centre (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 187 (A) at 189.
52 Shelagatha Property Investments CC v Kellywood Homes (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 187 (A) at 193 and 196.
53 Shelagatha Property Investments CC v Kellywood Homes (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 187 (A) at 195.
54 In short, the aggrieved contractor's right to remuneration is not conditional upon further performance
under the contract. Shelagatha Property Investments CC v Kellywood Homes (Pty) Ltd 1995 (3) SA 187 (A) at 195.
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The first is the court's view that the contractor's right to payment is dependent on
which party breached the contract. This is problematic because termination releases both
contracting parties from future unperformed obligations irrespective of which party
breached the contract.55 The only time the certainty of the contractor's right to receive
payment would depend on who was in breach is when the contract had notjet been terminated.
This is because of the availability of the exceptio non adimpleti contractus. As stated above, this
defence ought to play no direct part in determining the survival of accrued rights.
The second area of concern is the court's analysis of the reciprocal obligations in
this contract. In the court's view, the right to receive payment under the interim certificates
was reciprocal not only to the contractor carrying out the requisite work but also to his
ability and willingness to complete the entire work. The latter comes from Nienaber J's
analysis in Thomas Construction. In that case the contractor's unwillingness and inability to
complete the work precluded his right to receive payment under the certificates from
surviving termination for breach. This is not true in cases like Shelagatha Property Investments
where the employer is in breach as the contractor's willingness and ability to complete the
work is unaffected by the breach. The question whether this is the correct approach turns
on whether it is desirable to reach a different conclusion depending on which party
breached the contract. In my view, the outcome in Thomas Construction is preferable for two
reasons. Firstly, if the building contract was viewed as analogous to a contract of lease in the
sense that the delivery of a completed segment of the work is reciprocal to the right to
receive a corresponding part of the purchase price, then this would have negative
consequences for the employer in cases where the contractor was in breach. It is not
unlikely that the contractor might have carried out inferior work and/or was facing
55 For another criticism of this part of the court's reasoning see Van der Merwe et at, Contract: General
Principles (2003), 381-2. See also Winsen J in Arnold v VUjoen 1954 (3) SA 322 (C) at 331 where it was held that
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insolvency. If the work turned out to be defective despite the interim certification, then it
would be unfair to the employer if his damages claim was offset by the contractually agreed
upon interim payment.56 This is because the contractor would, all things being equal,
recover less under the duty to restore than the contractually agreed upon interim payment
as the latter presupposes proper performance. The unfairness would be felt in cases where
the contractor was facing insolvency. In these cases the developer would be left with a
larger unsecured claim if the contractor was allowed set off the amount due under an
interim certificate against the developer's damages claim than would be the case if the
contractor was obligated to institute an action under the duty to restore. Accordingly, the
preferable solution is to insist that the contractor institute an action under the duty to
restore against the developer to recover for his part-performance.
Secondly as regards the likelihood of receiving payment, it makes no difference
from the contractor's point of reference whether his claim against the breaching developer
is packaged as an accrued contractual right or as a claim for part performance under the
duty to restore (coupled, where appropriate, with a claim for contractual damages). This is
because both will ultimately depend on the developer's ability to settle the claim.
The above analysis leads to the conclusion that Frost building and Shelagatha Property
Investments ought not to be followed in future cases.
3.2.7 Lessons from South African Law
The story of accrued rights in South African law has been long and tortuous. The
'I cannot see how that fact that the respondent is the injured party alters ... the principle that obligations
accrued up to the date of rescission must be fulfilled.'
56 The cases make it plain that the amounts paid under interim certificates are subject to adjustment based on
information that subsequendy comes to light. See for example Thomas Construction (Pty) Ltd v Grafton Furniture
Manufacturers (Pty) Ltd 1986 (4) SA 510 (N) at 517.
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starting point was that a contractual right could not survive termination for breach. It came
to be recognised, however, that in some circumstances contractual rights can survive
termination for breach. The initial attempt by Walker's Fruit Farm to articulate a rule which
indicates when a contractual right survives termination was incomplete. Subsequendy,
Thomas Construction (confirming the obiter in Crest Enterprises) setded matters by holding that a
right to a contractual performance survives termination for breach if it is, prior to
termination, accrued, due and enforceable and independent of the executor}' part of the
contract.
Two limbs make up this doctrine. First, in order to survive termination a right
must, at the time of termination, be accrued, due and enforceable. This means that the
holder of this right must, at the time of termination, have been able to insist that the other
contracting party perform that right's correlative obligation.
Secondly, the right must, in addition, be 'independent of the executory part of the
contract.' This requirement is best explained by the twin concepts of reciprocity and
severability. For a right to survive termination for breach it must be counter-balanced by a
reciprocal obligation (i.e. an obligation that is reciprocal to that right's correlative obligation)
that is capable of being severed from other unperformed reciprocal obligation couplets.
Although this law is clear, it was demonstrated that it can be problematic to work
out precisely which obligations are reciprocal to each other in any particular contract. As
contractual arrangements vary widely, it is not sensible to search for a comprehensive list of
guidelines which articulate when a right is independent of the executor}' part of the contract.
It is possible, however, to give some guidance. The starting point is the parties' contractual
intentions.57 Throughout this chapter a sale of the car and a lease were used as paradigm
examples to illustrate the difference between cases in which a right was extinguished by
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termination and cases in which the right survived termination. One glaring difference
between the two contracts is that the lease is a continuous or running contract whereas the
sale is not. The lease contract creates a series of obligations that arise successively on a
monthly basis. The rent is paid on a monthly basis in exchange for the provision of
accommodation for the same period. In contradistinction, the purchaser of a car intends to
purchase the complete car (free from defects) in exchange for the entire purchase price.
This intention to purchase complete ownership of the car (as opposed to individual
segments of that car) is not altered by the fact that the purchaser's payment obligation
might be divided into several instalments. The lesson to be gleaned from these differences
is that the nature or type of contract is an important indicator of whether the parties intend
the obligations arising under the contract to be broken down into severable obligation
couplets or whether the parties intend the entire performance on one side to be reciprocal
to the entire performance on the other side.
Although a right will survive termination more easily when a contract contains
continuous obligations, this is not a necessary condition for the survival of an accrued
right.58 It will, however, be useful for the courts to ask whether the case before them is
analogous to the lease example or to the sale of the car example.
The analysis of Shelagatha Property Investments revealed it can be helpful — in absence
of a clear contractual provision - to enquire whether policy factors favour a particular
conclusion regarding the reciprocity and severability of obligations. In this regard it is
important to test whether the survival of an accrued right would negatively prejudice the
party not in breach of contract. Analysis demonstrated that this can become an issue in
the case of insolvency.
57 See BK Tooting (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) at 418 (translation) for a general
discussion about the starting point being a matter of contractual interpretation.
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3.3 Scots Law
Given that neither Roman law nor the Scottish institutional writers had developed a
general right to terminate a contract for breach, much less a coherent theory detailing the
effects of termination for breach, it is hardly surprising to find that these systems did not
deal with accrued rights. Unlike modern South African law, however, modern Scots law has
not gone on to formulate a theoretically satisfactory rule which articulates when contractual
rights survive termination for breach. As a result, the story of accmed rights in Scots law
cannot be told by explaining the development of one particular rule. Instead, it is necessary
to consider the various types of cases that have had an impact on this doctrine. It will be
demonstrated that many problems encountered in Scots law in this area will be overcome
by adopting South African law's formulation of the accrued rights doctrine.
In order to explain accmed rights in Scots law and defend my argument, I will
divide the cases into three groups. The first group of cases demonstrate that there is
authority on the back of which Scots law can adopt South African law's formulation of
accmed rights. The second group of cases focuses on the principle of mutuality. These
cases will demonstrate (a) that Scots law has mn into trouble by applying a mle which
prevents a party in breach from suing for performance on the contract in all circumstances
and (b) that Scots law has not properly understood the relationship between the right of
retention, the duty to restore and the doctrine of accrued rights. The third group of cases
demonstrates that Scots law has inappropriately used the distinction between an advance
payment of the contract price and an advance payment against a future obligation to pay the
contract price to explain cases that ought to be explained either on the basis of accmed
58 For a statement that appears categorical in this regard see Harker, 'Damages for Breach of Contract:
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rights or on the basis of the forfeiture of a contractual payment.
3.3.1 A Path to Doctrinal Clarity
There are a number of cases in Scots law which indicate that there is some degree
of similarity between the accrued rights doctrines in the respective systems. In my view, the
underlying reasoning in these cases demonstrates that it would be doctrinally consistent for
Scots law to adopt South African law's formulation of accrued rights. Although these cases
all reached the correct results, the South African formulation provides a better
rationalisation of these cases. More importantly, by adopting this formulation Scots law will
be able to rectify the deeper problems encountered in the two other groups of cases.
(i) Gibson v McNaughton59
This case involved an employment contract in terms of which an employee was
paid wages on a weekly basis. The contract required the employee to give one month's
notice in order to terminate the contract. In breach of this clause, the employee left his
employment two weeks into the notice period. The question was whether the employee
could, nevertheless, claim wages for this two week period.60 Although there is little by way
of the theoretical justification, the court upheld the employee's claim.61
Two points are noteworthy. First, this case is cited by Gloag as authority for the
proposition that a material breach of contract does not allow the partywho terminated the
Negative or Positive Interesse' (1994) 111 SALJ5 at 11.
59 (1861) 23 D 358.
60 Gibson vMcNaughton (1861) 23 D 358 at 361.
61 Gibson vMcNaughton (1861) 23 D 358 at 362-3.
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contract to escape liability for debts already accrued.62 Although Gloag correcdy identifies
that some contractual rights survive termination for breach, he is incorrect to limit these to
claims by a contract breaker. Accrued rights can survive termination for breach irrespective
of which party is the holder of that right.
Secondly, this case is identical to the paradigmatic lease example.63 Accordingly, the
real reason the claim survived termination is because it formed part of an obligation couplet
that was independent of the unperformed obligation couplets and thus independent of the
executory part of the contract.
(ii) Turnbull v McLean64
In this case a coal seller agreed to supply coal to the purchaser on a monthly basis
against a mondily payment of the price. As a result of alleged minor breaches by the seller
(an allegation which turned out to be unfounded), the purchasers refused to pay for coal
supplied during November. In response, the seller refused to supply coal in December and
terminated the contract for the purchasers' repudiation.65 The purchasers argued that the
obligation to deliver coal in December was altogether separate from the obligation to pay
for coal supplied in November.66 The court rejected the purchasers' argument and found
that the seller was justified in terminating the contract for the purchasers' refusal to pay for
coal received in November. Furthermore, the court held that the sellers could enforce the
purchasers' payment obligation for November.67 In justifying its decision, the court set out
62 Gloag, The Law ofContract (1929), 622.
63 For another example of a similar type of case in Scots law see Thomeloe vMcDonald <& Co. (1892) 29 SLR
1096. For a commentary on this case see McBryde, 'Remedies for Breach ofContract' (1996) 1 Edin LR 43
at 66-7.
64 (1874) 1 R 730.
65 Turnbull vMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 736-7.
66 TurnbullvMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 737-8.
67 Turnbull vMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 737-9. The conclusion is supported by McBryde, (1996) 1 Edin LR 65.
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three principles which were said to govern mutual contracts in Scots law. The first two are
applicable to the cases in the following section and the third is as follows:
'[w]here one party has refused to perform his part of the contract in any material
respect the other is entitled to insist on implement, claiming damages for the
breach, or to rescind [terminate] the contract altogether - except in so far as it has
been performed.'68
This dictum refers to two conceptually independent and mutually exclusive choices
available to the aggrieved party after a breach. Importantly, the court qualified the aggrieved
party's right to terminate the contract with the words 'except in so far as it has been
performed.' By this it is meant that termination does not affect that part of the contract
which has been performed. Analysis in this chapter and the previous chapter established
that termination for breach does not affect the following: (a) rights that fall under the
accrued rights doctrine and/or (b) the right to retain a contractual performance if the right
to claim the corresponding performance from the other party falls directly under the
accrued rights doctrine or would have fallen under that doctrine but for the fact that it has
already been performed. The problem with the court's dictum is that it does not accurately
refer to either of the above. The upshot is that the dictum does not provide an accurate
mechanism for determining which rights survive termination for breach and by necessary
implication, which performances must be restored. It is clear that a performance rendered
prior to termination cannot be retained simply by virtue of being performed. If this were
true without qualification, the purchaser of the defective car on instalments would not be
able to reclaim payments made prior to termination. Accordingly, the dictum is over-
inclusive in expressing the accrued rights doctrine. A similar problem was encountered in
South African law immediately prior to the addition of the 'independent of the executory
68
part of the contract' requirement.69
Although the dictum in Turnbull is conceptually flawed, the reasoning in the case
supports an alternative rationalisation of accrued rights. The court expressly identified the
reciprocal obligations in the contract as the obligation to supply coal on a monthly basis and
the obligation to pay for this coal at the end of that month.70 The essence of the court's
final decision was the seller's right to receive payment for supplying coal in November
survived termination for breach because it was independent of the obligation to supply coal
in December. If this case was decided under the current South African law, the court would
have said that the right to payment in November survived termination for breach because it
was, immediately prior to termination, accrued, due and enforceable and independent of the
executor}' part of the contract. The upshot is that Tumbullprovides cogent authority on the
back of which Scots law can adopt South African law's formulation of the accrued rights
doctrine.
(iii) Lloyds Bank pic v Bamberger71
Lloyds Bankpic is the leading modern Scottish case on accrued rights. In this case,
the seller of a house terminated the contract as a result of the purchasers' failure to pay the
purchase price timeously. The seller claimed that the contract entitled it to interest on the
purchase price from the time the contract was concluded until it was terminated. They
argued that the right to this interest had accrued prior to termination for breach and hence
survived termination. In refusing the seller's claim the court relied on the following
principle from English law:
68 Turnbull vMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 738.
69 See section 3.2.2.
70 Turnbull vMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 736.
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'[ajlthough rescission [termination] absolves both parties from future performances
of their primary obligations under the contract, they are not absolved from primary
obligations already due at the time of rescission. Thus claims for debts or arrears of
money unconditionally due under the contract may still be enforced. Examples are
arrears of rent due under the lease, or instalments of price due prior to rescission.'72
Once again, this dictum suffers from the same over-inclusiveness problem encountered in
the preceding subsection. This is evident from the reference to the survival of the right to
claim an instalment of the purchase price due before termination. The defective car
example made it clear that the right to claim part of the purchase price does not always
survive termination.73
Although the dictum set out in Lloyds Bankpic is conceptually flawed, the underlying
reasoning supports an alternative rationalisation of accrued rights. The court held that the
right to claim interest did not survive termination for breach because this interest was only
payable in the event that the purchase price was paid (or was payable) after the due date. As
termination extinguished the purchasers' obligation to pay the purchase price, the court held
that the interest could not be claimed.74 It is clear that the reciprocal obligations in this case
are, on the one hand, the obligation to pay the purchase price and, on the other, the
obligation to transfer the house. In South African law, it is clear that the right to claim the
purchase price would not survive termination for breach because it is not independent of
71 1993 SC 570.
72 Lloyds Bankpic v Bamberger 1993 SC 570 at 573.
73 The court relied on the English case of Hyundai Heaty Industries Co. Ltd v Papadopoulous [1980] 1 WLR 1129
HL for this proposition. The case involved a shipbuilding contract in which the purchase price was payable
in instalments. The court held that an instalment due before termination survived termination for the
purchaser's breach. This resulted in the purchaser forfeiting the instalment. The case suffers from English
law's adherence to the theory that termination for breach operates prospectively only and from the fact that
their doctrine of accrued rights does not possess a mechanism which incorporates and delimits the scope of
the reciprocity and severability requirements embedded in the second leg of the accrued rights doctrine in
South African law. MacQueen has argued that Lloyds Bankp!c rejects the extreme interpretation of Hjundai
that rights arising before termination survive termination for breach because they are due and because
termination is prospective in effect. See MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent
Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual Institutionary andProprietary
Consequences (1997), 199 at 218.
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the executory part of the contract. If the right to claim interest only arises when the
purchase price is paid, then it follows logically that this right is also not independent of the
executor}^ part of the contract and accordingly, does not survive termination for breach.75
The above analysis is consistent with MacQueen's view that Lloyds Bankpic indicates
that the Scottish courts will hold that a right is accrued, and hence survives termination for
breach, if it has been met by the anticipated counter-performance. This, he argues,
counteracts the legitimate fear that finding a right to have accrued simply because a
performance is due will lead to an unjustifiable forfeiture of that performance.76
Interestingly, this concern was raised by the South African courts prior to the
introduction of the 'independent of the executory part of the contract' requirement.77
This problem is eliminated once the accrued rights doctrine contains this requirement.
This will ensure that all rights that survive termination for breach will do so because the
obligation that is reciprocal to that right's correlative obligation has been performed
according to terms of the contract.
(iv) Lump Sum and Measure and Value Construction Contracts
Lump sum contracts are analogous to the sale of the car example in that the
obligation to deliver the finished product is reciprocal to the right to receive the full
purchase price. Measure and value contracts are analogous to the lease example in that the
right to receive respective parts of the purchase price is reciprocal to the obligation to
74 Lloyds Bank pic v Bamberger 1993 SC 570 at 574.
75 Another - perhaps more technically correct - way of arriving at the same result is as follows: if interest was
only payable once the purchase price had been paid, then the fact that the purchase price had not been paid
before termination means that the right to claim interest was not, prior to termination, 'accrued, due and
enforceable'.
76 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure of
Contracts (1997), 217.
77 Lehmbecker''s Earthmoving andExcavators v Incorporated General Insurance 1984 (3) SA 500 (A) at 522.
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deliver completed segments of the building work (usually subject to architectural
certification).78
In my view, the South African formulation of the accmed rights doctrine explains
why the right to receive the contract price for the completed parts ofmeasure and value
contracts survives termination for breach. This contention is supported by the following
dictum explaining the nature ofmeasure and value contracts:
'[i]n such a contract the covenants for work are independent of each other in this
sense, that a builder who has completed a number of items conform to contract
and has handed over the works to the building owner, and has obtained the final
certificates of the architect and measurers, is not disentitled to recover in respect of
these items on the ground that on other items he has failed to conform with the
contractual conditions.'79
The point that emerges from the analysis of the cases in this section and the
preceding section is that there are a number of key Scottish cases which are capable of
being rationalised on tire basis of South African law's formulation of the accmed rights
doctrine. This provides the authority on the back of which Scots law can adopt this
formulation.
3.3.2 Accrued Rights and the Mutuality Principle
The mutuality principle underpins the rule in Scots law that one party is entitled to
withhold a contractual performance until such time as the other contracting party has
78 As stated in section 3.2.5(i), the fact that the purchase price is payable in instalments (i.e divisible) does not
turn a lump sum contract into a measure and value contract.
79 Forrest v The Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd 1916 SC (HL) 28 at 36. See also Lord Skerrington's
comments in the Inner House: Forrest v The Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd 1915 SC 115 at 134-5. For a
full discussion of these two cases see MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment and Breach of Contract' (1994)
JR 137 at 152-9. See also CutterMil! Restaurant v Hogg 1996 SCLR 182 (Sh Ct) discussed briefly by Hogg,
Obligations (2003), para. 4.112.
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rendered proper performance.80 It is has been established that this rule only applies to
obligations that are exact counterparts of each other.81 This right to withhold a contractual
performance is known as the right of retention in Scots law and is equivalent to the exceptio
non adimpleti contractus in South African law. Scots law has encountered two problems in this
area that have had an impact on the accrued rights doctrine. First, Scots law has failed to
clarify the relationship between the right of retention, the effect of termination for breach
and the accrued rights doctrine. Secondly, Scots law has sometimes interpreted the principle
ofmutuality to mean that the contract breaker cannot sue on the contract in any
circumstances. The impact of these two problems on the accrued rights doctrine in Scots
law will be illustrated with reference to Graham v United Turkey Recfi2 and Bank ofEastAsia
Etd v Scottish EnterpriseP
(i) Graham v United Turkey Red
In this case Graham was engaged as an agent to distribute United Turkey Red's
products. The contract ran from 1914 to 1917. It was agreed that the agent would not act
for other manufacturers during this period. The agent breached that clause from 1916 until
the time the contract was (unjustifiably) terminated by the agents in 1917. Although
commission was to be paid monthly, some commission earned during the contract period
had not yet been paid when the contract was terminated. The court held that the agents
were not entitled to claim any unpaid commission earned whilst they were in breach (1916-
80 Turnbutl vMcLean (1874) 1 R 730 at 70. For a general discussion of this principle see McBryde, (1996) 1
Edit.t LR 64-9.
81 Redpath Dorman Long Ltd v Cummings Engine Co. Ltd 1981 SC 370 and Bank ofEastAsia Ltd v Scottish
Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 (HL). For a recent consideration of the mutuality principle see Hoult v Turpie 2003
SCLR 577 at 581-2. This case is discussed briefly in section 3.3.2(i) below.
82 Graham v United Turkey Red 1922 SC 533.
83 1997 SLT 1213 (HL).
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1917).84 The court relied on the second principle from Turnbull vMcLean which stated that
the failure of one party to perform any material part of the contract will prevent him from
suing the other for performance. The court interpreted this principle stricdy to mean that a
party in breach is prevented from suing on the contract for performance in any
circumstances. This meant that the agent forfeited the unpaid commission earned while he
was in breach.85
This case raises a number of issues for the doctrine of accrued rights. Firsdy, it was
pointed out in section 3.2.6(i) that it is theoretically unsound for the right of retention (the
exceptio non adimpleti contractus) to play any direct role after a contract has been terminated for
breach. This is because the aim underlying the right of retention, which is to put pressure
on the contract breaker to perform his side of the bargain, loses its currency after a contract
is terminated. This means that the second principle enunciated in Turnbull is only applicable
prior to termination for breach.
The theoretical defect in Graham v UTR is reflected in the fact that it is incompatible
with the rules set out in chapter two.86 According to the scheme proposed in the rules, the
economic imbalances after termination for breach are regulated exclusively by accrued
rights, restitution and the duty to pay contractual damages.87 In this light, Graham v UTR
ought to be resolved by asking first whether the agent's right to the unpaid commission
earned while he was in breach falls under the accrued rights doctrine. There is little difficulty
identifying the reciprocal obligations in this case. It was stipulated that the principal was
under an obligation to pay the agent commission on a monthly basis and that the agent was
84 For the facts and the ultimate decision see Graham v United Turkey Red 1922 SC 533 at 540-3.
85 There was, however, some obiter suggestion that the principal might be liable to the agent in unjustified
enrichment to the extent that he had benefited from the agent's services. Graham v United Turkey Red 1922 SC
533 at 550. From an accrued rights perspective, the fact that the agent could retain some of the commission
earned during the period in breach indicates that the decision is unprincipled. See McBryde, (1996) 1 Edin
LR 68.
86 For a discussion of further problems with this case see McBryde, (1996) 1 Edin ER 65.
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under a reciprocal obligation to perform according to the terms of the contract on a
monthly basis.88 In order for the agent's right to claim the unpaid commission to survive
termination, it would need to be, immediately prior to termination, 'accrued, due and
enforceable'. In this instance enforceability is the key. For the period during which the agent
was in breach, the principal would have been able to resist the agent's claim for commission
by exercising the right of retention. If 'enforceable' is taken to mean 'can actually be
claimed,' the agent's right to the unpaid commission would not meet the requirement of the
first leg of accrued rights. On this interpretation, a claim will not be 'enforceable' (and
hence fall outside the doctrine of accrued rights) whenever the aggrieved party could,
immediately prior to termination, have raised the right of retention. Assuming that the
contract does not provide for complete forfeiture, then there are two ways to compensate
the agent for work carried out whilst he was in breach. First, the 'enforceable' requirement
could be given an interpretation which does not entail a correlation between the right falling
within the accrued rights doctrine and the availability of the right of retention. The problem
is that the aggrieved party would then be left with an incomplete performance for which he
was now contractually liable. This is ameliorated by the aggrieved party's right to set off the
contract breaker's contractual claim with a claim for damages.89
Secondly, if the contract breaker's contractual claim is excluded from the doctrine
of accrued rights, then the rules dictate that he will have a restitution claim against the
aggrieved party.90
In my view, the second option is preferable. The first solution runs counter to the
87 This argument carries with it the implicit claim that Scots law ought to abandon the rule that a party in
breach cannot sue on the contract. For a similar call see McBryde, (1996) 1 Edin LR 68.
88 Graham v United Turkey Red 1922 SC 533 at 548.
89 Redpath Dorman Long Ltd v Cummings Engine Co. Ltd 1981 SC 370.
90 This clarifies an issue which, according to MacQueen, has not received much attention in Scots law: the
relationship between the duty to restore and the doctrine of accrued rights. MacQueen, 'Contract,
Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure ofContracts (1997), 219. This
relationship is articulated in rule three and rule four set out in section 2.2.3.
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underlying rationale of accrued rights because it is not possible to say that (for at least part
of the contract) each party received what they bargained for. Accordingly, the contract
breaker ought to institute a restitution claim against the aggrieved party to recover for work
rendered.91
Two points emerge from the above analysis. First, important work is done by the
inclusion of 'enforceable' in the first limb of the accrued rights test. The relationship
between accrued rights and the right of retention is encapsulated in the following general
principle: if the aggrieved party could have raised the right of retention (or the exceptio non
adimpkti contractus) against the contract breaker immediately prior to termination, then the
right to the performance repelled by this defence will not fall under the accrued rights
doctrine.
This principle is unaffected by HonIt v Turpie where Lord Drummond Young held
that the requirement that obligations must be contemporaneous with each other should not
be interpreted strictly so as to curtail the right of retention by breaking up the essential unity
of the contract.92 According to Lord Dmmond Young, Turnbull vMclean is authority for the
proposition that a seller's obligation to deliver an instalment of goods due under the
contract is the counterpart of the purchaser's obligation to pay for a previous instalment.93
Thus the seller in Turnbttllwas entitled to withhold delivery of coal due in December as a
result of the purchaser's failure to pay for coal supplied in November. The principle stated
above holds true because the seller was repelling the purchaser's right to demand delivery of
coal at the beginning of December and this right to performance clearly does not survive
91 Although this second solution is preferable, it is sometimes possible to achieve satisfactory results with the
first solution. For example, a satisfactory result would have been reached in Graham v United Turkey Red 1922
SC 533 if the agent's right to commission survived termination for breach subject to the principal's right to
counterclaim for damages. This is probably true for all cases in which the breach can only be rectified by a
damages claim and the damages claim is less than the value of an accrued rights claim.
92 Hoult v Turpie 2003 SCLR 577 at 581.
93 Hoult v Turpie 2003 SCLR 577 at 585.
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termination. Importantly, the principle does not affect the conclusion that the seller's right
to demand the outstanding payment for coal supplied in November survives termination
for breach.
Secondly, analysis in this section establishes that Scots law ought to jettison the rule
that a party in breach cannot sue for contractual performance in any circumstances.94 A
proper application of the theoretically sound rules regulating the right of retention, the
accrued rights doctrine, and right to claim restitution after termination for breach will
ensure that just results are reached in all cases. The point is that these doctrines are sharper
instruments to ensure these just results than the more blunt and indiscriminate rule that a
party in breach is prevented from suing on the contract in any circumstance.
(ii) Bank of East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise95
The facts of Bank ofEastAsia were as follows. The Scottish Development Agency
(SDA), the predecessor of Scottish Enterprise, contracted with Stanley Miller (Scotland) Ltd
(SM) for construction works. Prior to the commencement of works, it was agreed between
the parties that SM would arrange finance to meet ongoing expenses. SM arranged this
finance through the Bank of East Asia to whom they duly assigned all their rights to
payment from the SDA. An instalment of £416,000 had been due on 15 May 1990. SM
went into receivership on 29 May 1990. On that date the construction work incomplete and
defective. The losses suffered by the SDA as at 15 May were £168,000. Further losses were
incurred after 29 May 1990 as a result of SM's breaches.96 The Bank sued the SDA for the
instalment due on 15 May. The SDA sought to exercise their right of retention over the
obligation to pay the £418,000 due on 15 May 1990 as a result of breaches that had taken
94 This rule is clearly incompatible with the accrued rights doctrine.
95 1997 SLT1213 (HL).
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place both prior to and after that date. The House of Lords held that whilst there could be
retention of funds in respect of breaches that had occurred up until 15 May 1990, the SDA
could not retain any of the £418,000 for breaches occurring after that date. It was agreed
between the parties that the SDA could retain the £168,000, being the amount of damages
required to compensate them for their losses until 15 May 1990. The difference was to be
paid to the Bank and the SDA was left with a damages claim against SM.97
The essence of the court's decision was that the right of retention can only be used
to repel defective performances for 'contemporaneous' or 'concurrent' obligations.98 The
court relied on the principle from Tumbull vMcLean which stated that failure to perform any
material or substantial part of the contract by one party will prevent that party from suing
the other party for performance. The court stated that this principle only applies to that part
of the contract which is reciprocal to the obligation not being performed.99
Although the court does not make this clear, the SDA, when they engaged another
96 This loss was caused by the SDA having to (i) remedy the defects in the existing work; (ii) engage a more
expensive contractor to complete the defective work; and (iii) delay letting the units.
97 For the facts and ultimate decision see respectively Bank ofEastAsia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213
(HL) at 1214 and 1218.
98 Bank ofEastAsia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 (HL) at 1214-5. For a criticism of the court's use
of these terms to clarify the reciprocal obligations in the contract see McBryde, 'Mutuality Retained: Bank of
East Asia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise' (1996) 1 Edin LR 135 at 138.
99 Bank ofEastAsia Ltd v Scottish Enterprise 1997 SLT 1213 (HL) at 1217. In Macari v Celtic Football Club 1999
SC 628 this requirement caused a problem in an employment context. Macari, the manager of Celtic Football
Club, was dismissed for not complying with a residence clause. He argued that various acts by the club
amounted to a breach of their implied obligation to act with 'mutual trust and confidence' and that this
entitled him to withhold his performance under the residence clause. The First Division held that the club's
obligation to act with 'mutual trust and confidence' was not a counterpart to Macari's obligation to obey the
club's instruction that he comply with the residence clause. Macari v Celtic Football Club 1999 SC 628 at 633,
638 and 641-2. Thomson has argued (rightly) that an employer's obligation to act with mutual trust and
confidence 'goes to the root of the employment relationship so much so that its counterpart must be all the
obligations which the employee undertakes.' As a result, an employee wanting to suspend a performance
obligation for such a breach cannot 'pick and chose' from his performance obligations but must suspend all
his performance obligations. Thomson, 'An Unsuitable Case for Suspension? Macari v Celtic Football Club'
(1999) 3 Edin LR 394 at 397. Thomson's criticism establishes that once an employee withholds part of his
performance for an employer's breach of 'mutual trust and confidence', he will himself be in breach of
contract and will not be able to claim that his right to remuneration for the period in question survives
termination as an accrued right. It was stated in section 3.2.7 that as contractual arrangements vary widely, it
is not sensible to search for a comprehensive list of guidelines which articulate which obligations are
reciprocal to each other in a general sense. This point is recognised by McBryde when he states, citing
Sivwright vlJghtbourne (1890) 17 R 917, that the starting point must always be the parties' intentions as
evidenced by the terms of the contract. McBryde, (1996) 1 Edin LR 139.
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contractor to complete the defective work, must have terminated the contract for SM's
breach. If this is true, then, for the reasons cited in the preceding subsection, the right of
retention is in principle not directly applicable. Instead, the case should have been resolved
by applying the accrued rights doctrine and by enquiring whether the right to restitution
arose. What outcome would this analysis yield? It is clear that SM had delivered defective
performance under the contract prior to 15 May 1990. It was established above that if the
aggrieved party could have used the right of retention immediately prior to termination,
then the right to the performance that has been repelled by the right of retention will not be
an accrued right. Accordingly, the bank's right to receive the interim payment on 15 May
should not have survived termination for breach.100 As a result, the contractor would have
to institute a restitution claim against the SDA to recover for the defective performance
rendered. The SDA would in turn be entitled to a damages claim against the contractors for
any additional losses suffered as a result of the breach.
This case neady illustrates why, as a matter of equity, the right to a contractual
performance should not survive termination for breach if the performance rendered has
been defective. This is because the aggrieved developer will be left with a greater unsecured
claim against the insolvent estate than would be the case if the contractors were compelled
to institute a restitution claim to recover for their defective performance. This rests on the
assumption that the restitution claim will be worth less than the contractually stipulated
amount for proper performance. This assumption will only be untrue if the developer has
entered into a losing contract.101
100 Even if the contractor had completed the work as per contract up until 15 May 1990,1 argued in section
3.2.6(ii) that there are good reasons for holding that the right to claim payment is not independent of the
executory part of the contract.
101 See section 6.4.1 for an analysis of the contract breaker's claim for restitution of a performance resulting
in a defective end product.
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Although Bank ofEastAsia is to be welcomed in so far as it rectified some of the
misconceived dicta about reciprocal obligations in Turnbull vMcLean, it also reveals that
Scots law has not fully appreciated the inner workings of accrued rights or the relationship
between accrued rights and restitution.
3.3.3 Distinction between a Payment of the Contract Price and an Advance
against Payment of the Contract Price
In Scots law the distinction between a payment of the contract price and an
advance payment against a subsequent liability to pay the contract price originated in freight
cases.
(i) Watson v Shankland
The Scots law on payment of freight was set out in Watson v ShanklandA1 The basic
rule is that freight is payable on conclusion of the voyage. Complications arise where there
is an early payment of freight (or part thereof) and the voyage is not completed. In Watson v
Shankland, Lord President Inglis stated that there is a distinction between an advance against
freight (or an advance on account of freight) and a payment of freight.103 The former is
recoverable if the voyage is not completed. In respect of the latter, the party who has made
the payment is considered to have taken the risk that the voyage will not be completed and
he cannot recover this early payment if that eventuality arises.
102 (1871) 10 M 142.
103 Watson v Shankland (1871) 10 M 142 at 153 and 154.
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This distinction has proved to be problematic. As MacQueen has pointed out, it is
irreconcilable with Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd}04 In this
case, an engineering firm contracted with a shipbuilding company to supply the latter with
marine engines. The contract stated that the first instalment of the price was payable on
conclusion of the contract. After the conclusion of the contract and the payment of the first
instalment, the contract was frustrated as a result of the outbreak of the FirstWorld War.
The purchasers claimed restitution of the instalment. It was clear that the instalment paid
was not an advance against a future obligation to pay the full purchase price. Although
payment of the purchase price was arguably reciprocal to deliver)' of the completed engines,
it was clear that the obligation to pay the first instalment had arisen prior to delivery and
was a payment of the contract price.
The House of Lords rejected this distinction since its application can lead to the
purchaser unjustifiably forfeiting the purchase price without receiving any counter-
performance. This is particularly acute when the full purchase price is paid before any
counter-performance has been received.105
This leads MacQueen to the conclusion that the general rule in freight cases where
payment is designed to follow performance ought not to be applied to cases where there is
a different underlying rule as to the order of performance.106 In my view, it would be
preferable if the rule in fright cases is rationalised on the basis of the set of doctrines, set out
in the rules, designed to regulate the consequences of termination for breach in a
generalised and principled way.
104 1923 SC (HL) 105. MacQueen, (1994) JR 137 at 146.
105 See in particular the decisions of Lord Finlay and Lord Shaw in Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and
Engineering Co. LJd 1923 SC (HL) 105 at 115 and 121 respectively.
106 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure of
Contracts (1997), 220.
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The question that arises in these freight cases is whether the payer can recover the
early payment. We know that the underlying rule is that freight is generally payable on
completion of the voyage. This clearly indicates that the obligation to make payment of
freight is reciprocal to the successful performance of the obligation to complete the voyage.
Accordingly, in the absence of any contrary indication, the payee's right to receive (and
retain) the early freight payment will not qualify as an accmed right until the voyage is
complete. This is because the right to claim freight will not be, immediately prior to
termination, independent of the executory part of the contract. If this is true, then the
payment of freight prior to the completion of the voyage can be recovered with a restitution
claim.
The critical question is whether there is a contrary intention which overturns the
above conclusion. If it can be demonstrated that the parties intended that the payer was
taking the risk of the voyage not being completed, then the payment can be retained by the
payee. This is best viewed as a contractual exclusion of restitution. The important point is
that from a conceptual point of view, the distinction between an advance against freight (or
an advance on account of freight) and a payment of freight does no useful work.
The upshot is that Scots law ought to jettison the distinction used in Watson v
Shankland in favour of a solution based on the doctrines set out in the rules. As a result,
Scots law will not only avoid the undesirable results that can ensue from applying this
distinction but will also have a set of doctrines of general application to regulate the
economic consequences of termination for breach.
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(ii) Connelly v Simpson107
The above claim is further supported by an analysis of Connelly v Simpson. The facts
were as follows. C paid £16,000 for one-third of the shares in S's company. C negotiated
for the right to demand delivery of the shares at some time in the future in order to
minimise the value of his estate for his divorce proceedings. As a result of performing badly
in the two years following the sale, S put the company into voluntary liquidation. The
liquidator offered C £400 - a third of the remaining company assets. C alleged that S had
breached the contract and instituted a restitution claim for £16,000.108 The present interest
lies in the fact that one of the grounds used by the court to reject C's claim was that it was
not an advance against the purchase price but a payment of the purchase price.109 This is
unsatisfactory as an explanation for the decision.
It is necessary for the following analysis to assume that S was in breach and that C
had terminated the contract for this breach.110 The operative component of rule three and
rule four, articulating the right to restitution, states that S is under a duty to restore the
purchase price to C unless C's right to demand the exact reciprocal counter-performance
from S survives termination for breach by being an accrued right. Clearly, C's right to
demand the shares was accrued, due and enforceable and thus passes the first limb of the
accmed rights test. C's right to demand the share certificate is not, however, independent of
the executory part of the contract. This can be demonstrated as follows. Assume that C
actually took delivery of the shares when he paid the purchase price and that he
subsequently terminated the contract for S's breach. It is clear that rule three dictates that
107 1993 SC 391.
108 Connelly v Simpson 1993 SC 391 at 393-4.
W9 Connelly v Simpson 1993 SC 391 at 405.
110 It is unfortunate that the case that does not state unequivocally that S was in breach and that C terminated
the contract for this breach. For some commentary on this aspect of the case see MacQueen, (1994) JR 143;
83
both C and S would be under an obligation to restore the share certificates and the purchase
price respectively. There is no question of any rights surviving termination for breach in this
instance. Indeed, this case maps squarely onto the paradigmatic example of the sale of a car
and accordingly demonstrates that as a result of the retrospective effect of termination, both
parties are under a duty to restore performances received prior to termination. If this is
correct, then the fact that there was a time lag between the payment of the purchase price
and delivery of the shares makes no principled difference as far as accrued rights and
restitution are concerned. The point is that if C had received the share certificates and
would have been able to reclaim the purchase price (subject to tendering the return of the
share certificates), then logically he ought to be in the same position if he had merely
received the right to demand the share certificates at some future date.
This case has divided the Scottish commentators. On the one hand, MacQueen has
defended the decision on the basis that as C received what he bargained for - the right to
demand the shares in the future - the court was justified in refusing C's claim for the return
of the purchase price.111 In other words, as the right to delivery of the shares survived
termination, the obligation that is reciprocal to that right's correlative obligation - the
payment of the purchase price - is excluded from the duty to restore.
On the other hand, Dieckmann and Evans-Jones suggest two different grounds on
which the outcome of the case might be defended. First, the particular facts of the case
justify an exception to the right to restitution. It is clear that C accepted the risk of the
shares falling in value from the moment of the sale. The argument is that if the only reason
S put the company into voluntary liquidation — making it impossible to deliver the shares -
was because the company had done badly, then C is rightly refused restitution as this
Dieckmann and Evans-Jones, 'The Dark Side of Connelly v Simpson' (1995) JR. 90 at 96-7 and Scottish Law
Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 109,1999), para. 4.40 n74.
111 MacQueen, (1994) JR 145-6.
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eventually related to the risk that C undertook from the time of the sale.112 Secondly, they
argue that if S's breach was failing to consult C before putting the company into voluntary
liquidation rather than rendering it impossible to deliver the shares, then this breach is not
sufficiently material to justify termination. It follows that without termination there can be
no claim for restitution.113
The point that emerges (by omission) from the above analysis is that the distinction
between advances against the purchase price and payment of the purchase price does no
useful work in resolving Connelly. This reinforces the claim that Scots law ought to abandon
this distinction in favour of an approach which regulates the economic consequences of
termination for breach according to the doctrines set out in the mles.
3.3.4 Doctrinal Basis of Accrued Rights
MacQueen has argued that as the survival of accrued rights limits the scope of the
duty to restore, this points towards the enrichment-preventing nature of accrued rights.114
Although this is undoubtedly true, it was pointed out in section 3.2.5(iii) that this does not
mean that accrued rights ought to be rationalised on the basis of unjustified enrichment
law.115
112 Dieckmann and Evans-Jones, (1995) JR 96. See also Evans-Jones, 'The claim to recover what was
transferred for a lawful purpose outwith contract (condictio causa data causa non secuta)' (1997) AJ 139 at 170-1
and Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 6.123.
113 Dieckmann and Evans-Jones, (1995) JR 97. See also Evans-Jones, 'The claim to recover what was
transferred for a lawful purpose outwith contract (condictio causa data causa non secutaj (1997) AJ 139 at 170-1.
114 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure of
Contracts (1997), 217.
115 This is implicit in MacQueen's analysis as deals with accrued rights in a section entitled 'Contract Rules
which Prevent Unjustified Enrichment'. MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent
Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure ofContracts (1997), 216. See also Clive, JudicialAbolition ofthe Error
ofLaw Rule and itsAftermarth, (Appendix to Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper No. 99, 1996),
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3.3.5 Lessons from and for Scots Law
The story of accrued rights in Scots law has not been an entirely happy one. The
overarching problem is that Scots law does not have a theoretically satisfactory rule which
articulates when a right survives termination for breach. In my view, this ill is best remedied
by adopting South African law's formulation of the accrued rights doctrine. This will not
involve a big step for Scots law as Gibson vMcNaughton; Lurnbull vMcLean; and Lloyds Bank
pic v Bamberger can all be rationalised on the basis of that formulation.
This will make the following three improvements to Scots law. First, Scots law
would avoid interpreting the principle of mutuality to mean that the party in breach cannot,
in any circumstances, sue on the contract for a performance. Although this interpretation of
the mutuality principle has not led to an accrued rights case being incorrectly decided, it has
the potential to do so and accordingly ought to be jettisoned.
Secondly, Scots law would clarify the relationship between the right of retention,
accrued rights and restitution. This lack of clarity has mistakenly resulted in the right of
retention being made available to the aggrieved party after termination for breach. This
does not mean that the right of retention is irrelevant in determining whether a right
survives termination. The relationship between the right of retention and the 'enforceability'
requirement of the first leg of the accrued rights test is encapsulated in the following
principle: if the aggrieved party could have raised the right of retention (or the exceptio non
adimpleti contractus in South African law) against the contract breaker immediately prior to
termination, then the right to the performance repelled by this defence will not fall under
the accrued rights doctrine.
rule 7(3) where the enrichment-based duty to restore excludes all accrued rights. The implication is that
these contractual rights ought to be respected because of the contractually agreed bargain.
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Thirdly, Scots law would jettison the distinction between the payment of the
contract price and an advance payment against a subsequent liability to pay the contract
price to resolve cases that ought to be resolved by applying the doctrines set out in the
mles. It was pointed out that at best the distinction does no useful work and at worst can
lead to unjust results.
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Chapter 4
The Doctrinal Basis of Restitution after Termination for Breach
4.1 Introduction
This chapter and the following two chapters will consider the duty to restore
performances ('restitution') received prior to termination for breach. The two most
important questions that arise are as follows: (a) when does the right to restitution arise
and (b) when this right arises, what is the quantum of this restitution claim? The main
debate about restitution concerns its proper doctrinal basis or more precisely, whether it
is better regarded as a remedy arising in the law of contract, the law of unjustified
enrichment, or sometimes in the law of contract and sometimes in the law of unjustified
enrichment. Although this debate does not quadrate precisely with the two
abovementioned questions, there is a large overlap between them.
The aim of this chapter is to set the intellectual scene for a detailed
consideration of the South African and Scots law. As a critical part ofmy argument
relies on the inner workings of the law of unjustified enrichment, it is necessary first to
outline the relevant law in both jurisdictions. Thereafter, the various academic
approaches to the doctrinal basis of restitution will be considered. Finally, I will advance
the approach that, in my view, ought to be adopted to resolve the debate about the
proper doctrinal basis of restitution after termination for breach.
4.2 Liability for Unjustified Enrichment in South African Law
Recent cases and academic analysis have demonstrated that the taxonomy of
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unjustified enrichment in South African law is in a state of flux. For the purposes of this
thesis, a broad outline of this law is sufficient.
4.2.1 Requirements of Enrichment Liability
The substance of the law of unjustified enrichment in South African law is
usually articulated in terms of the specific enrichment actions. For present purposes, the
most important of these are the condictio causa data causa non secuta\ the condictio sine causa
specialis in the form of the condictio ob causamfinitanr, and the action for work done and
services rendered. Although South African law does not yet have a general enrichment
action, there are four general requirements for enrichment liability underpinning the
specific enrichment actions: (i) the defendant must be enriched; (ii) the plaintiffmust be
impoverished; (iii) there must be a causal link between the defendant's enrichment and
the plaintiffs impoverishment (the 'at the expense of requirement) and (iv) the
enrichment must be unjustified ('the sine causa or 'without legal ground' requirement).1 In
the context of restitution after termination for breach, the second and third
requirements are unproblematic. This leaves the 'enrichment' and the 'sine causa
requirements. The former will be discussed in chapter six.
Given that South African law does not have a general enrichment action, there is
no definitive definition of the sine causa requirement. In an excellent recent survey of this
requirement in mixed legal systems, Jacques Du Plessis has stated that the notion of
1 The Supreme Court of Appeal has recently stated, obiter., that there is sufficient authority for the
recognition of a general enrichment action in South African law. See McCarthy Retail ~Ltd v Shortdistance
Carriers CC 2001 (3) SA 482 (SCA). For an overview of the various elements see Hutchison et al, WiUe's
Principles ofSouthAfrican Caw (1991), 630-5.
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absence of legal ground is used in two contexts.2 Firstly, the notion of absence of legal
ground is reflected in two of the above named condictiones. Thus, the condictio causa data
causa non secuta is applicable if something was transferred on the incorrect assumption
that some future event would occur.3 The condictio sine causa specialis is applicable where
there is a transfer of something for a causa which, although it might have existed at the
time of the transfer, has subsequently fallen away.4 Secondly, sine causa is also used to
refer to a requirement underpinning all enrichment claims in South African law that the
enrichment must be 'unjustified' or 'without legal ground'.
Du Plessis points out that there are many divergent views about the proper
meaning of the sine causa requirement. On the narrower interpretation, sine causa means
that an enrichment is without legal ground if the benefit has been derived without legal
title. Legal title will be missing if the benefit was derived in the absence of a valid
obligation.5 On this narrow interpretation, it is not sufficient to establish enrichment
liability that there is an absence of legal ground. In addition, the requirements of the
specific enrichment actions will have to be met before such enrichment liability is said
to lie.
The broader approach to the sine causa requirement regards legal ground to be
missing when any element of a specific enrichment action is absent. Thus the elements
of a specific enrichment action taken together in any particular situation determine
2 Du Plessis, 'Towards a rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts from two
mixed jurisdictions' (2005) 122 SAT] 142 at 148-52.
3 Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Taw ofSouth Africa (vol. 9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 85.
4 See Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Taw ofSouth Africa (vol. 9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 88
n3 and Zimmermann, The Taw ofObligations (1990), 855. In Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ttd v Caterna Ttd
2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at 201 the condictio ob causamfinitam was described as an 'offshoot of the condictio sine
causa specialist This condictio would, for example, be applicable where a contractual obligation is terminated
due to supervening impossibility of performance.
5 Du Plessis, 'Towards a rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts from two
mixed jurisdictions' (2005) SATJ 150.
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whether the enrichment is sine causa?
For the present study the important taxonomic question is whether it is possible,
in principle, for restitution after termination for breach to meet the requirements of an
enrichment claim in South African law.
4.2.2 Measure of Recovery
The measure of recovery in an enrichment claim in South African law differs
depending on the type of redress sought. This can vary depending on the type of
enrichment received.7
(i) Specific Restitution
When the restitution claim is for the return of a specific returnable benefit, the
recipient is under an obligation to return the specific thing itself together with its fruits
(less the cost of production) and accessions.8 Where the recipient is no longer in
possession of the benefit transferred or its equivalent, he is liable to the extent that he
still remains enriched. Thus, he is liable for its surrogate if one exists (e.g. where the
recipient has sold the thing, he is liable to restore the purchase price or the net profit) or
its value.
6 Du Plessis,'Towards a rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts from two
mixed jurisdictions' (2005) SAL] 151.
7 Whitty and Visser, 'Unjustified Enrichment' in Zimmermann, Visser and Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems
in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004), 399 at 433.
8 Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Law ofSouth Africa (vol. 9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 80.
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(ii) Restitution of Money or (Consumed) Fungibles
Where the benefit transferred consists ofmoney or a fungible, the recipient is
Liable to return the principal sum. The common law principle that the recipient is not
liable for interest on the principal sum has now been superseded by section 2A of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 7 of 1997, which states that every unliquidated debt will
bear interest at the rate determined by the Minister ofJustice.9 Where the recipient has
rendered counter-performance corresponding to his receipt of the transfer to him, he
may refuse to restore the benefit received until the claimant tenders restoration of the
benefit conferred on him (by the recipient).10
(iii) Compensation for Work Done or Services Rendered
When a contract has been terminated for breach, South African law states that
both parties' claims for compensation for work done or services rendered are
enrichment remedies.11 It has been said that in principle the plaintiffs enrichment claim
is limited to the lesser of the market value of his expenditure or the aggrieved party's
enrichment. In contracts of hire (locatio conductio opens), there are limited instances where
the contract price has been used to determine the recipient's enrichment.12 In contracts
of employment (locatio conductio operantm) where the employer's enrichment takes the
9 For the common law see Ba/iot Investment Co. (Pty) Ltd vJacobs 1946 TPD 269.
10 Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Law ofSouth Africa (vol. 9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 80.
11 BK Tooling (Ecims) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) at 436 (translation) and Spencer v
Gostelow 1920 AD 617 at 625-6. This position is unequivocally accepted by academics as being correct in
South African law. See for example Lubbe and Murray, Far/am and Hathaway-Contract: Cases Materials and
Commentary (1988), 593 n4; De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987), 279; 285 and
287; Visser, 'Rethinking Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of the Competition between Contractual
and Enrichment Remedies' (1992) AJ 203 at 208 and Hutton, 'Restitution after Breach of Contract:
Rethinking the Conventional Jurisprudence' (1997)^4/201.
12 The authorities, such that there are, will be discussed in chapter 6.
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form of expenses saved, the measure of recovery is said to be determined by reference
to the contractual salary or wages.13 The role of the contract price in determining the
quantum of restitution is a vexed problem and will be considered in chapter six.
4.2.3 Change of Position
In South African law 'loss of enrichment' is the functional equivalent of 'change
of position' in Scots and English law. The importance of this defence is that, if
successfully pleaded, it allows the recipient of an enrichment to repel (or partially repel)
the impoverished party's claim for restitution. In South African law, the recipient's
enrichment is measured at the time of litis contestatio (the close of pleadings).
Accordingly, the recipient is only liable for the enrichment (or, in some cases, the value
thereof) surviving in his hands at litis contestation The onus of proving that the
enrichment has been lost is on the recipient. The general position in South African law
can be stated thus: the recipient of a benefit is assumed to be enriched unless he can
prove that this is no longer the case at the date of litis contestation Although this appears
to be the general position, commentators have recently noted that the precise limits of
the defence have not been explored in South African law.16 A critical question that
remains unclear is whether the courts have the right to refuse to grant the defence on
purely equitable grounds.
13 See De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 295-6.
14 African Diamond Exporters (Pty) Ltd v Barclays Bank International 1978 (3) SA 699 (A). This approach is
endorsed by the leading commentators. See Visser, (1992) A] 194; Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Taw ofSouth
Africa (vol. 9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 76 and De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987),
200ff.
15 In the case of partial loss of enrichment which does not yield a surrogate the recipient is only liable for
the enrichment remaining.
16 Whitty and Visser, 'Unjustified Enrichment' in Mixed Tegat Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and
Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004), 435-6.
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4.3 Liability for Unjustified Enrichment in Scots Law
If the South African law of unjustified enrichment is in state of flux, the law of
unjustified enrichment in Scotland has, in one commentator's words, undergone a
'revolution'.17 Although progress has been made, much remains unsettled.
4.3.1 Requirements of Enrichment Liability
(i) Pre 1995: Three Rs and Condictiones
Until 1995 the Scots law of unjustified enrichment was characterised by an
amalgam of the three Rs (restitution, repetition and recompense) and the condictiones.
Much has been written about the true basis of the three R's and their relationship to the
condictiones. There is, however, little agreement. As Evans-Jones has pointed out, there
are several theories rationalising the distinction between the three R's, namely, that it
was founded upon: (a) the type of benefit received; (b) the quantum of recovery; (c)
whether the content of the obligation was the restoration of a certum or an incertunr, (d)
recompense as a general enrichment action; or (e) an haphazard historical accident
without a satisfactory basis.18 Fortunately, subsequent developments in the case law have
made it unnecessary to resolve this debate.
17 Whitty, 'The Scottish Enrichment Revolution' (2001) 6 SLPQ 167.
18 Evans-Jones, 'Unjustified Enrichment' in Reid and Zimmermann (eds), A History ofPrivate Haw in
Scotland (2000), 369 at 372-396. See also Evans-Jones and Hellwege, 'Some Observations on the
Taxonomy of Unjustified Enrichment in Scots Law' (1998) 2 Edin HR 180.
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(ii) The 1995-1998 Trilogy of Cases
In Morgan Guaranty Trust Company ofNew York v Tothian Kegional Council Lord
President Hope stated the following about the three Rs:
'[a]s a general rule it would appear that restitution is appropriate where the
demand is for the return of corporeal property, repetition where the demand is
for the repayment ofmoney and recompense where the defender has been
enriched at the pursuer's expense in the implement of a supposed obligation
under a contract other than by the delivery of property or the payment of
money. Recompense will be available, as a more broadly based remedy, in cases
where the benefit was received by the defender in circumstances other than
under a contract or a supposed contract.'
The problem with this approach, which is based on the differences in the nature
of the remedy, is that it implies that causes of action differ merely because the
enrichment takes a particular form.20
Three important improvements were made by Morgan Guaranty. First, the court
stated that restitution, repetition and recompense all served the same purpose, namely,
'to redress an unjustified enrichment .. .'21 By recognising that a single general principle
underpinned each of the remedies, the court solved many of the problems that beset the
classification of unjustified enrichment according to the three Rs.
Secondly, Morgan Guaranty also established that all enrichment claims had certain
common components: (i) the defender must be enriched; (ii) the pursuer must be
impoverished; (iii) there must be a causal link between the defender's enrichment and
the pursuer's impoverishment (the 'at the expense of requirement); (iv) the enrichment
19 1995 SC 151 at 155. For similar statements see also Lord President Hope in Dollar Land (Cumberland)
Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC 90 (HL) at 99.
20 See Birks, 'Resdtudon: A View of Scots Law' (1985) 38 CLP 57 at 63.
21 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company ofNew York v Lothian Pxgional Council 1995 SC 151 at 155. See also Dollar
Land (Cumberland) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC 90 (HL) at 98.
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must be unjustified ('the sine causa or 'without legal ground' requirement) and (v) it must
not be inequitable for the court to grant the remedy.22
Finally, Morgan Guanranty held that any of the three Rs would be available 'when
the enrichment lacks a legal ground to justify the retention of the benefit', and, as a
result, is '[i]n such circumstances ... held to be unjust.'23
The role of the three Rs and the condictiones was further clarified by Lord Rodger in
Shillidaj v Smith.24 In addition to endorsing the 'without legal ground' approach to the sine
causa requirement, it was held that repetition, restitution and recompense should no longer
be treated as categories of the substantive law of obligations but rather as examples of
remedies reversing an unjustified enrichment. Repetition is used to claim the return of
money paid. Restitution is used to claim the return of property transferred, and
recompense is used when services have been rendered. The condictiones were said to refer
not to forms of action or remedies but rather to groups of factual situations 'in which the
law may provide a remedy because one party is enriched at the expense of the other'.25
Accordingly, these groups of factual situations form grounds of action for the redress of
unjustified enrichment and, if established, indicate that the enrichment has no legal
justification and should be reversed.
Although Shillidaj solved many of the previous difficulties encountered in this area,
Lord Rodger did not clarify in precise terms how Scots law ought to test whether an
enrichment is unjustified. Shillidaj was decided amidst intense taxonomic debate in
22 Morgan Guaranty Trust Company ofNew York v Totbian Regional Council 1995 SC 151 at 155 and 165-6. The
fifth requirement is not technically an element of the cause of action in unjustified enrichment. Instead,
Morgan Guaranty makes it clear that once the other four elements have been established by the pursuer, it
is open to the defender to demonstrate, as a defence, that it would be inequitable for the court to grant
the claim.
23 Dollar Land (Cumberland) Ltd v CIN Properties Ltd 1998 SC 90 (HL) at 98.
24 1998 SC 725.
25 Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725 at 728.
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Scotland. The batde was whether Scots law ought to follow the 'unjust factor' approach of
English law or whether it should adopt a scheme akin to the 'without legal ground'
approach ofGerman law. Lord Rodger did not come down unequivocally on either side.
Indeed, there are divergent views on which approach the judgment endorses. One
commentator has taken Shilliday to endorse the 'unjust factor' approach originally
advocated by Peter Birks.26 Another view is that Shilliday blends the civilian 'without legal
ground' approach with the unjust factor approach of the common law to form a novel
taxonomy.27 According to this view, Shilliday starts from the basic civilian principle that an
enrichment should be reversed when it is retained without legal ground, but then, without a
wholesale adoption of the unjust factor approach, follows its mode of thought by using the
unjust factors to articulate why an enrichment is retained without legal ground.2"
Although the taxonomic debate in Scots law looks set to continue, it appears that
'without legal ground' will play a central role in determining whether an enrichment is
unjustified.29 This is reinforced by the recent successful attack on the unjust factor
approach by Sonia Meier.30 This attack has led Peter Birks, previously the chief advocate of
26 Stewart, ''Shilliday v Smith' (1998) 6 RLR 260 at 261. There are statements in Shilliday v Smith where Lord
Rodger does refer with approval to Peter Birks' work. See Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725 at 727. Cf
Hellwege, 'Rationalising the Law of Unjustified Enrichment' (2000) StellLR 50 at 58 who takes Shilliday v
Smith to endorse the demise of the 'unjust factor' approach advocated by Stewart. For a view which also
rejects the 'unjust factor' interpretation of Shilliday v Smith see Visser, 'Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed
Legal Systems' (unpublished plenary paper, conference in honour of Marcel Henri Bregstein on the
'European Law of Contract and Unjustified Enrichment' held at the Free University of Amsterdam in
October 2000) extracts from which are cited in Whitty, (2001) 6 SLPQ 167 at 185. For an analysis of
these view see Du Plessis, 'Towards a rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts
from two mixed jurisdictions' (2005) SALJ 162-72.
27 Visser, 'Unjustified Enrichment in Mixed Legal Systems' (unpublished plenary paper, conference in
honour of Marcel Henri Bregstein on the 'European Law ofContract and Unjustified Enrichment' held at
the Free University ofAmsterdam in October 2000) extracts from which are cited in Whitty, (2001) 6
SLPQ 167 at 185.
28 One commentator has expressed concerns that this could lead to a system of unjust factors being
adopted via the back door. See Whitty, (2001) 6 SLPQ 185-6.
29 For a concise summary of all the possible suggestions as to the way Scots law might proceed see
Whitty, (2001) 6 SLPQ 174-86.
30 Meier, 'Unjust Factors and Legal Grounds' in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment:
Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 37. See also Meier and Zimmermann, 'Judicial Development of
the Law, Error luris, and the Law of Unjustified Enrichment - A View from Germany' (1999) 115 LQR
556 at 563.
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that approach, to beat an agonised retreat in favour of the civilian starting point.31
According to Du Plessis there is evidence that, like South African law, Scots law
also interprets the 'without legal ground' requirement in both a narrow and a broad way. In
the narrow sense, 'without legal ground' means that an enrichment claim will, in principle,
be available if the enrichment was derived without legal tide. On this view, an enrichment
will only ultimately be unjustified if additional requirements are established.32 These
additional requirements are probably to be found in the requirements of the specific
condictiones and the 3Rs (when they were viewed as substantive grounds of action in the pre-
1995 taxonomy). In the broad sense, the 'without legal ground' requirement includes all the
elements that are required to mount a successful enrichment claim.33
Once again, the important taxonomic question for the present study is whether it is
possible, in principle, for restitution after termination for breach to meet the requirements
of an enrichment claim in Scots law.
4.3.2 Measure of Recovery
Akin to the position in South African law, the measure of recovery in an
enrichment claim in Scots law also differs depending on the type of redress sought.
According to Evans-Jones, Scots law distinguishes between cases where the defender is
obliged to restore a certum (the exact thing or sum ofmoney that was received) or to
restore an incertum (a benefit that cannot be exactly restored).
31 Peter Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), 39-40.
32 See for example Whitty, 'Rationality, Nationality and the Taxonomy of Unjustified Enrichment' in
Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Kej Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 658 at
692 n201.
33 Du Plessis, 'Towards a rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts from two
mixed jurisdictions' (2005) SAL.J 153.
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(i) Specific Restitution
When the restitution claim is for the return of a specific returnable benefit, the
recipient is under an obligation to return the specific thing in the same condition that it
was received (barring accidents).34 The recipient is also obliged to restore all surviving
fruits (or their surrogate) and accessions.35 Where the recipient is no longer in
possession of the benefit transferred or its equivalent, then he is liable to the extent that
he still remains enriched. Thus, he is liable for its surrogate if one exists (e.g where the
recipient has sold the thing, he is liable to restore the purchase price or the net profit) or
its value.36
(ii) Restitution ofMoney or (Consumed) Fungibles
In a claim for money, the recipient is obliged to restore the sum received/7 In
contrast to the common law position in South African, the pursuer can claim interest on
the principal sum from the date of payment until the time the claim is raised.38
(iii) Compensation for Work Done or Services Rendered
Where a service results in an end product or in improvements to the recipient's
34 Bell, Principles ofthe Caw ofScotland (1899), s537.
35 Reid, 'Unjustified Enrichment and Property Law' (1994) JR 167 at 196-7. Where the fruits have been
consumed the defender-possessor will, however, only be liable if he has consumed them in bad faith. For
a comprehensive discussion see Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), paras 9.34-40.
36 Hogg, Obligations (2003), paras 4.19-20. Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 9.33.
37 Shilliday v Smith 1998 SC 725 at 728. See Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 9.11.
38 See Guydyr v LordAdvocate (1894) 2 SLT 260; Countess ofCromertie v LordAdvocate (1871) 9 M 988 at 991
and Duncan, Galloway and Co. Ltd v Duncan, Falconer and Co. 1913 SC 265. For a full discussion see Evans-
Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), paras 9.41-55.
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estate, the Scottish courts are likely to apply the quantum luctratus measure to assess the
value of the enrichment.39 This refers to the increase in the objective market value of the
estate. Where no such end product results, as would be the case with a so-called pure
service, then the enrichment is probably measured by calculating the expense the
recipient saved by receiving that service. The reference point is the market value of the
services rendered.40
4.3.3 Change of Position
The recipient of a benefit will be relieved of his enrichment obligation where he
has changed his position in the belief that he is the owner of that enrichment and the
courts deem that it would be inequitable to enforce the enrichment obligation.41 The
leading case in Scots law is Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson & Co. Ltd where it was
stated that
'[i]n my opinion, the defenders in order to establish such a defence would
require to show (1) that they had reasonable grounds for believing that the
money was theirs; and (2) that having that reasonable belief, they acted upon it
so as to alter their position in such manner as to make repetition unjust.'42
Where expenditure is saved, the saving itself can never be lost. Accordingly, the
39 Buchanan v Stewart (1874) 2 R 78. See also the discussion by Hogg, Obligations (2003), para. 4.37.
40 See Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), paras 9.14-8. Although the contract breaker's claim in
Scots law is probably enrichment-based, the doctrinal basis of the aggrieved party's quantum meruit claim
for non-returnable benefits is unclear. This is discussed in chapter 6.
41 Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson and Co. Etd (1901) 9 SLT 93 at 95. See also Bank ofScotland v Grimm-Foxen
[1992] GWD 37-2171; Borland, 'Change of Position in Scots Law' 1996 SET (News) 139 and Evans-Jones,
Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 9.59ff.
42 Credit Lyonnais v George Stevenson <& Co. Ltd (1901) SLT 95. Borland has pointed out that this dictum
actually specifies three requirements for the defence: (1) a reasonable belief by the defender that he was
entitled to the benefit; (2) a causal link between the belief and the change of position; and (3) that it would
be unjust to allow the claim. Borland, 1996 SLT (News) 139-40.
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plea of loss of enrichment or change of position does not apply to actions where the
measure of recovery is based on expenditure saved (e.g. in the action for
compensation/recompense for work done or services rendered).
One important factor relevant to the present study is the role of fault in the
change of position defence. Unfortunately, the law is unclear. According to Borland,
fault is relevant to determining which of the parties ought to bear the loss.43 Evans-
Jones argues against this approach and points out that in any event, Credit lyonnais is not
clear on the role of fault in the change of position defence.44
The matter is further complicated by Royal Bank ofScotlandpic v Watt.45 Watt
received money which emanated from a fraud. Watt handed this money over to the
fraudster shortly after it reached his account.46 Although Watt was found to be in good
faith with regards to his role in the fraud, the court rejected a plea equivalent to the
change of position defence on the basis that he had been '... careless to the point of
recklessness' in his participation in the fraud.47 In this light, RoyalBank ofScotlandpic v
Watt appears to support the view that the change of position defence in Scots law is part
of a broader equitable defence in terms of which the court will balance the equities
between the parties in order to decide whether to allow an enrichment claim to succeed.
Hellwege has criticised the decision on the basis that an approach that simply seeks to
balance the equities operates too arbitrarily. In his view, the Scottish courts should
rather seek to work out the precise requirements of the defence in a more principled
43 Borland, 1996 SLT (News) 140.
44 For a discussion of this point see Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 9.68. While admitting
the possibility of looking at fault issues in limited circumstances, Evans-Jones is generally against the use
of fault as a mechanism of apportioning losses between the parties in enrichment cases. Evans-Jones,
Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 9.68.
45 1991 SC 48.
46 For the facts see Royal Bank ofScotlandpic v Watt 1991 SC 48 at 54-5.




In sum, the change of position defence in Scots law, like its counterpart in South
African law, has not reached an advanced stage of development and cannot, as a result,
be regarded as settled.
4.4 Doctrinal Basis of Restitution
There are deeply divided views in South African and Scots law about the proper
doctrinal basis of restitution after termination for breach. Despite this divergence of
opinion, it will be shown that the commentators in both jurisdictions have relied, by and
large, either on considerations of abstract taxonomic doctrine or on an historical
analysis of a particular enrichment action. These views will be considered after a brief
overview of the current law in both jurisdictions.
4.4.1 Doctrinal Basis of Restitution in South Africa and Scotland: Current Law
Although a detailed examination of the case law is undertaken in the following
two chapters, it is useful at this stage to have a broad overview of the current South
Africa and Scots law. Restitution in South African law is asymmetrical in that its
doctrinal basis depends on whether the benefit conferred is, on the one hand, a money
benefit or a returnable benefit in kind or, on the other, by its very nature inherently non-
returnable. In Scots law, uncertainty about the doctrinal basis of restitution precludes
generalisation.
48 Hellwege, 'The Scope and Application of Change of Position in the Law of Unjust Enrichment: A
Comparative Study' (1999) 7 RLR 92 at 102. For a similar call see also Burrows, 'Swaps and the Friction
between Common Law and Equity' (1995) 3 RLR 15 at 21. Cf Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003),
para. 9.71 for a defence of the outcome in Loyal Bank ofScotlandpic v Watt.
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0) Money Benefits and Returnable Benefits in Kind
When a contract is terminated for breach, South African and Scots law grant
both the aggrieved party and the contract breaker the right to claim restitution of a
money benefit or a returnable benefit in kind conferred prior to termination.49 Although
there is no clear authority in Scots law establishing the doctrinal basis of restitution of
money benefits or returnable benefits in kind, the weight of authority favours
unjustified enrichment.50 The following dictum by Cloete J in Trnedie v Park TravelAgency
(Pty) Ttd t/a Park Tours indicates that South African law is unequivocal in stating that the
claim for restitution of these benefits is a distinct contractual remedy:
'...a claim for restitution of performance upon cancellation of a contract for
breach is a distinct contractual remedy: Baker v Probert 1985 (3) SA 429 (A) at
438I-439B. The vexed question whether the duty to restore the performance of
a party as a consequence of the cancellation of a contract due to a breach is a
contractual remedy or an enrichment action, which had its roots in the divergent
views of the Sabinians and Proculians in the Roman law and persisted in the
Roman-Dutch law ... was settled by that case.'51
(ii) Inherently Non-Returnable Benefits
Both jurisdictions treat restitution of inherently non-returnable benefits as an
unjustified enrichment remedy. This is more clearly articulated by the South African
courts than by their Scottish counterparts.52 Two examples of this type of benefit are the
49 For South African law see Bonne Fortune Beleggings Bpk v Kalahari Salt Works (Ptyj Ltd 1974 (1) SA 414
(NC) at 423-4; Wan Heerden v Sentra/e Kutismiskorporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A) at 31 and Baker v
Probert 1985 (3) SA 429 (A) at 438. For Scots law see McCormick v Rittmeyer (1869) 7 M 854 at 858 and
Lloyds Bank pic v Bamberger 1993 SC 570 at 573. The right to claim restitution is not as clearly established in
Scots law as it ought to be. For a full discussion see sections 5.3.1 (i)(b) and 6.3.2(ii).
50 Bell, Commentaries on the Law ofScotland and on the Principles ofMercantile Jurisprudence (1870), 478.
51 1998 (4) SA 802 (W) at 807. Cf Cloete v Union Corporation Ltd 1929 TPD 508 at 521.
52 For South African law see BK Fooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) at 436
and Spencer v Gostelow 1920 AD 617 at 625-6. This position is unequivocally accepted by academics as
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provision of services and the erection of buildings on land.
Closely allied to the question about the doctrinal basis of restitution of
inherendy non-returnable benefits is the question about the proper doctrinal basis of
quantum meruit claims. Neither South African law nor Scots law has answered this
question definitively.53 As the two questions are substantially similar, the latter can be
subsumed into the more general question as to whether restitution after termination for
breach is best classified exclusively on the principles of unjustified enrichment,
exclusively on the principles of contract, or sometimes on the principles of unjustified
enrichment and sometimes on the principles of contract.
4.4.2 Restitution is an Unjustified Enrichment Remedy
(i) Introduction
Over the past decade, the majority of scholars in South African and Scots law
have argued, in line with their counterparts in English law, that restitution after
termination for breach ought to be classified as an enrichment remedy.54
being correct in South African law. See for example, Lubbe and Murray, Farlam and Hathaway-Contract:
CasesMaterials and Commentary (1988), 593 n4; De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 279; 285 and 287;
Visser, (1992) A] 203 and Hutton, (1997) A] 201. For Scots law see Ramsay v Brand (1898) 25 R 1212; Kerr
v Dundee Gas Ught Co. (1861) 23 D 343; P.E.C. Barr Printers Ltd v Forth Print Lid 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 118and
Watson v Shankland (1871) 10 M 142 at 152. Despite dicta in these cases which refer to the availability of
enrichment claims in this context, there are few instances where enrichment claims have actually been
granted by the Scottish courts. See MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment and Breach of Contract' (1994)
JR 137 at 162.
53 In South African law there is a trilogy of cases which have held that a quantum meruit claim is based on
the principles of unjustified enrichment. See Hauman vNortje 1914 AD 293; Breslin vHichens 1914 AD 312
and Wan Rensberg v Straughten 1914 AD 317. It has, however, subsequently been held that this claim is
contractual. See BK Footing (EdmsJ Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) and Thomson v Scho/t^
1999 (1) SA 232 (SCA). For an analysis of quantum meruit claims in Scots law see Wolffe, 'Contract and
Recompense: ERDC Construction Ltd vHM Love & Co' (1997) 1 Edin LR 469.
54 Visser, (1992) AJ 203; Hutton, (1997) A] 201 and MacQueen, (1994) JR 137. CfMacQueen, 'Contract,
Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts:
Contractual, Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 199.
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These arguments have relied primarily on the theory that the law of obligations
is divided into at least three major branches - contract, delict and unjustified enrichment
- with each branch demarcating a largely autonomous territory. According to this theory,
the classification of obligations reflects the events which generate legal rights and
duties.55 The type of event which gives rise to a contractual right is consensus (and
sometimes reliance) whereas the type of event which gives rise to an enrichment right is
the retention of a benefit sine causa. This differentiation between the types of events is
intended to show that the three branches of obligations give rise to three independent
causes of action. Furthermore, underpinning each type of event is one defining or
unifying principle: contract concerns binding promises and agreements and unjustified
enrichment is based on the principle that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at
another's expense.
This theory is used to support the claim that contractual remedies and
unjustified enrichment remedies ought to be distinguished from each other by
considering the alignment between the unifying principle of one of the branches of
obligations and the principle of recovery underpinning a particular remedy. If the aim of
a remedy is more closely connected to fulfilling the expectations created by the contract,
then the remedy should be contractual. However, if the aim of a remedy aligns more
closely with the principle that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at another's
expense, then the remedy should be based on the rules of unjustified enrichment.56
55 Visser, (1992) AJ 209; Hutton, (1997) A] 211-2 and MacQueen, (1994) JR 143-4. These authors rely to
some extent on the works of Peter Birks and Andrew Burrows. See Birks, An Introduction to the Raw of
Restitution (1989), Chapter 2; Birks, 'Restitution and the Freedom of Contract' (1983) 36 CLP 141 at 146;
and Burrows, 'Dividing the Law of Obligations' in Burrows (ed), Understanding the Law ofObligations: Essays
on Contract, Tort and Restitution (1998), 1. Birks has subsequently changed some of his views on
classification. See for example Birks, 'Misnomer' in Cornish et al'. (eds), Restitution: Past, Present and Future:
Essajs in Honour ofGareth Jones (1998), 1; Birks, 'Rights, Wrongs and Remedies' (2000) 20 OJLS 1 and
Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), chapter 1. See section 4.4.4(ii)(c) for an outline of Birks' new classificatory
scheme.
56 Visser, (1992) AJ 208-10; Hutton, (1997)4/211-2 and MacQueen, (1994)/R 143-4.
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Those who argue for an increased application of the law of unjustified enrichment after
failed contracts consider that certain remedies arising in the three species of contractual
failure fit into the latter category.
(ii) Peter Birks: The Original Scheme
Peter Birks is the wellspring of the ideas about the classifying obligations
according to causative events (outlined in the introduction) and its implications for the
doctrinal basis of restitution after termination for breach. Originally, Birks believed that
there was a perfect quadration between the causative event of unjust enrichment and the
response of restitution.^7 In other words, restitution (in the sense of having to give
something back) is always the response to unjustified enrichment and unjustified
enrichment is always the event which triggers restitution.58 Logically, in order to
establish that restitution after termination for breach qualified as an enrichment remedy
it was simply necessary to establish that the duty to restore arose after such termination.
In English law this duty arises when the requirements of 'failure of consideration' are
met. Essentially, this occurs when the party claiming restitution has not received the
bargained-for counter-performance.59 The full argument explaining why these
requirements are met after termination for breach is set out in subsection (v) below.
In terms of Birks' original taxonomy, the English law of unjustified enrichment
was arranged around a series of'unjust factors'.60 As restitution met the requirements of
57 Birks, An Introduction to the Law ofRestitution (1989), 16-7. See also Mclnnes, 'Restitution, Unjust
Enrichment and the Perfect Quadration Thesis' (1999) 7 RLR 118.
58 Birks, 'Misnomer' in Restitution: Past, Present and Future (1998), 1 and Birks, (2000) 20 OJLS 1. Birks has
since recanted from the perfect quadration thesis. Accordingly, the response of restitution may be
triggered by causative events other than unjust enrichment. Sec Birks, 'Misnomer' in Restitution: Past,
Present and Future (1998), 6ff; Birks, (2000) 20 OJLS 1 and Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), 23-4.
59 Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 324ff.
60 Birks, (1985) 38 CLP 65-7.
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'failure of consideration', this qualified as one of the factors establishing a cause of
action in unjust enrichment. As a matter of logic, it follows from the perfect quadration
thesis that Birks' considers restitution after termination for breach to arise uniformly in
unjustified enrichment.61
As we shall see below, Birks' arguments played a significant role in shaping Sally
Hutton's views.
(iii) Joubert
The seeds of the approach described in the introduction were planted in South
African law by Joubert. In justifying his argument that restitution after termination is an
enrichment remedy, Joubert focuses on the sine causa requirement. He argues that
although there is a valid causa for the initial transfer of the performance under the
contract, this causa falls away when the contract is terminated for breach. This leads
Joubert to the conclusion that the resulting claim for restitution is an unjustified
enrichment remedy based on an analogy of the condictio causa data causa non secuta or the
condictio ob causamfinitambl This argument rests on the proposition that the sine causa
requirement for an enrichment claim ought to be considered with reference to the causa
retinendi (the justification for the retention) of a benefit as opposed to the causa dandi (the
justification for the initial transfer) of that benefit.
As we shall see below, this argument laid part of the foundation for Sally
Hutton's deeper analysis along similar lines.
61 See for example, Birks, An Introduction to the Lam> ofRestitution (1989), 220-1 and 234-5.
62 Joubert, 'Restitusie na Terrugtrede' (1981) De Jure 222 at 224. See also Joubert, General Principles of
Contract Gam (1987), 245. For a similar conclusion see O' Brien and Reinecke, 'Restitusie na Terugtrede
weens Kontrakbreuk' (1998) TSAR 561 at 569 where the authors say that it will become obvious to South
African law that unjustified enrichment is the proper doctrinal basis for restitution once it is recognised
that a benefit is retained sine causa after termination for breach because the contractual performance did
not achieve its aim of discharging the performance obligation.
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(iv) Daniel Visser
As part of a broader enquiry into the competition between contract and
enrichment remedies in the three species of contractual failure under review, Daniel
Visser has argued that restitution after termination for breach in South African law
should arise uniformly in unjustified enrichment.63 Visser uses the method of
distinguishing between contractual and unjustified enrichment remedies outlined in the
introduction to this section to conclude that restitution after termination for breach is
doctrinally closer to an enrichment remedy than to a contractual one. In direct response
to the asymmetry in the South African legal position, Visser argues that it is difficult to
see why the nature of the contract breaker's claim for restitution should depend on
whether the performance can be returned.5"1 He argues that if it is accepted that
restitution is designed to return the parties to their pre-contractual positions, then there
is no difference between restitution of money and returnable benefits on the one hand,
and intrinsically non-returnable benefits on the other.65 And if this is so, he argues, then
'there is no compelling reason why the orthodox position should be preferable to the
one proposed here.'55 One very compelling reason might be that the reclassification
produces undesirable results. This is not considered in Visser's work.
In addition to Birks and Joubert, Visser's analysis also helped pave the way for
Hutton's analysis.
63 Another claim that comes under the reclassification hammer is restitutio in integrum after termination of a
voidable contract. For an analysis of this claim see section 7.3.
64 The aggrieved party's claim in respect of intrinsically non-restorable benefits is also enrichment-based.
65 Visser, (1992) A] 228. He says that this assumption is not undermined by the fact that the aggrieved
party has, over and above the restitution claim, a claim for contractual damages designed to place him in




In a study comparing South African law and English law, Sally Hutton has
argued that South African law should follow English law and treat restitution after
termination for breach as arising uniformly in unjustified enrichment. Although she
builds on Joubert and Visser's work, she explores the case for classifying restitution as
an enrichment remedy in greater depth. Her method of distinguishing contractual
remedies from unjustified enrichment remedies is substantially the same as that
described in the introduction. She claims that there are two points of difference between
contractual remedies and enrichment remedies: they have different causes of actions and
different principles of recovery. Contractual remedies are said to react to a breach and
aim at the fulfilment of the expectation interest engendered by the contract, either
directly by specific performance or in the economic sense by damages. Enrichment
remedies are said to aim at restoring the parties to the positions they occupied before
the enriching event. This is achieved by returning gains to the impoverished party/'7
Thus, if restitution reacts to a breach and is aimed at fulfilling contractual expectations
then it is contractual, whereas, if it responds to an unjustified enrichment and is aimed
at restoring the parties to their positions before the enriching event, then it is based on
the principles of unjustified enrichment. 68
67 Hutton, (1997) AJ 211-2 citing Burrows 'Contract, Tort and Restitution - a satisfactory division or not'
(1983) 99 LjgR 217 at 218 and Visser, (1992) AJ 210. This differentiation is preferable to the one adopted
by Visser as it highlights more precisely the cause of action as a distinguishing feature. Another subtle
difference between their formulations is that Hutton says that the aim of enrichment remedies is to
restore the parties to their positions prior to the enriching event, whereas Visser says that a remedy is
enrichment-based if its aim is to restore the parties to their pre-contractualpositions. Hutton's formulation is
preferable since the immediate aim of the law of unjustified enrichment is to reverse gains retained




(a) Establishing Unjustified Enrichment as the Cause of Action for Restitution
As stated in section 4.2.1, there are four general requirements for enrichment
liability in South African law. The focus here is on the sine causa requirement. We saw
that this requirement is often given expression with reference to the cumulative
requirements of the specific enrichment actions in South African law.
The three principle enrichment actions relevant to this study are the condictio
causa data causa non secuta\ the condictio sine causa specialis in the form of the condictio ob
causamfinitam, and the 'action for work done and services rendered'. The condictio causa
data causa non secuta is available for the recovery of a fixed sum ofmoney or property that
was transferred on the basis of an assumption relating to the future which failed to
materialise, or subject to a modus which was disregarded or frustrated.6<) The condictio sine
causa specialis in the form of the condictio ob causamfinitam is available for the recover}' of a
fixed sum ofmoney or property that was transferred in terms of a valid causa which has
subsequently fallen away.70 Finally, the 'action for work done and services rendered' lies
for the recovery of the value ofwork done or services rendered under a contract
terminated for breach.
From the requirements of these three enrichment actions, Hutton concludes
that South African law recognises enrichment liability where the state of affairs
contemplated as the basis or reason for the transfer has failed to materialise, or if it did
materialise, failed to sustain itself.71 If this is true, so Hutton's argument runs, then
South African law allows recovery in unjustified enrichment in circumstances in which
69 De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 154-60 and Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The l^aw ofSouth Africa (vol.
9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 85.
70 Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Taw ofSouth Africa (vol. 9, first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 88.
71 The fact that a valid causa for the transfer of a benefit existed at the time of the transfer does not
necessarily mean that there is also a valid causa for its retention. Hutton, (1997) AJ 214.
110
English law allows recovery on the basis of 'failure of consideration'. The majority view
in English law is that this is one of the unjust factors which triggers an unjust
enrichment claim.72 The underlying idea is that where the basis for the conferral of a
benefit fails, the retention of that benefit is retained sine causa from that moment
onwards.
Drawing further on the comparison with English law, Hutton suggests two
possible constructions of the causa for a contractual performance in terms ofwhich the
basis for that performance can be said to fail. The first identifies the causa as the
existence of a valid primary contractual obligation to perform and the second identifies
the causa as the assumption that the contract will be duly completed.73
(a i) The Causa as the Primary Obligation to Perform
On the first construction of the causa, a party who confers a benefit under a
contract does so because he is under a valid contractual obligation. When the contract is
terminated for breach, the primary performance obligations under the contract are
terminated with retrospective effect.74 Accordingly, although there was a valid causa
justifying the initial transfer of the performance, this causa falls away as a result of the
termination for breach and the benefit is thereafter retained sine causal On this
construction of the causa, restitution after termination for breach is analogous to the
condictio sine causa specialis in the form of the condictio ob causamfinitam. This condictio is
72 Hutton, (1997)4/212-3.
73 Hutton, (1997)4/213.
74 Hutton, (1997) AJ 214-5. This excludes those cases where accrued rights survive termination.
75 Hutton, (1997) 4/ 215. This argument is premised on the view that in determining whether the sine
causa requirement has been satisfied regard must be had not to the causa dandibut to the causa retinendi. See
also Visser, (1992) A] 208-10 and O'Brien and Reinecke, (1998) TSAR 565. This issue has not been
definitely settled in South African law.
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available in South African law, usually after supervening impossibility of performance,
for the recovery of money or property that has been transferred in terms of a valid causa
which has subsequently fallen away.76
(a ii) The Causa as the Assumption of due Completion of the Contract77
According to this construction of the causa, a party performs under a valid
contract on the assumption that he will obtain the anticipated counter-performance.78
As stated in chapter two, one of the undoubted effects of termination for breach is that
both parties are released from any performance obligations arising in the future.79 In a
partly performed contract, the assumption that a party will receive the full counter-
performances accordingly fails the moment the contract is terminated for breach.80
On this construction of the causa, restitution falls under the condictio causa data
causa non secuta as this condictio is available for the recovery ofmoney or property
transferred on the basis of an assumption relating to the future that has failed to
materialise.
The categorisation of restitution as akin to the condictio causa data causa non secuta
is, according to Hutton, supported by both the common law and some modern cases.81
In respect of the common law, Hutton says that Roman law and Roman-Dutch law
used this condictio to facilitate recovery of a contractual performance when counter-
performance failed to materialise. In light of historical research, particularly by
76 Hutton, (1997)4/ 214.
77 It is more accurate to refer to a contractual obligation here than to the contract as a whole.
78 Hutton, (1997)4/ 214.
79 This is the prospective effect of termination described in chapter 2.
80 This, of course, excludes rights that survive termination for breach by being accrued contractual rights.
81 Hutton, (1997)4/ 216.
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Evans-Jones and De Vos, this is interpretation of the condictio causa data causa non secuta is
82
open to question.
Leaving this historical difficulty aside, the above analysis leads Hutton to
conclude that
'[t]he remedy of restitution responds to this unjust enrichment rather than to the
breach which is its more remote cause. This is evident from the fact that, unlike
a contractual remedy (like damages) which is activated by a breach of contract
and becomes available to the innocent party immediately on breach, restitution
becomes available only on the termination of the contract, at the point when the
basis for the transfer of the performance in question truly fails. ... In that it
reacts to an unjust enrichment, restitution after termination for breach displays
the first of the characteristics identified above as distinguishing an enrichment
from a contractual remedy.'83
(b) Purpose of Restitution after Termination for Breach
The second part of the test used by Hutton to distinguish contractual and
enrichment remedies refers to the manner in which a remedy responds to a particular
factual matrix. Hutton follows Visser's argument that restitution (and counter-
restitution) aims not to fulfil the goals created by the parties' contractual intentions but
rather to reverse the effects thereof. Accordingly, 'in function too, ...restitution bears
closer resemblance to an enrichment rather than a contractual remedy.'84
From this Hutton concludes that, having regard to
'... its cause of action and underlying principle of recovery, restitution after
termination for breach is best categorised as an enrichment remedy: another
species of that genus of enrichment actions which provides for the return of a
82 For the views of De Vos and Evans-Jones see section 4.4.3 below. See also Du Plessis, 'Towards a
rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts from two mixed jurisdictions' (2005)
SAT] 149 where he notes that the condictio causa data causa non secuta has limited application in modern
South African law. According to Du Plessis, it is not available if the purpose of the transfer is the aim of
fulfilling an existing contractual obligation. See also Lotz, 'Enrichment' in The Taw ofSouth Africa (vol. 9,
first reissue, revised by Horak, 1996), para. 85.
83 Hutton, (1997) A] 221.
84 Ibid.
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benefit in circumstances where the basis or causa for the transfer thereof has
failed.'85
Finally, Hutton argues that her solution will avoid an indefensible asymmetry in
the current South African law.86
The importance of Hutton's argument is that it establishes that it is theoretically
possible to classify restitution as an enrichment remedy. Furthermore, she has clearly
articulated the doctrinal reasons for doing so.
(c) Hutton and the Transformation Theory
The transformation theory does not stand in the way of the argument that
restitution after termination for breach ought to be an enrichment remedy. That said, it
does no useful work in the argument either. It is equally possible to sustain Hutton's
argument and say that termination for breach completely obliterates the contractual
nexus. This, however, would pose doctrinal problems for contractual damages and
should, for that reason, be avoided.
(vi) Hector MacQueen: The 1994 View
At almost the same time that Visser and Hutton were mounting their argument
in South African law, Hector MacQueen was advancing a similar argument in Scots law.
MacQueen's starting point, like that ofHutton and Visser, is the conceptual difference
between enrichment and contractual remedies described in the introduction.87
85 Hutton, (1997)H/222.
86 Hutton, (1997) AJ 207. For a similar claim see also O'Brien and Reinecke, (1998) TSAR 568.
87 MacQueen, (1994) JR 143-4.
114
Mutuality is fundamental to MacQueen's analysis. Mutuality is said to explain
two points about restitution after termination for breach: first, why restitution should
follow termination for breach and secondly, why the retention of a performance after
termination for breach makes the enrichment unjustified.
As stated in section 3.3.2, mutuality underpins the aggrieved party's right to
withhold his contractual performance until the contract breaker has properly performed
his (reciprocal) contractual obligation.88 According to MacQueen, saying that one party
may withhold his performance when the other has not performed in accordance with
the contract is not greatly divergent from saying that where one party fails to perform,
that party must return any performance already received.89 If this is correct, so the
argument runs, then restitution should follow termination for breach because the right
of retention necessarily implies that the anticipated proper counter-performance was not
received.
For the same reason, MacQueen argues that the mutuality principle explains why
a benefit is retained sine causa after termination for breach.90 According to this line of
reasoning, a party performs under the contract in order to receive the anticipated
counter-performance. In a partly performed contract, it is clear that the counter-
performance will not be forthcoming once the contract has been terminated for breach.
Accordingly, the purpose of the transfer fails from that moment onwards. MacQueen
argues that any performance rendered prior to termination for breach in these
88 The point about the reciprocity of obligations must now be read in light of Hoult v Turpie 2003 SCLR
577. This case is discussed in section 3.3.2(i).
89 MacQueen, (1994) JR 143. Evans-Jones also justifies the right to restitution in a similar way when he
says that the aggrieved party should not be denied the benefit of the mutuality principle simply because he
happened to have performed before termination. Evans-Jones, 'The Claim to recover what was
transferred for a lawful purpose outwith contract (condictio causa data causa non secuta)' (1997) A] 139 at 168.
90 MacQueen, (1994) JR 144.
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circumstances can be recovered with in Scots law with the condictio causa data causa non
91
secuta.
Although this argument is substantially the same as Hutton's argument,
MacQueen, perhaps somewhat surprisingly, falls short of saying that restitution after
termination for breach ought to arise uniformly in unjustified enrichment. Despite a
number of statements endorsing the enrichment nature of restitution, MacQueen
hedges his bets along the lines that when the courts consider restitution claims, they may
have recourse to enrichment techniques - such as defining what a benefit is and when a
recipient of a benefit ought to be able to use the change of position defence.92
(vii) Scottish Law Commission
The Scottish Law Commission has also advocated that restitution after
termination for breach ought to be an enrichment remedy.93 Following on from some of
91 MacQueen, bowing in the historical direction of Evans-Jones, says that while this may not be the
classical condictio causa data causa non secuta, this interpretation of the condictio is 'not manifestly unjust or
inconsistent with [unjustified enrichment] principles.' MacQueen, (1994) JR 149. See also Gloag and
Henderson, The Taw ofScotland (2001), para. 28.04. For Evans-Jones' view of this condictio see section
4.4.3(ii)(b) below.
92 The following two statements from MacQueen, (1994) JR 137 justify a categorical reading of
MacQueen's argument, (i) 'It is argued that both the innocent party and the contract-breaker can have
enrichment claims, generally following the termination of the contract for breach. In this the position is
rather similar to that prevailing on frustration of contract.' (137) [The current position in Scotland is that
the claims designed to redress the economic imbalances between the parties after frustration are
enrichment actions. See section 7.2.2(i)[ and (ii) '[i]f ... it is accepted that the restitution claim is based
upon unjustified enrichment, then it becomes possible to discuss not only the claim but also possible
defences in terms of enrichment law.' (144) The following three statements support my claim that
MacQueen hedges his bets, (i) 'But there are some instances in the case law where certain questions may
be better answered through enrichment techniques than ordinary contractual ones.' (138) [my emphasis]; (ii)
'[i]t has already been argued ... that, whether or not the recovery springs from contract, rescission entails
reversal of the unjustified enrichment of both parties...' (165); and (iii) '[t]he argument ... has been that
the principles of unjustified enrichment can support the claim of a contract-breaker to recovery for his
performance where he is precluded from recovery under the contract.' (165).
93 Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 109, 1999), para. 4.44.
Eric Clive also argues that restitution ought to be an enrichment remedy. JudicialAbolition ofthe Error
ofTaw Rule and itsAftermarth, (Appendix to Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper No. 99, 1996),
rule 5(l)(d) and rule 7(2)(b).
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MacQueen's analysis, the Scottish Law Commission argues that as many of the
problems that arise in this area - what counts as a benefit (an enrichment), the measure
of recovery, possible bars to recovery and equitable defences - are best dealt with by
enrichment law, there is no need to do this work twice, once in enrichment and once in
94
contract.
4.4.3 Restitution is a Contractual Remedy
(i) Introduction
Whereas the argument that restitution ought to be classified as an enrichment
remedy is well developed, the contractual explanation of restitution remains relatively
less well explored. This contractual explanation has been defended on historical grounds
and with reference to the transformation theory.
(i i) Historical Approach
(a) Wouter de Vos
Writing from the standpoint of South African law, Wouter De Vos has argued
that the availability of the condictio causa data causa non secuta after termination for breach
in Roman law was intimately connected to the distinction between innominate real
contracts and consensual contracts.95 The innominate contracts of Roman law were not
94 Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 109, 1999), para. 4.44.
95 De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreek/ikheid (1987), 10-20; 62-6 and 156-8.
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enforceable by raising a legal action. Whilst counter-performance could not be obtained,
Roman law allowed the party who had performed under the contract to recover this
performance by means of the condictio causa data causa non secuta. This condictio was based
on the principles of unjustified enrichment and was used to recover property transferred
for a causa that failed to materialise. After the reception of Roman law in Europe, the
principle ofpacta sunt servanda established that all agreements seriously intended became
binding on agreement alone. The result of this was that in Roman-Dutch law the
innominate real contracts of Roman law were treated in the same way and enforced by
the same remedies as the consensual contracts. The distinction between innominate real
contracts and consensual contracts still applied in Roman-Dutch law to regulate the
recovery of benefits conferred prior to termination for breach. In respect of contracts
that would have been classified as innominate real contracts under Roman law, Roman-
Dutch law continued to grant the aggrieved party the right to claim the return of a
contractual performance by way of the condictio causa data causa non secuta. In respect of
contracts that would have been classified as consensual contracts in Roman law,
Roman-Dutch law granted the aggrieved party similar relief by way of a lex commissioria,
the actio empti or the actio redhibitoria?b
In De Vos's view, these specific actions available to terminate a contract and to
claim restitution in contracts that would have been regarded as consensual in Roman
law were considered to be contractual remedies.97 After South African law developed a
generalised right to terminate a contract for breach, the distinction between consensual
contracts and innominate real contracts was abolished for the purposes of regulating
restitution after termination for breach. According to De Vos, this development meant
96 De Vos, Veriykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 156.
97 Ibid.
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that the condictio causa data causa non secuta has no place in modern South African law after
terminadon for breach and as a result, restitution ought to be regarded as a contractual
remedy in all instances where the claim is for restitution ofmoney or returnable benefits
in kind.98
Although De Vos's view has had wide support, it has not gone uncontested.
While it is generally accepted that restitution after termination of innominate real
contracts of the do ut das variety was based on unjustified enrichment in both Roman
law and Roman-Dutch law, van der Walt has argued that it is not clear that restitution
after the termination of a consensual contract in Roman law was regarded as
contractual. According to van der Walt, there is equivalent historical support for the
conclusion that restitution after termination for breach is based either on unjustified
enrichment or simply upon the natural operation of termination.99
Furthermore, Hutton points out that even if it is accepted that the actions
available under Roman law and Roman-Dutch law for the recovery of benefits
conferred under contracts other than innominate real contracts were contractual in
nature, the most one can conclude from this is that the common law authority as to the
juristic basis of restitution is equally divided.100 As a matter of logic, therefore, De Vos's
conclusion could quite easily have gone the other way.101 Accordingly, the argument that
restitution of money and returnable benefits in kind is contractual is not supported by
98 Ibid.
99 Van der Walt, 'Die Grondslag van die Terruggaweplig ten opsigte van wat reeds gepresteer is waar na
kontrakbreuk terruggetree word — n kwessie van metode? (1985) 48 THRHR 5 at 13-4 cites, inter alia, the
following text in support of his argument: Voet 19.1.3 explaining D19.1.29 merely states that the actio
empti is available in certain circumstances for recovery of the purchase price after termination for breach
of the contract of sale. Importantly, Voet does not state that this is a contractual remedy. Indeed certain
South African writers contend that the actio redhibitoria is, in principle, best regarded as an enrichment
action. See Visser, (1992) A] 225 and Hutton, (1997) A] 210.
100 Hutton, (1997) A] 210 and Van der Walt, (1985) 48 THRHR 14.
101 Hutton, (1997)4/ 210.
119
the fact that the condictio causa data causa non secuta is not available after termination for
breach in modern law.
(b) Robin Evans-Jones
A similar historical argument is found in Scots law. Robin Evans-Jones builds
on the above history of the condictio causa data causa non secuta to argue that this condictio is
by definition not applicable after termination for breach.102 It is well established that the
condictio causa data causa non secuta is only available to recover a performance rendered
where the purpose {causa) of that transfer has failed.103 In the civilian tradition, a party
makes a transfer under a valid contract in order to fulfil a contractual obligation {causa
solvendi). If the contractual obligation is valid, transfers made prior to termination will
accordingly always achieve their purpose. It follows that restitution after termination for
breach cannot be an instance of the condictio causa data causa non secuta as this condictio is by
definition only available where the purpose of a transfer has failed.104
It is necessary to clarify one potentially ambiguous point in this argument.
When Evans-Jones refers to the purpose of performing under a contract, he must mean
the 'aim' of discharging a contractual obligation and not the actual fact of discharging it.
If this were not the case, then the causa would be non secuta where the contract breaker
rendered defective performance since this would not discharge his contractual
102 Evans-Jones has developed this argument in a series of contributions. See Evans-Jones, 'Unjust
Enrichment and the Third Reception of Roman Law in Scotland' (1993) 109 EQR 663; Dieckmann and
Evans-Jones, 'The Dark Side of Connelly v Simpson (1995) JR 90; Evans-Jones, (1997) AJ 139; Evans-Jones,
'Roman Law in Scotland and England' (1999) 115 EQR 605; Evans-Jones and Kruse, 'Failure of
Consideration' in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative
Perspective (2002), 128 and Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), paras. 4.02-04.
103 Evans-Jones, (1997) AJ 140.
104 Evans-Jones, (1997) AJ 140-1.
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obligation.105 From Evans-Jones' point of view, the undesirable result would be that the
contract breaker would be able to use the condictio causa data causa non secuta to recover his
defecdve performance.106
Like De Vos, Evans-Jones uses this as one of his arguments that restitution after
termination for breach ought to be regulated by contract law instead of the law of
unjustified enrichment.
Although the historical merits of this argument are well established, modern
Scots law has not interpreted the ambit of the condictio causa data causa non secuta in this
way. There is clear authority in Scots law for interpreting the purpose {causa) of a
contractual transfer to mean 'failure of consideration' where the consideration is taken
to mean the receipt of the anticipated counter-performance. This is most clearly seen in
Cantiere San Kocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. L&/107 where the condictio causa data
causa non secuta was used to recover what was transferred under a valid but subsequently
frustrated contract.108 As a result of the uncertainty surrounding Connelly v Simpson, it is
unclear whether this condictio applies in cases where the contract has been terminated for
breach. This issue will be discussed in section 5.3.1 (i)(b ii).
(iii) Restitution is Contractual because of the Transformation Theory: Gerhard
Lubbe
In explaining the contractual nature of restitution with reference to the
transformation theory, Lubbe makes two essential claims. First, the retention of a
105 The same would also hold true in cases where the aggrieved party renders part performance under the
contract. Zimmermann and du Plessis, 'Basic Features of the German Law of Unjustified Enrichment'
(1994) 2 RLR 14 at 21.
106 Zimmermann and du Plessis, (1994) 2 RLR 21.
107 1923 SC (HL) 105.
108 por a fu[] discussion see chapter 7.
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benefit is not held sine causa after termination for breach because termination leaves the
contractual nexus in tact (albeit with a transformed content).109 Lubbe uses the fact that
the contractual nexus survives termination for breach to justify the contractual nature of
restitution (at least in respect ofmoney and returnable benefits).
Hutton attacks this argument on two grounds. First, she argues that there is not
sufficient evidence that a contractual nexus survives termination for breach. The
existence of secondary obligations to make restitution and to pay damages, she argues,
does not itself support the existence of a continued contractual nexus as a contractual
nexus only consists of obligations that arise ex consensu (i.e those obligations which
derive from the formation of the contract).110 In her view, the question whether the
contractual nexus survives termination is essentially the same as the question whether
the duty to restore arises ex contractu or in unjustified enrichment.111 It is clear that
Hutton believes it is the latter.
Hutton's second line of attack concerns the sine causa requirement. Assuming
that the contractual nexus survives termination, Lubbe's argument is that this precludes
the claim for restitution from meeting the sine causa requirement. On this view, the causa
for a contractual performance is the contractual nexus itself.112 In Hutton's opinion, this
is less convincing than the view that the causa for the contractual performance is either
the valid contractual obligation to perform under the contract or the assumption of due
completion of the contract.
109 Lubbe, 'The Assessment of Loss upon Cancellation for Breach ofContract' (1984) 101 SALJ 616 at
637.
110 Hutton, (1997)A] 219. For a similar type of argument see also O'Brien and lteinecke, (1998) TSAR
562-3. The authors argue that the idea of the transformation theory is not associated with the intention of
the parties because, they say, contracts are concluded with a view to fulfilment and not with a view to
their premature termination. For an argument that termination extinguishes all obligations that are
affected by termination see Van der Merwe et a/., Contract Genera!Principles, (2003), 377.
111 Hutton, (1997) A] 219.
112 Lubbe, (1984) 101 SALJ 637.
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Lubbe's second point is that restitution is a necessary step towards calculating
positive interesse damages. Although it is necessary to take account of the aggrieved
party's 'restitution' interest in calculating damages, O'Brien and Reinecke have pointed
out that this is not a convincing reason for viewing restitution as a contractual remedy.
Lubbe's argument presupposes that as a matter of doctrine, restitution and damages
ought to have the same doctrinal basis and that damages and restitution are inextricably
linked as two components of one remedy or at least so closely connected that they
cannot be separated. The authors rightly point out that this does not explain why the
contract breaker is also entitled to restitution without, obviously, ever having a damages
claim.113 This leads the authors to the conclusion that there is no practical or doctrinal
impediment to regarding damages and restitution as having separate doctrinal bases.
Indeed, this is the current position in South African law where restitution of inherently
non-returnable benefits is considered to be an enrichment remedy.
Although Lubbe's use of the transformation theory to justify a contractual
explanation of restitution strains under the weight of the above criticisms, this is not the
end of the matter.114 In my view, the transformation theory can be made to do useful
explanatory work if it turns out that restitution ought to be regulated by contract law.
One way ofmaking sense of the distinction between primary and secondary
obligations is to see it as providing a theoretical tool to distinguish between two types of
contractual rights. The primary contractual rights are those which aim at the performance
of a contract while the secondary contractual rights are those which aim at the winding
up of a contract after termination for breach. Put another way, restitution is a
contractual remedy precisely because it is the secondary right that arose after the
1)3 O' Brien and Reinecke, (1998) TSAR 567-8.
114 For a hedged concession see Lubbe, 'Voidable Contracts' in Zimmermann and Visser (eds), Southern
Cross: Civil Taw and Common Taw in SouthAfrica (1996), 261 at 286 n241.
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aggrieved party terminated the contract for a breach of his primary contractual right to
performance.113 This clearly cuts across the arguments made by those in the enrichment
camp who view contractual remedies as inextricably linked to the parties' contractual
intentions. Although their view of the division of obligations and the way of
differentiating between contractual and enrichment remedies has predominated over the
last decade, it can be argued that there is more to the story of contractual rules than
binding promises and fulfilling contractual expectations.116 Indeed, there is something
counter-intuitive about allowing contract law to determine when a contract is formed;
when it is breached; how it is discharged by performance; when damages can be
claimed; and what quantum of damages are recoverable and then to remove from its
ambit an integral part of the winding up process after termination for breach.
(iv) Restitution is Contractual because of the Source of the Obligation to
Restore
(a) Johannes Dieckmann and Robin Evans-Jones
Johannes Dieckmann and Robin Evans-Jones have argued that restitution is
contractual because
'[t]he source of the obligation to restore ... arises from fully valid contracts and
it therefore by reference to the law of contract that the solution for these cases
... is best found. Under this approach restitution is merely one of a range of
responses, including damages and specific implement, provided by the law of
contract.'117
115 For a similar type of argument see Perillo, 'Restitution in a Contractual Context' (1973) 73 Columbia LR
1208 at 1213-6. For a useful discussion of the theory underlying the distinction between primary and
secondary rights see Barker, 'Rescuing Remedialism in Unjust Enrichment Law: Why Remedies are Right'
(1998) 57 CLJ 301 at 319-26.
116 See for example Atiyah, 'Contracts, Promises and the Law of Obligations' in Atiyah (ed), Essajs on
Contract (1986), 10. See also Hogg, Obligations (2003), para. 4.101.
117 Dieckmann and Evans-Jones, (1995) JR 100. De Vos, in a similar vein, argues that the secondary
obligations of the transformation theory come from the naturaha of the contract. De Vos,
Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 356. See also Van der Merwe et al., Contract: General Principles, (2003), 382
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This argument is closely linked to the use of the transformation theory to explain the
contractual nature of restitution and, as we shall see below, probably best explains
MacQueen's analysis in 1997.
(b) Hector MacQueen: The 1997 View
Although MacQueen was not unequivocal about the doctrinal basis of
restitution after termination for breach in his 1994 article, the tenor of the argument
shows that he inclines — albeit in a slightly hedged way - towards an enrichment view of
this remedy.118 In 1997, as part of a broader enquiry into the relationship between
contract and unjustified enrichment, MacQueen inclines — this time, hedging in the
opposite direction - towards a contractual view of restitution after termination for
breach.119 This is evident from the fact that this remedy is dealt with under a heading
entitled 'Contract Rules which Prevent Unjustified Enrichment'.120 The central idea is
that the prevention of unjustified enrichment is one of the aims of contract law. In
other words, just because a remedy aims to prevent an unjustified enrichment, this does
not necessarily mean that the remedy is enrichment in nature. MacQueen does,
however, go on to say that enrichment considerations might still be relevant.121
Presumably, this means that the courts might profitably look to relevant enrichment
where the authors say that the traditional view is that restitution is based on the naturalia of the contract
and is therefore a contractual remedy. Although the authors supported the contractual analysis of
restitution (at least in respect ofmoney benefits and returnable benefits in kind) in the first edition of
their book, they now support the enrichment analysis. See respectively, Van der Merwe et al., Contract
General Principles, (1993), 293 and Van der Merwe et al, Contract GeneralPrinciples, (2003), 382.
118 See section 4.4.2(vi).
119 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure
ofContracts (1997), 199.
120 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability A Scots Perspective' in Failure
ofContracts (1997), 216.
121 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure
ofContracts (1997), 217.
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concepts without necessarily importing wholesale enrichment analysis. For example, the
courts might look to enrichment law to assist in the analysis ofwhat constitutes a
benefit without necessarily opening the door to the change of position defence.
Although MacQueen appears to come down firmly in favour of the view that
resdtudon is contractual, he argues, perhaps somewhat inconsistently, that quantum
meruit claims - which raise the same issues as restitution claims — ought be classified as
enrichment actions. This is justified, he says, by the twin facts that these claims aim to
prevent unjustified enrichment and involve a departure from the terms of the
contract.122
Two points are worth noting about MacQueen's analysis. First, although this is
not made explicit, MacQueen appears to be justifying his contractual view of restitution
after termination for breach along similar lines to Dieckmann and Evans-Jones.
Secondly, by arguing that restitution is contractual even though its aim is to prevent an
unjustified enrichment MacQueen is implicitly making an important concession: that he
no longer advocates distinguishing between contractual and enrichment remedies
according to the approach outlined in the introduction to section 4.4.2.
4.4.4 Restitution: Contract, Unjustified Enrichment or Sometimes Contract
and Sometimes Unjustified Enrichment?
(i) Introduction
The above exposition demonstrates that both the contractual and the
enrichment analysis of restitution after termination for breach are doctrinally defensible.
122 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure
ofContracts (1997), 222.
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This poses a difficult question: how should a legal system chose between two doctrinally
defensible solutions? This is especially acute when the courts and some academics are
strongly opposed to each other. Van der Walt rightly warns that researchers must tread
cautiously in these circumstances.123 What follows is an assessment of the various
approaches considered above and a theoretical suggestion as to how, in my view, a legal
system ought to choose between doctrinally defensible solutions.
(ii) A Question ofMethodology
(a) Historical Approach
One way of tackling the doctrinal basis of restitution is to consider the history of
the remedy. We saw that the doctrinal basis of restitution was not satisfactorily resolved
in Roman law, Roman-Dutch law or Scots law during the period of the institutional
writers. This is unsurprising as the lack of a generalised right to terminate a contract for
breach limited the respective lawyers from considering the consequences of termination
for breach on the requisite level of generality.124 This historical approach is accordingly
of limited value in this instance.
Another variation of the historical argument is used by De Vos and Evans-
Jones. In order to support their claim that restitution is based on the law of contract, the
authors focused on the history and scope of the condictio causa data causa non secuta. The
argument is that it is historically inaccurate to use this condictio after termination for
breach. Although the historical development of this condictio is well established, modern
123 He also (jokingly) suggests that the researcher should think carefully about choosing another topic for
his labour. Van der Walt, (1985) 48 THRHR 6.
124 See O' Brien and Reinecke, (1998) TSAR 561.
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Scots law has applied this condictio after contractual failure. South African law still
appears to follow a restrictive approach.125 South African law does, however, have the
condictio sine causa specialis in the form of the condictio ob causamfinitam which can regulate
restitution after termination for breach.126 This condictio is available for restitution of a
transfer that was made on the basis of an initially valid causa that has subsequently fallen
away.
It was established by authors in the enrichment camp that it is at least
theoretically possible for one of the established enrichment actions to regulate
restitution after termination for breach. This is strengthened by a move towards a more
generalised approach to enrichment liability in both South African and Scots law.
According to this generalised approach, all that is required is that the general
requirements for enrichment liability are present.127 As a result, the importance of the
precise historical scope of a particular enrichment action diminishes in favour of a more
principled and conceptual approach.
In my view, the above reasons demonstrate that the argument for the
contractual analysis of restitution is not sufficiently supported by a consideration of the
history of restitution itself or by a consideration of the historical development of one
specific enrichment action. This analysis also highlights a potential deficiency with using
the history of a particular remedy as the threshold criterion for solving doctrinal
problems.
125 See Du Plessis, 'Towards a rational structure of liability for unjustified enrichment: Thoughts from two
mixed jurisdictions' (2005) SAL] 149.
126 This condictio is applied to reverse transfers made under a valid causa that has subsequently fallen away.
127 See Kudu Granite Operations (Ptyj Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at 202. The case involved a
claim to redress the economic imbalances after the termination of a contact as a result of supervening
impossibility of performance (frustration). In referring to the choice between the condictio ob causamfinitam
and the condictio causa data causa non secuta and specifically to Evans-Jones' argument about the latter, Navsa
JA and Hefer AJA stated that 'the essential point is that [the] claim is covered by one or the other remedy
for unjust enrichment. It follows that to assess that claim one has to consider whether the ... general
enrichment elements are present.'
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(b) Abstract Taxonomic Approach
The views of those in the enrichment camp are united by their reliance on
abstract taxonomic or doctrinal reasons. By this it is meant that their arguments rest on
a particular way of carving up the law of obligations or on matters relating to the
internal workings of unjustified enrichment. These arguments have established that it is
theoretically possible to treat restitution as an enrichment remedy. Interestingly, Collins
has suggested that the recent surge of interest in the breakdown of contracts is due to
'the long delayed impact of the Realist insight that the content of primary obligations
does not determine the content of the secondary obligations.'128 In other words, just
because a benefit was transferred pursuant to a valid contract, there is no reason why
the remedies after the termination of that contract cannot be based on the law of
unjustified enrichment. What is clear from the literature is that the enrichment lawyers
have used this awareness of the 'loosening of the ties between primary and secondary
obligations' to argue that restitution after termination for breach should arise uniformly
in unjustified enrichment.129 The irony is that their arguments presuppose a strong,
enrichment-based link between the very same primary and secondary obligations.
Although these arguments have a certain compelling internal logic, this does not paint
over the indeterminacy between the primary and secondary obligations. In other words,
there appears to be no argument based on prior logic which we can use to determine the
juristic basis of restitution after termination for breach.130 Indeed, we saw that the
argument that restitution is enrichment-based does not preclude the finding that
128 Collins, 'Review of Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual, Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences'
(1998) 2 Edin LR 368.
129 Collins, (1998) 2 Edin LR 369.
130 For a criticism of the use of the taxonomic divisions in the law of obligations to justify legal rules see
Cockrell, 'The Hegemony of Contract Law' (1998) 115 SAL] 286 at 304-8.
129
restitution can be contractual. It should not come as a surprise that there are two
doctrinal alternatives which could govern restitution after termination for breach since it
is rare for arguments based exclusively on abstract taxonomic doctrine to yield definitive
answers to complex legal problems.131
The same concerns can be raised against Lubbe's use of the transformation
theory to support a contractual explanation of restitution. Even if the analysis of the
effects of termination for breach on the contractual nexus points towards a distinction
between primary and secondary obligations, this is not a sufficiently good reason for
classifying restitution as contractual. The argument suffers the same deficiencies as the
'abstract taxonomic' argument advanced by the enrichment lawyers. The crucial point is
that in deciding on the proper doctrinal basis of restitution, it is vitally important that
the tail does not wag the dog.
(c) Comparative Approach
A brief comparison with the position in other countries supports the claim that
there is nothing self evidently correct about treating restitution as arising in either the
law of contract or the law of unjustified enrichment.
The position in English law is complex. The majority of English academics
think that unjust enrichment is best organised around a system of unjust factors.
According to this approach, a specific factor is required to trigger an enrichment claim.
One of the unjust factors, relied upon by Hutton in mounting her argument, is 'failure
of consideration'. Failure of consideration is tested by looking at whether the party
131 For a colourful and cutting critique of the abstract doctrinal approach see Campbell, 'Review Article,
Classification and the Crisis ofthe Common haul (1999) 26 JLS 369.
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claiming restitution ofmoney has received the bargained-for counter-performance.132 If
this bargained for counter-performance has not been forthcoming, then the benefit can
be reclaimed with an enrichment action.
A number of points are important to note. First, although an enrichment
analysis of failure of consideration is the majority view amongst academics, this view is
not universally held.133 Secondly, those who favour an enrichment analysis of failure of
consideration have done so for abstract taxonomic reasons and are subject to the same
criticisms raised directly above. Thirdly, the whole system of unjust factors has recently
been called into question by a combination of the House of Lords decision in Kleinmrt
Benson Ltd v Lincoln City Council34 and Sonia Meier's comparative work. Indeed, such was
the force of Meier's arguments that it has led Birks to abandon his original scheme of
unjust factors in favour of the civilian starting point. This approach asks whether there
is any legal ground for justifying the enrichment.135
This new paradigm requires a reworking of the 'failure of consideration' unjust
factor as the enrichment-based explanation for restitution. In cases where a contract has
been terminated for breach, the requirements of failure of consideration are met when
the anticipated counter-performance is not received.136 In Birks' new scheme, the failure
of contractual reciprocation is not the direct trigger of an unjust enrichment claim.
Instead, it allows the aggrieved party to terminate the contract which in turn invalidates
(retrospectively) the contractual obligation to perform and the 'invalidity of the
132 Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 324ff.
133 See for example Jaffey, The Nature and Scope ofRestitution: Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts and
Disgorgement (2000), 54-64 and Jaffey, 'The llestitutionary Conditional Transfer Analysis and the Death of
Contract' (1998) 2 Edin LR 23. For an insightful and critical review ofJaffey's argument see Barker,
'Review Article, The Nature and Scope ofRestitution' (2001) 9 RLR 232.
134 [1999] 2 AC 349 AC (HL).
135 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), 38-9.
136 Burrows, The Eaw ofRestitution (2002), 324ff.
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obligation constitutes the absence of explanatory basis which renders the enrichment
unjust.'137 Although this briefly attempts to explain how failure of consideration fits into
this new scheme, some uncertainty remains.
The upshot is that English law does not decisively illuminate the path to
doctrinal clarity.
German law also provides an interesting point of comparison. Until the recent
revisions of the code, restitution after terminadon for breach had a dual doctrinal basis.
The old regime was complex. The consequences of termination were generally found in
the contract rules §346-361 of the BGB. Dannemann notes that, surprisingly, §346-361
had been drafted for the much rarer case of a contractually stipulated right to
termination. It is only by reference to §327 that these provisions applied, in addition, to
the statutory right to terminate. The problem was that §327 contained a rather oblique
second sentence, which said that if termination of a contract has been declared against a
party who is not to blame, this party is liable under the more lenient rules of unjustified
enrichment rather than the stricter contractual rules.138 The interpretation of this
sentence has caused problems. The courts, however, applied its rationale, which was
obviously to benefit the aggrieved party, and held that the aggrieved party is liable in
terms of the more lenient rules of unjustified enrichment.139 The net result was that the
doctrinal basis of restitution differed depending on whether the aggrieved party or the
137 Birks, Unjust Enrichment {2003), 127.
138 There is generally stricter liability under the contractual provisions than under the enrichment
provisions (§813ff) in that change of position is not recognised as a defence under the former.
Dannemann, 'Restitution for Termination of Contract in German Law' in Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts:
Contractual, Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 129 at 144.
139 Zimmermann notes, however, that some commentators are prepared to accept the literal meaning of
the second sentence in §327. This effectively means that this section has no scope with the result that
both the aggrieved party and the contract breaker are liable under the stricter contractual rules of §346ff.
Zimmermann, 'Restitution after Termination for Breach of Contract in German Law' (1997) 5 RLR 13 at
15.
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contract breaker was the restitution claimant.140
The legal position under the old law can be summarised as follows: if a contract
was terminated as a result of a right stipulated in the contract, then restitution occured
entirely under the law of contract (§346-361), while if termination occured in terms of
the statutory right, then a mixed contractual (§ 346-361) / unjustified enrichment (§813
et seq) model applied depending on whether the claimant was the contract breaker or the
aggrieved party.141
Recent reforms have significantly simplified the position in German law. Whilst
both parties are still under a duty to restore performances received prior to termination
for breach, the doctrinal basis has now changed. The law of unjustified enrichment no
longer regulates restitution after termination for breach in any circumstances. Instead,
restitution is governed by a set of specific contractual rules (§ 346ff). Although this can
be seen as a set of special suigeneris rules, Zimmermann says they rest on the following
juristic basis:
'[djoctrinally, the existence of this specific restitution regime has always been
justified by pointing out that termination does not remove the entire contract
(be it ab initio or ex nunc) and does not, therefore, create a situation where the
performance can be said to have been made 'without legal ground' [as is
required in German law for an unjustified enrichment claim], but instead
transforms a relationship aiming at the implementation of the contractual
programme originally agreed upon into a contractual winding-up relationship.'142
In contrast to the majority view of English law, German law has opted for a
specific contractual regime to regulate restitution after termination for breach.
This brief comparative picture demonstrates that legal systems can, and in fact
do, legitimately differ in what they consider to be the proper doctrinal basis of
140 Dannemann, 'Restitution for Termination of Contract in German Law' in Failure ofContracts (1997),
131.
141 Ibid.
142 Zimmermann, 'Remedies for Non-Performance: the revised German law of obligations, viewed against
the background of the Principles of European Contract Law' (2002) 6 Edin LR 271 at 306.
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restitution after termination for breach. This demonstrates that both in logic and in
practice restitution after termination for breach can arise in either contract or unjustified
enrichment. Accordingly, if there is no apriori way to determine whether restitution
should be based on the principles of contract, unjustified enrichment or sometimes on
the principles of contract and sometimes on the principles of enrichment, then we need
to find some alternative method for making this choice.
(d) An Approach based on the Principles Underlying the Remedy and the
Consequences of Classifying a Remedy According to a Set of Doctrinal
Rules
The above analysis demonstrates that neither the historical, the abstract
taxonomical/doctrinal or the comparative approach yielded a satisfactory answer to the
question regarding the proper doctrinal basis of restitution after termination for breach.
The aim of this section is to set out a theoretical framework that, in my view, ought to
be used whenever a legal system has a choice between two doctrinally defensible
alternatives.143 This framework will be used in the following two chapters to resolve the
doctrinal debate about the basis of restitution after termination for breach. This
framework will also be used in the final substantive chapter to suggest the proper
doctrinal basis of the claims under review in the other two species of contractual failure.
In my view, the choice between doctrinal alternatives ought to be made after
143 It is important to note that we are dealing here with a decision that a legal system must make between
viewing restitution as being regulated by the law of contract, the law of unjustified enrichment, or
sometimes by the law of contract and sometimes by the law of unjustified enrichment. This is different
from questions of concurrence in the sense that the same facts disclose two distinct causes of action that
might be pleaded in the alternative by one party. On issues of concurrence in this sense see Stevens,
'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective — A Comment' in Rose
(ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual, Pestitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 225 at 228-30 and
Visser, 'Concurrence of Enrichment and Contractual Claims' (2000) 117 SAL] 173.
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careful consideration of the following: (a) the principles of recovery underpinning a
particular remedy in each of the distinguishable contexts in which this remedy arises and
(b) the consequences of imposing liability according to a particular set of doctrinal rules.
It will be argued that the proper doctrinal basis of a particular remedy is the one which,
having due regard to the consequences of imposing liability according to a doctrinal set
of rules, most accurately reflects these principles of recovery.144 The important
difference between this approach and the abstract taxonomic approach is the type of
reason used to support a particular doctrinal justification for classifying a remedy. My
claim is that purely doctrinal reasons are, by themselves, not sufficiently cogent reasons
for making doctrinal choices. This is not to say that those who advocate either the
contractual or the enrichment view of restitution are wrong in respect of their ultimate
conclusion. The claim is that if a particular conclusion turns out to be correct or
partially correct, it is critical that this is for the right reasons.
In order to give content to the approach advocated here, it is first necessary to
define precisely what is meant by 'principles'. In discussing judicial reasoning, Neil
MacCormick gives the following useful explanation ofwhat is meant by the 'principles'
underlying legal rules:
'[t]he 'general principles' ... express the underlying reasons for the specific rules
which exist. As such they are not found but made; to give principlep as the
'underlying reason' of the rule r, or the rules r, rp r2 , r3 and so on, is to impute to
those who first introduced it some general policy whose introduction it was
supposed to promote, or alternatively to state what seems the best
contemporary justification for maintaining it. The content of the rules partly
determines the possible range of reasons which could conceivably be adduced as
explanatory of them. The contemporary standards of received values (what
judges call 'common sense') further limit the matter; only what is conceived
144 This approach gives substance to the calls of those who have argued, albeit in different contexts, that
justice or policy reasons, ought to guide the choice between classifying a remedy according to a particular
set of doctrinal rules. See Van der Walt, (1985) 48 THRHR 23 and Wolffe, (1997) 1 Edin LR 477.
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good or desirable can count as a policy whose furtherance by the introduction or
maintenance of legal rules can be propounded as the underlying justification and
rationalization of the rules in question. Statements of 'legal principles' are
normative expressions of such rationalizing or justifying policies.'145
It is in this sense that 'principles' will be used throughout this thesis.
In respect of the consequences of imposing liability according to a particular set
of doctrinal rules, it will be demonstrated that two considerations are critical: first,
unjustified enrichment law necessarily brings with it the change of position/loss of
enrichment defence and secondly, once impoverishment of the pursuer is established,
unjustified enrichment law has one hand tied behind its back in that it is restricted to
viewing matters exclusively from the defender's perspective.
Having defined what these principles and consequences are, the next task is to
give them meaningful content in the context of the claims under review. A helpful way
of teasing out these principles and these consequences is by considering real and
hypothetical cases. It will be demonstrated that our intuitions about the just results that
ought to be reached in these real and hypothetical cases indicate that three general
factors are critical in distilling the principles of recovery underpinning the remedies
arising in the three species of contractual failure: the contract price; the contractual
allocation of risk; and the incidence of fault in the circumstances leading to contractual
failure. The last of these factors is also a key feature in distinguishing between contracts
terminated as a consequence of breach and improperly obtained consent on the one
hand and contracts terminated as a consequence of frustration on the other. This
suggests that the features which distinguish the three species of contractual failure also
have an important role to play in distilling the principles of recovery underpinning the
145 MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (1978), 166. Dworkin's view of legal principles — as they
are contrasted to legal rules - would have been equally helpful for my purpose. See Dworkin, Taking Rights
Seriously (1978), 22-3 and 26.
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claims under review.
Furthermore, examining the position in other jurisdictions can also assist with
the task of uncovering the principles of recovery. This will involve examining the
specific rules that regulate the consequences of contractual failure in other jurisdictions.
Although Hutton attempts to attribute a unitary purpose to restitution after
termination for breach, a more differentiated approach is necessary. This is because the
circumstances in which restitution occurs can differ significantly. Accordingly, it is
necessary to test more carefully which principles underlie restitution in each of the
justifiably divergent circumstances in which this claim arises. If different principles
govern restitution in these different circumstances, then it is critical for the rules on
restitution to reflect these principles. For this reason, restitution after termination for
breach is divided into claims for restitution ofmoney or returnable benefits in kind
(chapter five) and claims for restitution of inherently non-returnable benefits (chapter
six). Each of these chapters is further subdivided depending on whether the claimant is
the contract breaker or the aggrieved party. This is necessary because it can affect the
moral blameworthiness of the parties and this can influence the principles of recovery.
I will argue that the law of unjustified enrichment is in many cases insufficiently
sensitive to the principles of recovery underpinning the claims under review. This is for
two reasons. First, unjustified enrichment is tied to imposing liability according to a
single principle, namely that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at another's
expense. Secondly, where liability ought to rest on other principles, the unjustified
enrichment doctrines that buttress the general principle are often too blunt or narrow to
take these other principles into account. It will be argued that in the majority of cases
contract law is, or can be adapted to be, more sensitive to these principles of recovery
than the law of unjustified enrichment. This is because contract law is constituted by a
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broader and more complex set of principles than the law of unjustified enrichment.
Furthermore, even where liability does rest on the principle that no one should be
unjustifiably enriched at another's expense, this can be accommodated by contract law.
Accordingly, where a legal system has a choice between a contractual solution and an
unjustified enrichment solution, contract law will often enable a more just solution than
the law of unjustified enrichment.
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Chapter 5
Restitution of Returnable Benefits and Restitution of Money
5.1 Introduction
The focus in this chapter is on restitution of returnable benefits and on
restitution of money. The following chapter will focus on restitution of inherently non-
returnable benefits. There are two reasons for this separate treatment: first, the different
restitution claims raise different issues in respect of working out when the right to
restitution arises and secondly, claims for restitution of inherently non-returnable
benefits present more acute valuation problems.
As stated in the introduction to chapter four, the two critical questions that need
to be answered are: (a) when does the right to restitution arise and (b) when this right
arises, what is the quantum of this restitution claim? When the question about the
doctrinal basis of restitution arises, the approach suggested in section 4.4.4(ii)(d) will be
followed.
After the introduction, this chapter is divided into three main sections: the first
considers restitution of returnable benefits; the second section considers restitution of
money from a co-contractant and the third considers restitution of money from a third
party (i.e someone other than a co-contractant).
5.2 Restitution of Returnable Benefits
5.2.1 Aggrieved Party's Claim
Both South African law and Scots law grant the aggrieved party the right to
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claim restitution of returnable benefits conferred on the contract breaker prior to
termination for breach.1 This will occur most commonly when the aggrieved party sells
and delivers goods to a purchaser who subsequently breaches the contract. Where the
goods can be returned, it makes no difference whether the claim is regarded as a
contractual remedy or as an enrichment remedy. Either way, the aggrieved party gets the
actual goods back.2
Problems arise, however, if exact restitution is no longer possible, say, because
the goods are accidentally lost or destroyed. The general rule in contracts of sale is that
the purchaser bears the risk of accidental loss of, or destruction to, the goods.
Accordingly, it is right that the breaching purchaser rather than the aggrieved seller
bears this loss. From a doctrinal point of view, this is significant as this result would not
be achieved if the breaching purchaser was allowed to repel the aggrieved party's
restitution claim with the change of position defence. If the claim were to be regarded as
enrichment-based, then it is imperative that the contract breaker is prevented from
raising this defence. Although it is clear that this defence rests on an equitable
foundation and would probably be denied to the contract breaker in these
circumstances, this is by no means clear given the uncertain scope of the defence in
South African and Scots law.' It is important to note, however, that the aggrieved party
can sidestep this problem by repackaging his restitution claim as a claim for reliance loss
1 For South African law see Bonne Fortune Be/eggings Bpk v Kalahari Salt Works (Pty) Ltd 1974 (1) SA 414
(NC) at 423-4; Van Heerden v Sentrale Kunsmiskorporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A) at 31 and Baker v
Probert 1985 (3) SA 429 (A) at 438. For Scots law see McCormick v Rittmejer (1869) 7 M 854 at 858 and
Lloyds Bankpic v Bamberger 1993 SC 570 at 573. As we shall see the right to claim restitution is not as
clearly established in Scots law as it ought to be.
2 It is clear in these cases that the aggrieved party can escape the consequences of a bad bargain by
claiming restitution. This is also the solution favoured by the Principles ofEuropean Contract Law. See PECL
Art 9:308 and Lando and Beale (eds), Principles ofEuropean Contract Law (2000), comment on Art 9:308.
3 For the scope of the defence in South African and Scots law see sections 4.2.3 and 4.3.3 respectively.
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damages.4
If the contract breaker is prevented from raising this defence, how much can the
aggrieved party recover by way of substitutionary financial restitution? The critical
question is whether the aggrieved party is entitled to the value of the benefit conferred
even where this will leave him better off financially than he would have been had the
contract been fulfilled, or whether, on the contrary, his expectation interest should cap
his restitution claim. The following example illuminates the issues at stake. Say that A
sold his rare second hand sports car to B for £5,000. B was obliged to pay the purchase
price in five monthly instalments. B pays the first instalment and A delivers the car. At
the end of the first month the car is accidentally destroyed by fire and thereafter B
repudiates the contract. A terminates the contract. It turns out that the car was worth
£7,500. The question is whether A can claim £7,500 from B or whether his claim is
limited to £5,000.
If the aggrieved party claims reliance loss damages, his claim will be restricted by
his expectation interest (£5,000). In any event this issue is unlikely to arise in practice as
it would always be in the contract breaker's interest to pay the remaining instalments if
he knew that breaching the contract would open him up to a greater (enrichment) claim.
This is also probably the correct result in principle as it seems intuitively unfair
to allow the aggrieved party to make a windfall gain in these circumstances.5
Accordingly, the aggrieved party's restitution claim ought to be measured with
reference to the contract price. This indicates that the law of contract provides the
solution to these cases. There is accordingly no good reason to change the existing
4 For the overlap between the restitution interest and the reliance interest in contractual damages see
Hutchison, 'Back to Basics: Reliance Damages for Breach of Contract Revisited' (2004) 121 SALJ 51 at
57-8.
5 For an argument as to why this might not be the case in a limited number of circumstances see section
6.4.2(iii)(b).
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doctrinal basis of this claim in South African law. Although the doctrinal basis of
restitution of returnable benefits is not clear in Scots law, it is submitted that Scots law
ought to follow South African law in this regard.
5.2.2 Contract Breaker's Claim
A contract breaker's claim for restitution of returnable benefits will occur most
commonly in a contract of sale where the aggrieved party is the purchaser and the
contract breaker is the seller. The contract breaker's restitution claim will frequently be
raised as a counter-claim to the aggrieved purchaser's claim for restitution of the
purchase price.
(i) South African Law
In South African law, if the aggrieved party cannot make counter-restitution by
exact equivalent or in specie then, subject to a number of exceptions outlined below, he
loses his right to terminate the contract.6 This inability may be caused by loss, destruction
or alienation of the goods.
There are, however, a number of exceptions to the above rule. Termination is
still permitted if the reason for the inability to return the performance is not attributable
to the aggrieved party's fault.7 In these circumstances the contract breaker's claim for
6 Van Heerden v Sentrale Knnsmiskorporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A). For a full discussion of the South
African law in this regard see Van der Merwe et at., Contract: General Principles (2003), 374-6.
7 Examples in this category include loss or destruction caused by the following: vis major (Hatl-Tbermotank
Natal(Pty) Ltd vHardman 1968 (4) SA 818 (N); fair wear and tear (Beneke vLaney 1949 (3) SA 967 (ODPA)
at 972); the use in the ordinary way as contemplated by the parties (purpose and manner) without the
aggrieved party receiving any benefit (Montagu Cooperative Wineries Ltd v Lewin 1912 CPD 1153); and an
inherent defect or weakness in the subject matter complained of (Marks Ltd v Laughton 1920 AD 12). See
more generally Extel lndnctrial (Pty) Ltd andAnother v Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 719 (SCA) at 731-3.
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restitution is for the surrogate (where applicable) or the value of what remains in the
aggrieved party's possession.8
Even where the impossibility of making full counter-restitution is due to the
aggrieved party's fault, the courts have sometimes been willing to relax the strict
requirement of counter-restitution and have ordered the deficiency to be made up by
pecuniary substmitute.9
Perhaps a better approach would be for South African law to permit the
aggrieved party to terminate the contract in all cases and to allow the contract breaker to
claim restitution by way of a financial substitute.10 This will clear the way for a principled
evaluation of the critical issue that arises on these facts: who should bear the risk of the
accidental damage to, or destruction of, the subject matter of the sale where there is no
connection between the damage/destruction and the breach?
The current South African law does not answer this question directly. Instead,
according to the general risk rule in contracts of sale, the purchaser bears the risk of
accidental loss to, or destruction of, the goods. The question is whether this rule is
appropriate in this context.
(ii) Scots Law
In Scots law, the question of the contract breaker's claim for restitution of
returnable goods has arisen in the prescription context. In N. V. Dews Gebroeder v
8 In Basson v Barkhuisen 1945 CPD 37 the aggrieved party who slaughtered a pig remained liable for the
value of the carcass. Similarly, in Diblej v Furter\95\ (4) SA 73 (C) the aggrieved party was liable to restore
the price obtained from the sale of the res vendita to third party.
9 Harper v Webster DBG (2) SA 496 (FS). See also Van Heerden v Sentrale Kunsmiskorporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973
(1) SA 17 (A) at 31-2 and Cash Converters Southern Africa v Rosebud WP Franchise 2002 (5) 494 (SCA) at 509.
10 See also section 5.3.1 (ii)(c) for further analysis of this argument.
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Sunderland Sportswear Ltdn a seller delivered goods that turned out to be partly defective.
As a result of these defects, the purchasers successfully repelled a claim for the contract
price in respect of non-defective goods. After litigation had determined that the sellers
could not claim on the contract, they instituted an enrichment claim (recompense) to
recover for the goods that were accepted and profitably used by the purchasers.12
Although the court accepted that the sellers could, in principle, have an enrichment
action in these circumstances, it was unnecessary to decide the issue because it was held
that this enrichment claim had prescribed.13 The case is, however, of limited authority
for present purposes since academic commentary has established that it was not
necessary to resort to the law of enrichment on these facts. MacQueen has suggested
that the real problem with the case was that it was incorrectly decided at first instance.
When the case was decided, the law stated that a purchaser, faced with partly defective
goods, either had to reject all the goods (and thus avoid liability for the total contract
price) or accept all the goods and pay the purchase price subject to his claim for
damages.14
In dealing with accidental damage to, or destruction of, returnable goods, Scots
common law does not appear to prevent the aggrieved party from terminating the
contract because of an inability to make counter-restitution of returnable benefits.15 For
11 1990 SC 291.
12 N. V. Devos Gebroeder v Sunderland Sportswear Ltd 1990 SC 291 at 298-9.
13 N. V. Devos Gebroeder v Sunderland Sportswear Ltd 1990 SC 291 at 304.
14 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Rose
(ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual\ Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 199 at 202. See now
s35A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended) which allows the purchaser to reject part of a
consignment of goods without having to reject the whole consignment. It is thought that the purchaser
remains liable at the contract rate for the goods that have been accepted. Beale et al. (eds), Chitty on
Contracts (1999), para. 43-285. For another argument about resolving N. V. Devos Gebroeder along
contractual lines see Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), para. 10.49.
15 None of the textbooks list this as one of the reasons that might cause the aggrieved party to lose his
right to terminate the contract for the contract breaker's breach. See for example, MacQuecn and
Thomson, Contract Lmw in Scotland (2000), para. 5.43-52 and McBryde, The ~Law ofContract in Scotland (2001),
para. 20-121. Indeed, MacQueen has stated that the aggrieved party's ability to make restitutio in integrum, a
requirement for setting aside a voidable contract, does not apply to termination for breach. MacQueen,
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a complete picture, it is necessary to consider the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended).
In respect of bearing the risk, the basic rule in the Sale of Goods Act is that risk of
accidental damage to, or destruction of, the goods tracks the ownership of those goods.
If the seller has reserved the ownership of the goods, the accidental destruction of the
goods (and concomitant inability to return the goods) would probably not block the
purchaser's right to terminate the contract. In cases where the purchaser carries the risk,
academic opinion is that this would not block the purchaser's right to terminate the
contract if the goods were destroyed as a result of the seller's breach.16 The position is,
however, unclear. The position is even less clear in cases where the cause of the
accidental damage to, or destruction of, the goods is unconnected to the seller's breach.
If risk tracks ownership and the purchaser takes ownership on delivery, then it would
appear logical that the purchaser bears the risk and would, depending on the approach
adopted, either lose his right to claim restitution of the price or be subject to a
restitution claim from the contract breaker.
(iii) The Position in Principle and the Doctrinal Basis of Restitution
In my view, the ability to make counter-restitution should not restrict the
aggrieved party's right to terminate the contract and to claim restitution of the contract
price. Such a restriction is a blunt way of dealing with the question ofwho should bear
the risk of accidental loss of, or destruction to, the goods when compared with the
'Unjustified Enrichment and Breach of Contract' (1994) JR 137 at 148. See also Hellwege, 'Unwinding
Mutual Contracts: Restitutio in Integrum v. The Defence ofChange ofPosition' in Johnston and Zimmermann
(eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Kej Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 243 at 254.
16 Guest et al., Benjamin's Sale ofGoods (2002), para. 12-057.
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approach which allows counter-restitution by way of a monetary substitute.17
Where there is a connection between the breach of contract and the cause of the
destruction of, or damage to, the goods, it is just to allow the aggrieved purchaser to
claim restitution of the contract price without having to make counter-restitudon to the
contract breaker. Even South African law recognises this as an exceptional situation
which does not prevent the aggrieved party from terminating the contract and claiming
restitution of the purchase price.
The position is more complex when the goods are destroyed as a result of
neither party's fault. The ordinary risk rules in contracts of sale state that the purchaser
bears the risk of accidental destruction of the goods. If the aggrieved purchaser is
entitled to claim restitution of the purchase price without simultaneously making
counter-restitution, it will have the effect of reversing the contractual allocation of risk.18
This has important implications for the doctrinal basis of the contract breaker's
restitution claim. If the claim is enrichment-based, the aggrieved purchaser will be
entitled to raise the change of position/loss of enrichment defence to repel the contract
breaker's claim.19 If the right answer is that the contractual risk rules ought to be
respected, then South African law and Scots law would have to find a way of preventing
the aggrieved purchaser from raising this defence and thereby escaping his duty to make
counter-restitution. If the law is simply upholding a contractual risk rule, then surely it is
better to leave it to the law of contract to regulate this restitution claim than to engage
with the uncertainty surrounding the change of position defence.
17 This is the position adopted by both the Principles of European Contract Law (PECL Art 9:309) and
Unidroit's Principles of International Commercial Contracts (PICC Art 7.3.6).
18 When the contract breaker is the recipient of the goods, the aggrieved party's claim for reliance loss
damages neutralises the loss of enrichment defence.
19 For an alternative argument why the change of position defence should not be available after
contractual failure see Hellwege, 'Unwinding Mutual Contracts: Restitutio in Integrum v. The Defence ofChange
ofPosition' in Unjustified Enrichment: Kej Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 243.
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It is not easy to decide whether the contractual risk rules ought to be respected
on these facts. On the one hand, a breach does entitle the aggrieved party to terminate
the contract and this sets in motion the process of unwinding the contract. It can be
argued that this sufficiently changes the relationship between the parties to warrant
subverting the risk rules. The argument here is that it is jusdfied to subvert the risk rules
because the seller has not performed properly under the contract.20 On the other hand,
it could be argued that the merely fortuitous occurrence of a breach is not a sufficiently
good reason to make the contract breaker responsible for the accidental damage to, or
destruction of, the goods. This is supported by the fact that the breach is unconnected
to the cause of the damage to, or destruction of, the goods. Furthermore, this approach
is supported by the fact that if the purchaser knows that he carries the risk of accidental
damage to, or destruction of, the goods, then he will make sure that he is insured against
these risks.
This problem has been encountered in German law. §350 BGB (old version)
provided the aggrieved party with a change of position defence in these circumstances.
This provision had, however, been criticised on the grounds that it subverted the
contractual risk rules.21 Although the new rule in German law is that a party must make
restitution in value if restitution in kind is no longer possible, this is subject to a number
of exceptions.22 Importantly, the duty to make good the value is excluded where the
performance has deteriorated or has been destroyed despite the fact that the recipient
has treated the performance in the way he would ordinarily treat his own goods. As a
20 Zimmermann, 'Remedies for Non-performance: The revised German law of obligations viewed against
the background of the Principles of European Contract Law' (2002) 6 Edin LR 271 at 306-7.
21 See Dannemann, 'Restitution for Termination of Contract in German Law' in Rose (ed), Failure of
Contracts: Ccontractual, Restitutionaiy and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 129 at 134-6; Zimmcrmann,
'Restitution After Termination for Breach of Contract in German Law' (1997) 7 RER 13 at 20-1 and
Krebs, Restitution at the Crossroads: a comparative study (2001), 96-8.
22 §346 BGB (new version).
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result, the risk still 'jumps back' to the seller.23 Zimmermann has stated that the
soundness of this rule will remain contentious in German law and it is clear that he
thinks German law has missed an opportunity to change matters.24
On balance, it seems that the argument favours respecting the contractual risk
rules. This means that the change of position defence is inappropriate in these cases.
Accordingly, it seems right to leave it to the law of contract to regulate the contract
breaker's restitution claim. This leads to the conclusion that the current law in South
African ought to be retained. Although the doctrinal basis of this claim has not been
clarified in Scots law, it is submitted that Scots law should, for the above reasons, follow
South African law.
5.3 Restitution of Money from a Co-Contractant
5.3.1 Aggrieved Party's Claim
It is settled in South African law that either party is, in principle, entitled to
restitution of a monetary performance rendered prior to termination for breach. This is
subject to that party's willingness and ability to make counter-restitution of any
performance received. Although most commentators are of the opinion that this is (or,
at least, ought to be) the position in Scots law, uncertainty in some of the case law
precludes a definitive statement.23
"3
Zimmermann, (2002) 6 Edin LR 306-7.
24 Ibid.
25 See for example, MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots
Perspective' in Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual, Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 199
at 216 where it is said that 'Scots law allows a party who has terminated a contract for the other's breach
to claim restitution of any performance rendered before the termination.' Cf McBryde, The Eaw ofContract
in Scotland (2001), para. 20-143 where he says that '[i]t is not clear that this is the present Scots law.'
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The logical starting point is the case law dealing with the existence of the
aggrieved party's right to claim restitution. I will argue that the aggrieved party ought, in
principle, to have the right to reclaim a monetary performance rendered prior to
termination for breach.
Two further issues require consideration: first, does the receipt of a counter-
performance affect the aggrieved party's restitution claim and secondly, should the
quantum of the aggrieved party's restitution claim be limited in order to prevent the
escape from a bad bargain.
(i) Availability of a Claim for Restitution ofMoney
(a) South African Law
As stated above, it is trite law that the aggrieved party has the right to reclaim a
monetary performance rendered prior to termination for breach. The courts have
expressly stated that this right to restitution is a distinct contractual remedy.26
(b) Scots Law
As Connelly v Simpson is contentious and problematic in respect of recognising the
aggrieved party's right to restitution ofmoney, it will be helpful to consider the law
apart from that case.
26 Baker v Probert 1985 (3) SA 429 (A) at 438-9. See also Tweedie vPark TravelAgency (Pty) Ltd t/a Park Tours
1998 (4) SA 802 (W) at 807; Meyer v Hess/ing 1992 (3) SA 851 (Nm Sc) at 866 and Kudu Granite Operations
(Pty) Ltd v Catema Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at 201.
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Case Law excluding Connelly v Simpson
A number of Scottish commentators have stated that the aggrieved party can, as
a matter of principle, claim restitution of a monetary performance rendered prior to
termination for breach. For example, Bell states that an aggrieved purchaser's claim has
two elements:
'[t]he claim of the buyer, to whom delivery is refused, is twofold: 1. For repayment
of the price, if already paid to the seller; and, 2. For indemnification of the loss
sustained by non-fulfillment.'27
In a section entitled 'Rescission of Contract Involves Restitution' Gloag similarly states
that:
'[i]n cases of breach of contract the party aggrieved has an action for damages,
but in addition to this, and whether damages have been suffered or not, he is
clearly entitled to recover any part of the price or other consideration which he
may have paid.'28
In respect of contracts of sale, these statements find support in a number of
older Scottish cases. For example, Lord President Inglis stated in McCormick v Rittmeyer
that
'[w]hen a purchaser receives delivery of goods as in fulfilment of a contract of
sale, and thereafter finds that the goods are not conform to order, his only
remedy is to reject the goods and rescind the contract. If he has paid the price,
his claim is for repayment of the price, tendering re-delivery of the goods.'29
27 Bell, Commentaries on the Taw ofScotland and on the Vrinciples ofMercantile Jurisprudence (1870), 478.
28 Gloag, The Taw ofContract (1929), 59-60. See also MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment and Breach of
Contract' (1994) JR 137 at 139-42. CfMcBryde, The Taw ofContract in Scotland (2001), paras 20-108 to 20-
120 and paras 20-132ff where it appears that he does not regard restitution as one of the natural
consequences of terminating a contract for breach.
29 (1869) 7 M 854 at 858. It is settled law that the aggrieved party has the right to claim contractual
damages. Lord President Inglis was accordingly incorrect to limit the aggrieved party's claim to restitution
of the price. See also Duff& Co. vThe Iron and Steel Fencing and Buildings Co. (1891) 19 R 199 where the
purchaser of defective iron huts was entitled, after termination, to reclaim the purchase price and Aird <&
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This position is supported by section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as
amended) which states that the purchaser has the 'right... to recover money paid
where the consideration for the payment of it has failed."0 This finds further support
in the following dictum by Lord President Inglis in Watson v Shankland:
'... if money is advanced by one party to a mutual contract, on the condition
and stipulation that something shall be afterwards paid or performed by the
other party, and the latter party fails in performing his part of the contract, the
former is entitled to repayment of his advance, on the ground of failure of
consideration.'31
Finally, C/oyds Bankpic v Bamberger (decided after Connelly) recently held that
'[ujnder our law, a seller who rescinds such a contract of sale, cannot retain
advances or instalments of the price that he has received, but is required to
repay these to the purchaser unless the payment falls to be regarded as a
deposit.'32
In my view, these cases support the claim that Scots law allows the aggrieved party
to claim restitution of money transferred prior to termination for breach. The waters
have, however, been muddied by Connelly v Simpson.
Before discussing this case, it is necessary to mention one apparent exception to
the aggrieved party's right to restitution of money. This is the rule in freight cases that a
payment of freight, as opposed to an advance against payment of freight, is not
recoverable if the voyage is not completed. This distinction was criticised in section
Coghill v Vidian &Adamas (1904) 7 F 258. For contracts involving the sale of heritage see Croft v Stewart's
Trs 1927 SC (HL) 65 and Mason vA & R Roberston & Black 1993 SLT 773 (OH) at 780.
311 The buyer has the right to claim the return of the purchase price if the seller is in material breach of
contract. This would commonly occur, for example, if the seller has breached any of the implied terms in
the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended).
31 (1871) 10M 142 at 152.
32 1993 SC 570 at 573.
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3.3.3(i). It was suggested there that this rule is better rationalised on the basis of the
accrued rights doctrine and the right to claim restitution. Although some facts might
justify the conclusion that right to restitution has been excluded by the contract, this is
not strictly speaking an exception to the aggrieved party's right to claim restitution.
Instead, the analysis demonstrated that this is merely an ordinary application of the
doctrines and principles regulating termination for breach.
(b ii) Connelly v Simpson
The facts were as follows. C paid £16,000 for one-third of the shares in S's
company. C negotiated for the right to demand delivery of the shares at some time in the
future in order to minimise the value of his estate for his divorce proceedings. As a result
of performing badly in the two years following the sale, S put the company into voluntary
liquidation. The liquidator offered C £400 - a third of the remaining company assets. C
alleged that S had breached the contract and instituted a restitution claim for £16,000.33 For
present purposes, the worrying part of the case is that the majority held that the aggrieved
party is not entitled to restitution ofmoney transferred prior to termination but is limited,
instead, to a claim for contractual damages. This emerges from the following dictum by
Lord McCluskey:
'... I can find nothing which is explicit authority for the view that a person who
has paid in advance of performance the sum of money which will be due in
respect of performance but has agreed that there should be no performance
until after a significant period of time, can claim anything other than damages
when, the time for performance having arrived, the other party, in breach of
contract, declines to perform or is unable to do so because, by his own actions,
he has put it beyond his power to perform his part of the contract. Leaving aside
the other remedies which might arise following a breach of contract, the
33 Connelly v Simpson 1993 SC 391 at 393-4.
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only remedy available to a person for breach of contract, if he seeks a monetary
remedy, is to claim damages which will compensate him for his loss... I see no
room, in a breach of contract case ... for a remedy in the form of restitution of
the price as such.'34
The case has been roundly criticised for denying, in principle, that the aggrieved
party has the right to restitution ofmoney.35 The most trenchant and cogent criticism is by
the Scottish Law Commission. First, they state that this will lead to incoherence in the law.
Lloyds Bankpic v Bambetgerhas decided that an aggrieved seller must repay instalments of the
price received prior to termination for breach. If an aggrieved purchaser is prevented from
claiming restitution from a seller in breach, then an aggrieved seller would incoherently be
in a worse position than a seller in breach.36
Secondly, they correctly point out that denying the aggrieved party the right to
restitution of money leads to arbitrary results. This is because an aggrieved purchaser who
has not paid under the contract would indefensibly be in a stronger position than a
purchaser who happens to have made payment in the same circumstances.37
Furthermore, the rule in Connelly puts the aggrieved party seeking restitution in a
breach case in a worse position than a party seeking restitution in cases where the contract
is terminated for improperly obtained consent or by frustration.38 This is problematic as the
a recipient ofmoney in breach is morally more culpable than the equivalent party in the
other two cases.
This clearly demonstrates that the mle articulated by Lord McCluskey in Connelly
ought to be jettisoned from Scots law. Instead, Scots law should follow the approach
34 1993 SC 391 at 407-8.
35 Hogg, Obligations (2003), para. 4.93; MacQueen, (1994) JR 143; Dieckmann and Evans Jones, 'The Dark
Side of Connelly v Simpson' 1995 JR 90 at 99; and Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract
(Discussion Paper No. 109, 1999), paras 4.40-3.
36 Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 99, 1999), para. 4.41.
37 Scottish Law Commission, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (Discussion Paper No. 99, 1999), para. 4.42.
38 Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), paras 6.117-8.
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supported by the cases discussed in subsection (i) above. Indeed, Lord Brand, giving the
dissenting judgment in Connelly, stated that
' it seems to me to be no more than common sense that a vendor who has been
fully paid but is unable to fulfil his obligation under the contract should be liable to
make restitution of the price.'39
(c) The Position in Principle
It is clear from the preceding discussion that the aggrieved party ought, in
principle, to have the right to claim restitution ofmoney transferred prior to termination
for breach. In South African law, it is settled that this is the position. Although there is
ample authority to support the position in principle in Scots law, Connelly v Simpson has
unfortunately left the law unclear. My view, in line with the unanimous call from the
Scottish commentators, is that Connelly ought to be overturned on this point. This will
clear the way for Scots law to recognise unequivocally that the aggrieved party has the
right, in principle, to restitution of money.
(ii) Limitation on the Right to Restitution: Receipt of a Counter-performance
(a) South African Law
If the aggrieved party cannot make counter-restitution by exact equivalent or in
specie then, subject to a number of exceptions, he loses his right to terminate the
contract.40 The aggrieved party's inability to make counter-restitution may be for one of
39 Connelly v Simpson 1993 SC 391 at 415.
40 Van Heerden v Sentrale Kunsmiskorporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A).
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two reasons. First, because a returnable benefit has, since its receipt, become incapable
of being returned. This was considered in section 5.2.1. Secondly, because the benefit
received is, by its very nature, incapable of being returned. Examples of benefits in this
category are the use of the contract breaker's property or the receipt of the contact
breaker's services.41 This is the focus of this section.
It is settled that South African law grants the contract breaker an independent
claim in unjusdfied enrichment against the aggrieved party for the value of intrinsically
non-returnable benefits conferred under a contract subsequently terminated for breach.
The question that arises here is what, if any, is the relationship between this claim and
the aggrieved party's right to claim restitution ofmoney.
Given the undisputed recognition of the contract breaker's right to claim
restitution, one would expect that South African law would recognise a correlation
between this claim and the aggrieved party's restitution claim. Accordingly, when the
aggrieved party claims restitution of his money performance, he ought to be under a
corresponding obligation to make counter-restitution to the contract breaker. Sally
Hutton has pointed out that the South African courts and academic writers have not
always fully appreciated this correlation. She identifies three distinct views in this
regard.42
At one extreme is the view that the impossibility of returning the performance
prevents the aggrieved party from terminating the contact.43
41 If restitution is partly impossible owing to the aggrieved party's fault, then he will be allowed to
terminate the contract and claim restitution provided he can still substantially return what he has received
coupled with payment for the shortfall. See Harper v Webster 1956 (2) SA 495 (FC); Lubbe and Murray,
Far/am andHathaway-Contract: Cases Materials and Commentary (1988), 592; and Van der Merwe et ah, Contract:
General Principles (2003), 375.
42 Hutton, RestitutionAfter Breach ofContract:A Comparative Study ofEnglish and South African Law
(unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), 32-8.
43 0' Connell v F/ischman 1948 (4) SA 191 (TPD) and Lni-Erections v Continental Engineering Co. Etd 1981 (1)
SA 240 (W). This view is irreconcilable with the current law. See Extel Inductrial (Pty) Etd and Another v
Crown Mills (Pty) Ltd 1999 (2) SA 719 (SCA) at 731-3.
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At the other extreme is the view that the aggrieved party has no duty of counter-
restitution in respect of non-returnable benefits. According to this view, the duty to
restore performances received prior to termination for breach (and so the
corresponding duty of counter-restitution) is restricted to the recovery of returnable
benefits, whether in kind or in money. Although this view recognises that either party
may have an independent enrichment action for the value of non-returnable benefits, it
regards this as a different remedy with no correlative duty of counter-restitution. In
other words, compensation of the contract breaker is not considered to be a
precondition for the aggrieved party's right to claim restitution of his monetary
performance.44 As principal evidence of this approach Hutton cites the following
composite statement by Wouter De Vos:
'[o]n cancellation, the original obligations disappear and are replaced by
reciprocal duties to restore where restoration is possible and practicable by
reason of the nature of the performance ... A party for whom work has been
done under the contract may cancel the contract without making restitution if
restitution would, for example, bring about the demolition of his house in order
to return the building materials... Labour is in any event not restorable... [The
aggrieved party] is then liable in enrichment for the amount by which he remains
enriched after he has restored what he can and must restore after termination, as
is the case where he has received a performance which cannot by its nature be
returned, which is the position, inter alia, where his land is built upon.'45
(Hutton's translation)
This view, Hutton argues, explains those cases where the receipt of a non-returnable
benefit by the aggrieved party is completely overlooked by the court when assessing the
aggrieved party's claim for restitution ofmoney. This occurred in De Vries v Wholesale
44 Hutton, RestitutionAfter breach ofContract:A Comparative Study ofEnglish and South African Eaw
(unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), 34.
45 Hutton, RestitutionAfter Breach ofContract:A Comparative Study ofEnglish and South African Eaw
(unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), 34 quoting De Vos, VerrykingsaanspreekHkheid in
die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987), 158, 279 and 287.
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CarsAb where the court ignored the fact that, prior to termination, the aggrieved
purchaser had the use of the car for ten days and drove 1000 kilometers.
According to the final view, there is a direct link between the aggrieved party's
restitution claim and the contract breaker's restitution claim. Hall-Thermotank Natal (Pty)
Ltd v Hardman47 is the cornerstone of this approach. In this case, the contract provided
for the installation of a refrigeration plant on the employer's fishing vessel. When the
contractors claimed payment for the work done, the employer counter-claimed for
termination of the contract, the return of payments already made and for damages. The
contractors argued that the employers were prevented from terminating the contract as
a result of being unable to restore the labour and certain materials supplied under the
contract. In rejecting this argument the court held that an aggrieved party is obliged to
compensate the contract breaker for work done under the contract to the extent that he
has benefited therefrom and that such compensation is a precondition to his right to
terminate the contract. This is evident from the following statement:
'to preserve that right [to terminate the contract] the owner must tender to
restore the benefits he has received pursuant to the contract ... he is not obliged
to make compensation for work or services rendered from which he derived no
benefit; the obligation of the owner to make restoration is not necessarily a sine
qua non to his right of rescission [termination], so that his inability to make
restitution is excused if it is not due to his own fault, for example, where the
fruits of the labour have perished casufortuito, or where restitution of work and
labour which were of no benefit to him is not possible.'48
In light of recent case law, it is now established that this third view represents
46 1986 (2) SA 22 (O).
47 1968 (4) SA 818 (D).
48 1968 (4) SA 818 (D) at 833. For the same approach see. Ambrose &Aitken vJohnson &Flethcher 1917 AD
327 where it was held that there was no duty on the defendant to make counter-restitution in respect of
labour from which he had not benefited. This case was approved in Hall-Thermotank Hiatal (Pty) Ltd v
Hardman 1968 (4) SA 818 (N) at 829. See also Sacher vAfrican Canvas <&Jute Industries (Pty) Ltd 1952 (3) SA
31 (T).
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the current approach to the receipt of a counter-performance in South African law. An
example is Masters v Thain t/a Inhaca Safaris.4 In this case, a holiday maker contracted to
go on holiday on the express undertaking that there would be scuba diving facilides
available. On arrival at the destination, it transpired that there were no such scuba diving
facilities. The aggrieved party immediately terminated the contract and requested to be
flown home. The first available flight home was four days after the date of arrival.50 The
court upheld the aggrieved party's claim for restitution of the purchase price. In so
doing, the court asked whether the contract breaker was entitled to any compensation as
a result of the aggrieved party having made use of some of the facilities during the four
days he was at the destination. If such compensation was appropriate, the court stated
that the aggrieved party's restitution claim should be correspondingly reduced. Although
the court found on the facts that the aggrieved party had not received any bargained for
benefits, the important point is that the court recognised the clear link between the
aggrieved party's right to restitution and his corresponding obligation to make counter-
restoration of non-returnable benefits.51
This case also indicates that the court's earlier reluctance to award substituted
pecuniary restitution appears to be overcome.
This approach is further supported by the cases which have held that the value
of the aggrieved party's use of the contract breaker's property must be set off against the
latter's use of the former's money. This has occurred most commonly in cases where the
aggrieved purchaser of a car has been evicted from possession by the true owner and
has sought to reclaim the purchase price from the seller. A recent example is Kat^eff v
49 2000 (f) SA 467 (W).
50 For the facts see Masters v Thain t/a inhaca Safaris 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) at 468-9.
51 Masters v Thain t/a Inhaca Safaris 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) at 474-5. For an identical approach see Tweedie v
Park TravelAgency (Pty) Ttd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W).
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City Car Sales}2 In this case a purchaser bought a car for R29,150. Two and a half years
later he was evicted from possession by the true owner. The purchaser claimed
restitution of the purchase price from the seller. At the time of eviction the car had
depreciated significantly and was worth R12,000. The sellers argued that the purchasers
were only entided to the value of the car at the time of evicdon. They based this
argument on the following obiter dictum by Botha JA in Alpha Trust v Van der Watt
'[i]t is possible that the purchaser of a rapidly deteriorating or consumable asset
would not, after a long period of undisturbed possession and use thereof, always
be entitled on eviction to repayment of the full purchase price as it is possible
that it could be argued that a court could in such a case modify the amount of
the purchase price which the seller should repay to the purchaser."3
The court in Kat^effrejected, rightly in my view, the seller's argument on the grounds
that that it would be inequitable to allow a seller who had deceived a purchaser by
selling a thing which he does not own to take advantage of his own wrongful conduct
by retaining a portion of the purchase price.54
The court did, however, hold that the loss of interest and the use of the car
balanced each other out and that a 'meticulous readjustment' of the economic imbalance
between the parties was not necessary.55
This line of cases is important for two reasons: it confirms the link between the
aggrieved party's restitution claim and his obligation to make counter-restitution and it
52 1998 (2) SA 644 (C).
53 1975 (3) SA 731 (A) at 719 (translation). See also Cash Converters SouthernAfrica (Pty Ltd v Rosebud ILcstcm
Province Franchise (Pty) Ltd 2002 (5) SA 494 (SCA) at 508-9 where Lewis AJA held (obiter) that a claim for
restitution ofmoney is subject to an equitable adjustment downwards if the subject matter of the counter-
restitution claim has deteriorated in value by the time of restitution.
54 Kat^effv City Car Sales 1998 (2) SA 644 (C) at 653.
55 Katsyffv City Car Sales 1998 (2) SA 644 (C) at 654. There are no cases where the courts have exercised
their discretion to reduce the aggrieved party's primafacie entitlement to reclaim the full amount paid
under the contract.
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indicates that South African law has moved away from a strict insistence on exact
restitution as a prerequisite for contractual termination.
(b) Scots Law
The law relating to the receipt of a counter-performance in Scotland remains
relatively unexplored. Indeed, the authorities are few and far between.
The starting point is the following dictum from McCormick v Kittmejer. '[i] f he
[the aggrieved party] has paid the price, his claim is for repayment of the price tendering
redelivery of the goods.'56 This position is reinforced by the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as
amended). In terms of the Act, the aggrieved buyer can terminate the contract for the
seller's material breach and claim restitution of the purchase price.57 As the contract in
McCormick was for the sale of movable goods, the dictum only applies to returnable
performances. The same limitation applies to the Sale of Goods Act 1979.38 This leaves
the problem of counter-restitution of inherently non-returnable performances.59
Like South African law, Scots law also grants the contract breaker a claim
against the aggrieved party for restitution of inherently non-returnable performances
rendered prior to termination for breach.60 In respect of the relationship between the
aggrieved party's right to restitution of money and the contract breaker's right to
56 (1869) 7 M 854 at 858. See also Gloag, The haw ofContract (1929), 59-60.
57 As a result of recent amendments, there are now two avenues open to the buyer to terminate a contract
of sale for breach. See respectively sections 15B(l)(b) and 48C(l)(b). For a discussion of the relationship
between these two different rights of termination see Hogg, 'The Consumer's Right to Rescind under the
Sale of Goods Act: a Tale ofTwo Remedies' 2003 ShT (News) 277. According to section 54, the buyer
can claim restitution of the purchase price in both instances of termination.
58 For reasons relating to conveyancing practice in Scotland, it is highly unlikely for a case to arise in
which the purchaser of property pays the price prior to the seller's performance. It is thought that the law
would be the same as for the sale of moveable goods. See MacQueen, (1994) JR 140.
59 For the law relating to the receipt of returnable benefits that are no longer capable of return see section
5.2.2(ii).
60 This issue is considered in detail in chapter 6.
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restitution of inherently non-returnable benefits, the leading case is Watson v Shankland
where Lord President Inglis stated that:
'[i]f a person contract to build me a house, and stipulate that I shall advance him
a certain portion of the price before he begins to bring his materials to the
ground, or to perform any part of the work, the money so advanced may
certainly be recovered back if he never performs any part, or any available part,
of his contract. No doubt, if he perform a part and then fail in completing the
contract, I shall be bound in equity to allow him credit to the extent to which I
am lucratus by his materials and labour, but no further; and if I am not lucratus at
all, I shall be entitled to repetition of the whole advance, however great his
expenditure and consequent loss may have been.'61
This dictum supports the proposition that there is a corresponding relationship between
the two restitution claims. This aligns Scots law with the present position in South
African law.
One of the problems originally encountered in South African law was how to
deal with the aggrieved party's use of the contract breaker's property. Until recently, the
position in Scots law was unclear. As a result of recent regulations amending the Sale of
Goods Act 1979, the buyer's right to reclaim the purchase price after termination can
now be reduced in order to take into account any use that has been made of the goods.62
The precise basis of this reduction is, unfortunately, not made clear. There is, however,
much to be said for the flexibility of this open ended provision.
(c) The Position in Principle
The position in principle requires the recognition of two points. First, the
61 (1871) 10 M 142 at 152.
62 This only applies to the termination of a contract under the new Pt 5A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979
(as amended). See section 48C. This section was added by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/3045). For a discussion of these new provisions see Hogg, 2003 SWT (News),
277.
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inability to make exact counter-restitution should not prevent the aggrieved party from
terminating the contract and claiming restitution ofmoney. The courts should always
award restitution by financial substitute. Secondly, the courts should recognise a
correlation between the aggrieved party's claim for restitution of money and the
contract breaker's claim for restitution of non-returnable benefits.
By adopting the position in principle (particularly in respect of the first point),
Scots law and South African law will avoid the problems encountered in English law in
this area. English law restricts the aggrieved party's right to claim restitution ofmoney if
he has received a counter-performance from the contract breaker. This manifests itself
in the requirement that the failure of consideration (the trigger for a restitution claim)
must be 'total'. Originally it was thought that total failure of consideration was excluded
where the aggrieved party 'got or received any part of what he bargained for'.63 It has,
however, subsequently been held that failure of consideration will not be 'total' where
the contract breaker has rendered performance irrespective of whether the aggrieved
party benefited therefrom.64
The commentators in English law are unanimous in their call for this
requirement to be abandoned. They argue that restitution ought to be allowed for partial
failure of consideration. In order to assess this argument, it is necessary to evaluate the
rationale underlying the total failure of consideration requirement. There are two main
justifications. First, it prevents the unwarranted subversion of the a contract by the law
of unjustified enrichment and secondly, it is merely another way of expressing the
requirement that the aggrieved party must make counter-restitution to the contract
breaker. When the aggrieved party cannot make exact counter-restitution, the total
63 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 329.
64 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 329 and Treitel, The Taw ofContract (1999), 977 n47.
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failure of consideration requirement shields the courts from the potentially troublesome
task of valuing the contract breaker's performance. Neither justification stands up to
scrutiny.
Firstly, the right to claim restitution on the basis of failure of consideration is
only triggered once the contract has been terminated for breach. Although the question
about the precise relationship between contractual remedies and unjustified enrichment
remedies after termination for breach is contentious, the important point for the present
is that the contract is not undermined by allowing restitution where there has been a
partial failure of consideration.
Secondly, there is academic support for the view that the failure of consideration
will not be total if the benefit received is readily returnable.65 The total failure
requirement accordingly bites where the performance cannot be returned to the contract
breaker.66 As stated above, there is no convincing reason why the courts should not
award restitution by way of financial substitute.
This establishes that the justifications for total failure of consideration are weak.
Furthermore, there are three good reasons that have been raised against this
requirement: the moral case for allowing the claim is the same irrespective of whether
the failure of consideration is partial or total; the courts have not been consistent in
their approach as to what constitutes total failure of consideration; and it is unjustifiably
inconsistent with other areas of the law where restitution is allowed for partial failure of
consideration.
The conclusion is that English law ought to jettison this requirement as the
65 Birks, An Introduction to the Caw ofRestitution (1989), 415 and Birks, 'No Consideration: Restitution after
Void Contracts' (1993) 23 UWALR 195 at 211.
66 See for example Baltic Shipping Co. v Dillon (The Mikhail hermontov) (1993) 47 A.L.J.R. 228 (High Court of
Australia).
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trigger for a restitution claim. It is clear that Scots law and South African law ought to
avoid these problems. This will be achieved by adopting the position in principle. In
particular, South African law ought to jettison the requirement that exact counter-
restitution must be possible in order to terminate a contract for material breach.
Furthermore, both legal systems ought to allow counter-restitution to be made by
financial substitute.
(iii) Quantum of the Aggrieved Party's Restitution Claim: Can the aggrieved
party escape the consequences of a bad bargain with a restitution claim?
The focus in this section is on the quantum of the aggrieved party's restitution
claim. The critical question is whether this claim ought to be limited by the aggrieved
party's expectation interest. Put another way, is it open to the contract breaker to argue
that his liability for restitution is limited to the contract price less the net loss that the
aggrieved party would have made had the contract run its proper course? The following
example illustrates the problem. A buys a second hand DVD player from B for R1000.
A pays the purchase price and awaits delivery. On receiving delivery, A discovers that
the DVD player is seriously defective. Fie terminates the contract. A tenders the return
of the DVD player and claims restitution of the R1000. B establishes that the market
value of a properly functioning DVD player in the same condition was R400 at the date
of delivery. The question is whether A is entitled to reclaim the full R1000 or whether
his claim is limited to R400 (R1000 less the net loss R600 that he would have made on
the contract if there was no breach).
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(a) South African Law
There is no direct authority in South African law indicating whether the
aggrieved party can use restitution to escape the consequences of a bad bargain. At least
one commentator has stated that
'[o]f course, restitution, sometimes has the effect that the aggrieved party
escapes the consequences of a bad bargain and is placed in a better financial
position than due performance would have given him.'67
South African law has grappled with this issue when dealing with the
relationship between negative and positive interesse damages. It was established in section
2.2.2(iv)(b) that Nienaber J in Probert v Bakerwas incorrect when he held that the
aggrieved party's restitution claim could be classified as a claim for negative interesse
damages. On appeal Botha JA held that restitution of the contract price was a distinct
contractual remedy rather than a claim for damages.
Importantly, it has subsequently been held that the claim for restitution of the
contract price can either be seen as an independent remedy or as part of the aggrieved
party's claim for positive interesse damages. This is evident from the following dictum in
Masters v Thain tja Inhaca Safaris-.
'[wjhere an injured party to a contract cancels that contract by reason of a
breach thereof by the opposite party (the guilty party), his claim that the guilty
party should repay or redeliver to the injured party the latter's prestation under
the contract does not, as a rule, fall within the purview of claims for payment of
negative interesse. ... [t]he plaintiff s claim fits the mould of that described by
Nienaber J and Botha JA [in Probert v Baker and Baker v Probert respectively] as
the distinct claim for repayment of the price and also into the mould of a claim
67 Sharrock, 'Breach of Contract: Damages for Negative Interesse' (1985) TSAR 207 at 211. See also Kudu
Granite Operations (Pty) Ttd v Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) where the court granted the return of the
purchase price in a case of supervening impossibility of performance irrespective of whether this involved
an escape from a bad bargain.
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for payment of his positive interesse. The plaintiffs claim is of the former kind
for the following reason: not having received that for which he had bargained
and having therefore lawfully cancelled the contract, he was, primafacie, entitled
to repayment of the sum which he had paid the defendant... It is the latter type
of claim because, had the defendant delivered as she was obliged to do, on his
return to South Africa he would have brought home with him the experience
and enjoyment of a holiday. As he did not bring that home with him, he was
entitled to the monetary value thereof.'68
Although nothing turned on how the claim was viewed in this case, there is an
important difference between the two conceptualisations. If restitution is seen as part of
the aggrieved party's positive interesse damages, then it is always open to the contract
breaker to establish that the contract was a losing one. This will reduce the aggrieved
party's claim by the net loss that he would have suffered had the contract run its
course.6'9 In terms of this approach, the aggrieved party will not be able to escape the
consequences of a bad bargain with a restitution claim. This is only problematic if it is
undesirable for the aggrieved party's claim to be limited in this way. This is considered
in the subsection (c) below.
(b) Scots Law
There is no Scottish case dealing with the question under review. If the
restitution claim in Connelly v Simpson had been successful, the aggrieved party would
have escaped the consequences of a bad bargain. MacQueen has suggested that this may
explain the court's reluctance to grant the claim. As the case decided that the aggrieved
68 Masters v Thain t/a Inhaca Safaris 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) at 473-4. See also Tweedie v Park TravelAgeng (Pty)
Ltd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W) at 807 where the court held in a similar type of case that the claim
for the return of the purchase price was a distinct contractual remedy.
69 For a helpful description of the interests protected by contractual damages and the reladonship between
these interests see Hutchison, 'Back to Basics: Reliance Damages for Breach of Contract Revisited' (2004)
SAL] 55-60. See also Fuller and Purdue, 'The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages' (1936) 36 Yale LJ
52 and 373 at 53-6. For a comparative account of the relationship between the interests see Treitel,
Remediesfor Breach ofContract (1988), 88ff.
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party is restricted to a damages claim, it does not shed light on the issue under
consideration.
There is, however, the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended). Section 54 states
that the buyer is entitled to reject goods for material breach and claim restitution of the
purchase price.70 Accordingly, the aggrieved party can escape a bad bargain with a
restitution claim in sale cases.
(c) The Position in Principle
If the aggrieved party is entitled to claim restitution of the full contract price in
these circumstances, this will allow the escape from a bad bargain and a subversion of
the contractual allocation of risk. Although this is not stated unequivocally, it appears
that this is the position in South African and Scots law in contracts of sale. Is this
justified or should the aggrieved party's restitution claim be limited by his expectation
interest? The problem will not arise often in practice as an advantageous contract will
usually deter a breach. In general the commentators have favoured the view that the
aggrieved party should be able to escape the consequences of bad bargain with a
restitution claim.71 A number of arguments have been put forward supporting this view.
The commentators in English law have argued that as restitution is an enrichment claim,
it is independent of an action for breach of contract and hence does not need to 'bow
down to the law of contract'.72 In my view this is not a persuasive argument. The law of
70 Section 54 of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended). This is also the position when termination
takes place in terms of the new remedies introduced by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers
Regulations 2002. See Part 5A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979 (as amended).
71 American law and English law allow the escape from a bad bargain. See Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution
(2002), 341-2 and Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998), 33-9.
72 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 342. For a similar argument see also Hutton, Restitution After
Breach ofContract:A Comparative Studj ofEnglish and South African Taw (unpublished Masters Thesis,
University of Oxford, 1994), 56-7.
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unjustified enrichment does not have a mechanism for limidng the aggrieved party's
claim for restitution of money. This is because there is no test of enrichment which can
prevent the aggrieved party from arguing that the contract breaker was enriched to the
extent of the money received. Accordingly, those who argue that restitution ought to be
classified as an enrichment action must maintain that the aggrieved party is entitled to
escape from a bad bargain by being allowed to claim restitution of the full contract
price.
It was stated in chapter four that the proper doctrinal basis of restitution ought
to be decided by considering the principles of recovery underpinning a particular
remedy and the consequences of imposing liability according to a particular set of
doctrinal rules. According to this approach it is necessary to test whether the existing
position is justified by good policy or justice. This, rather than an abstract taxonomic
justification, is the appropriate basis to determine the doctrinal foundation of restitution.
The law has a clear choice between two alternatives in these cases: to allow some
aggrieved parties to escape losing contracts after termination for breach or to allow
some contract breakers to retain all, or some portion, of the contract price without
having to provide reciprocal counter-performance.
Some commentators have argued that the policy of the law should favour the
aggrieved party, even if this means that some aggrieved parties escape from losing
contracts.73 This view is defended on two grounds. First, it is claimed that allowing
restitution of the full contract price actually protects the sanctity (or binding nature) of a
contract. The point is that if the contract breaker is aware that he will not be able to
retain any part of the contract price, then this will provide an incentive for
73 See MacQueen, (1994) JR 148 and Hogg, Obligations (2003), para. 4.97.
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performance.74
Secondly, it is claimed that the contracting party should not be able to benefit
from his contractual expectations unless he is ready and willing to perform his side of
the bargain. The argument here is that the aggrieved party's restitution claim should not
be restricted because the contract breaker forfeits his rights under the contract after
termination for his breach.75 This argument has been countered on the grounds that a
breach does not necessarily involve moral culpability on the part of the contract breaker.
This might occur, for example, in a complex construction contract where a protracted
dispute might result in both parties genuinely believing that the other party is in breach.
Accordingly, when the final decision is made as to which party is in breach, it might be
difficult to attach moral condemnation to the party in breach.76 It should not be
overlooked, however, that in many cases it is easy to ascribe moral responsibility to the
contract breaker.
Although the case is not watertight, on balance, the arguments favour allowing
the aggrieved party to claim restitution of the full contract price and thereby escape the
consequences of a losing contract. Scots law and South African law should, accordingly,
adopt this position unequivocally.
From a doctrinal point of view, it makes no difference whether the aggrieved
party's restitution claim is classified as a contractual or as an enrichment remedy. Either
way, the aggrieved party can claim restitution of the full contract price. There is
accordingly no good reason to change the existing South African law which states that
the claim for restitution of money is a distinct contractual remedy.
74 Beatson, 'Gap-Filling and Risk-Reversal' in Beatson (ed), The Use andAbuse of Unjust Enrichment (1991),
78 at 89.
75 See Hutton, RestitutionAfter Breach ofContract: A Comparative Study ofEnglish and South African Eaw
(unpublished Masters Thesis, University of Oxford, 1994), 57 and Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998),
41.
76 Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998), 65-6.
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5.3.2 Contract Breaker's Claim
(i) South African law
In South African law, the contract breaker has a claim for restitution of a
contractual payment. In the event of breach, it will usually be the aggrieved party who
institutes a claim for restitudon of his contractual performance. As a result, the contract
breaker's restitudon claim will usually fall under the aggrieved party's duty to make
counter-resdtution.
(ii) Scots Law
The leading Scotdsh case on the contract breaker's right to restitudon ofmoney
is Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd v Control SecuritiesplcJ7 The facts were as follows. Zemhunt
(Holdings) Ltd had successfully bid at an auction to purchase heritable property from
Control Securities pic. The purchaser agreed to pay a £165,000 deposit and the
remainder of the purchase price on a specified date. The purchasers failed to fulfil this
obligation and the seller justifiably terminated the contract. The purchaser sought to
recover the £165,000 with the condictio causa data causa non secuta.78 Lord Marnoch
characterised the purchaser's payment as an advance part payment of the purchase price.
He dismissed the claim because, in his view, the condictio causa data causa non secuta is an
equitable remedy that is not available to the contract breaker.79
77 1992 SC 58.
78 Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd v Control Securitiespic 1992 SC 58 at 61-2.
79 Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd v Control Securitiespic 1992 SC 58 at 63.
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On appeal, the Inner House characterised the payment as a forfeitable deposit
which served as a pledge that performance would be forthcoming. It could, accordingly,
not be reclaimed once the sellers had terminated the contract for the purchaser's
breach.80
Hogg has suggested that this case 'can be accommodated within the traditionally
understood view that a reciprocated advance performance may not be reclaimed.'81 On
this view, the right to retain the deposit survives termination because it is an accrued
contractual right and, as such, falls beyond the purview of restitution. This does not
accord with the traditional understanding of the reciprocal obligadons in this type of
case. A simpler explanation is to see this as a case where the terms of the contract
exclude the contract breaker's right to restitution.82
Regarding the scope of the condictio causa data causa non secuta, Lord Morison
stated that a breach of contract by the party who paid the deposit does not per se affect
the equity of a claim for restitution of that payment.83 This obiter dictum has been
welcomed by the commentators as a justifiable criticism of Lord Marnoch's approach.84
Furthermore, Evans-Jones has argued, rightly, that it is incorrect to link the availability
of the right to restitution with the scope of one of the enrichment actions.85
(iii) The Position in Principle
In line with the view that the aggrieved party is under a corresponding duty to
80 Zemhunt (Holdings) Ltd v ControlSecuritiespic 1992 SC 58 at 66-7.
81 Hogg, Obligations (2003), para. 4.90.
82 For a discussion of this issue more generally see Beatson, 'Restitution and Contract: Non-Cumul?'
(2000) 1 Theoretical Enquiries in Law 83.
83 1992 SC 58 at 70.
84 Stewart, 'Unjust Enrichment and Equity' 1992 SLT (News) 47 at 50 and Evans-Jones, 'The claim to
recover what was transferred for a lawful purpose outwith contract (condictio causa data causa non secuta)'
(1997) A] 139 at 166.
85 Evans-Jones, (1997) A] 139 at 166.
171
make counter-restitution when claiming restitution himself, it is correct in principle that
the contract breaker has the right to restitution of the contract price. It would clearly be
indefensibly punitive if the aggrieved party was simultaneously entitled to claim
restitution of his performance and allowed to retain the contract price.86 This is the
policy underlying the duty to make counter-restitution. As Evans-Jones puts it:
'... the innocent party who has rescinded must give restitution since otherwise
he will be able to retain the benefit of the contract while having chosen not to
render his agreed counter-performance. He is protected from any loss
attributable to the breach by a claim of damages.'87
The fact that restitution also prevents the aggrieved party being unjustifiably
enriched does not mean that this purpose cannot be accommodated by a contractual
rule.88 By terminating the contract, the aggrieved party is saying that he is no longer
prepared to be in a contractual relationship with the contract breaker and that he wants
restitution of his performance. It is only just that he simultaneously returns the purchase
price, subject to his claim for damages. In no case will the law be enhanced by regarding
the contract breaker's restitution claim as an enrichment remedy.
Finally, the contract breaker will never be able to escape the consequences of a
bad bargain by claiming restitution as the aggrieved party will always be entitled to set
off his damages claim against this restitution claim.89
86 Until relatively recently, some common law jurisdictions have denied the contract breaker recovery of
payments made prior to breach. This was seen by most commentators as indefensibly harsh and has led to
a change in the law. For a comparative overview see Englard, 'Restitution of Benefits Conferred without
Obligation' in Schlechtriem (ed), InternationalEngclopaedia ofComparative Law (1991), §148-150.
87 Evans-Jones, (1997) A] 166. For a similar view see also Gloag, The Law ofContract (1929), 59.
88 See for example Cash Converters Southern Africa v Rosebud WP Franchise 2002 (5) 494 (SCA) at 510 where it
is stated that the aim underlying the relaxation of the requirement of exact restitution is to prevent
unjustified enrichment.
89 Rndiotronics (Pty) Ltd v Scott Lindberg & Co. Ltd 1951 (1) SA 312 (C) at 355; Van Heerden v Sentrale
Kunsmiskorporasie (Edms) Bpk 1973 (1) SA 17 (A); and De Yos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 158.
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5.4 Restitution of Money from a Third Party
5.4.1 The Issue
The final issue in this chapter concerns the aggrieved party's claim for restitution
of money against a third party (i.e someone other than his co-contractant). Restitution
claims between co-contractants raise questions about the choice between defensible
doctrinal alternatives. As there is no contractual nexus between the aggrieved party and
the third party, this restitution claim can only be an enrichment remedy. This raises
questions about the role of the contractual matrix in determining the availability a
contractant's enrichment-based restitution claim against a third party.
5.4.2 Case Law in Scotland and England
Although South African law has not yet considered this issue, it has come before
the English and Scottish courts. The two leading cases are respectively Pan Ocean
Shipping Co. Ltd v Credit Ltd The Trident Beauty90 and Compagnie CommercialAndre SA v
ArtihellShipping Company LtdT The facts in both cases were similar. In terms of a
charter-party agreement, the hirer was obliged to make an advance payment of freight.
As freight is earned on completion of the voyage, the parties agreed that if this did not
occur for a reason outside the agreed upon perils, the owner would be obligated to
repay the unearned freight. In order to finance their shipping operations, the owner
so [i 994] i WLR 161.
91 2001 SC 653. For two Sheriff Court decisions see linstock Miller & Co. v Coia <& Co. 1957 SLT (Sh Ct)
47 and Alex Lawrie (Factors) Ltd vMitchell Investments (Pty) Ltd 2001 SLT (Sh Ct) 93.
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validly assigned the right to receive freight payments to a financial institution. As
required by the assignation, the hirer paid the advance freight to the financial institution.
The voyage was not completed as a result of a breach by the owner. The hirer
terminated the contract. As the clear contractual right to claim restitution of the advance
freight was not worth pursing against the owner, the hirer brought an action in
unjustified enrichment against the financial institution. This claim was refused in both
cases.
In Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Lord Goff dismissed the claim on the basis that the
contractual regime excluded a restitution claim against the financial institution. It was
stated that it would be unfair to undermine the contract of assignment (between the
owner and the financial institution) in terms ofwhich the financial institution had
bought the right to payment of the hire free of any condition as to repayment by the
owner.92 The net result was that the hirer was left to pursue his restitution claim against
the owner.
In Compagnie CommercialAndre SA Lord MacFadyen dismissed the claim on the
basis that the financial institution was not enriched by the hirer's payment. This was
because the payment of the advance freight was received in their capacity as the owner's
bankers rather than on their own account.93
Lord MacFadyen did, however, consider (obiter) whether the outcome would
have been the same if the enrichment requirement had been met. The critical issue was
92 Lord Woolf dismissed the claim on the basis that a claim for failure of consideration could only be
brought against the party who was responsible for that failure. This argument has rightly been criticised by
the commentators as being based on the privity of contract fallacy which overlooks the fact that the cause
of action in unjustified enrichment is conceptually distinct. Pan Ocean Shipping Co. Ltd v Credit Ltd The
Trident Beauty' [1994] 1 WLR 161 at 170. See also Visser, 'Searches for Silver Bullets: Enrichment in Three-
Party Situations' in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Kej Issues in Comparative
Perspective (2002), 526 at 549 and Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 349.
93 The assignation in this case was not an absolute assignation but merely an assignation in security:
Compagnie CommercialAndre SA vArtibell Shipping Companj Ltd 2001 SC 653 at 661-2.
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the sine causa requirement. In order to determine whether there was a justification for the
retention of the benefit, Lord MacFadyen stated that it is
'... necessary to examine and take into account the whole circumstances
including not only the shipping transaction between the pursuers and the first
defenders, but also the financing transaction between the second defenders and
the first defenders.'94
In giving substance to this dictum, Lord MacFadyen considered three factors.
First, Lord MacFadyen stated that the contractual regime, which regulated the payment
of the advance freight and the return of unearned freight, normally excluded a claim in
unjustified enrichment designed to achieve the same result.93 This echoes Lord Goff s
reason for dismissing the claim in Pan Ocean Shipping Co. iJd.
Secondly, Lord MacFadyen stated that as the hirers were aware at the time of
making payment that the financial institution had not assumed an obligation to repay
the advance freight, it was for them to assess the commercial risk involved in making
this payment to the assignee (the financial institution) when the obligation to repay, if it
arose, remained with the owners.96 This is not entirely convincing. Once the right to
receive the advance payment has been validly assigned, the hirer, in order to discharge
his obligation, has no choice but to make payment to the assignee. Any other course of
action will result in a breach of contract.
Thirdly, it was held that the payment to the financial institution did not result in
their receiving an 'unexpected windfall' but was part of a deal whereby the financial
institution provided finance to the owners to facilitate their shipping business.97
94 Compagnie CommercialAndre SA vArtibell Shipping Company Ltd 2001 SC 653 at 669.
95 Ibid.
96 Compagnie CommercialAndre SA vArtibell Shipping Company Ltd 2001 SC 653 at 670.
97 Ibid.
175
Accordingly, Lord MacFadyen held that the retention of the payment was not
sine causa,98
5.4.3 Academic Commentary and a Proposed Solution
This tricky issue has divided the academic commentators. Two main arguments
are put forward by those who support the decisions. First, if the hirers are allowed an
enrichment claim against the financial institution, this would unjustifiably allow them to
escape the risk of insolvency which necessarily flows from their contract with the
owners." The point is that the law of enrichment ought not to allow parties to escape
the risk allocation envisaged by a contractual relationship.
Secondly, it is argued that the decision would upset the contractual assignment
in terms of which the financial institution had effectively purchased the right to the
hirer's contractual payments.100 The point is that allowing the claim will undermine the
certainty of the assignee's receipt of the payment.
It is with this second argument that commentators who oppose the decisions
have taken issue. Barker argues that since the financial institution's right to payment was
not purchased from the hirers, this has no bearing on the latter's unjustified enrichment
action.101 The claim is that as an independent cause of action, it ought to make no
difference to the success of an unjustified enrichment claim that the financial institution
98 Compagnie CommercialAndre SA vArtibellShipping Company Ltd 2001 SC 653 at 671.
99 Birks, Unjust Enrichment (2003), 78 and Friedmann, 'Restitution from an Assignee' (1994) 110 EQR 521
at 523.
i°o Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 350 and Burrows, 'Restitution from Assignees' (1994) 2 RLR 52
at 55.
101 Barker, 'Restitution and Third Parties' (1994) TMCEQ 305 at 310. The effect of this on his argument is
clear from his conclusion where it is said that '[sjomewhere among all this complexity, the basis of Pan's
cause of action (the vitiation of their consent) has been forgotten, or confused.'
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had entered into a contract with the ship owner. In my view, this is another example of
an abstract taxonomic argument and is subject to the same cridcisms raised in chapter
four.102
On a different tack, Tolhurst raises three points: first, the courts paid too much
attention to the repayment obligation and insufficient attention to the payment
obligation. In his view, the right assigned was conditional on the freight being earned.103
Secondly, this type of case is not analogous to the case where a subcontractor performs
under a contract with the main contractor and then seeks to claim against the owner of
the property (i.e. it is not a case where A confers a benefit on C in the course of
performing a contractual obligation with B). It is rather a case of A performing an
obligation which is owed to C by virtue of the assignation between B and C.104 Thirdly,
the legal relations created by assignation bind the parties not to act unconscionably.
From these three points, Tolhurst concludes that
'[i]t seems unconscionable for the assignee to insist on its prima facie right to
payment, which always remained conditional, and then effectively deny the
conditional nature of the right when it turns out that it was not earned.'105
Although Tolhurst favours allowing the claim, he does, however, concede that the hirer
must first exhaust his remedies against the owner.106
Leaving aside the abstract taxonomic argument, all the commentators use the
underlying contractual matrix to decide whether the enrichment is unjustified. I have
102 See sections 4.4.4(ii)(b) and (d).
103 Tolhurst, 'Assignment, Equities, The Trident Beauty and Restitution' (1999) CLJ 546 at 552.
104 Cf Visser, 'Searches for Silver Bullets: Enrichment in Three-Party Situations' in Unjustified Enrichment:
Kej Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 548; Watts, 'Does a Subcontractor have restitutionary rights
against the employer?' (1995) LMCEQ 398; and Burrows, (1994) 2 RLR 53-4.
105 Tolhurst, (1999) CLJ 560.
m Ibid.
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argued elsewhere (with Daniel Visser) that this is the right way to resolve this type of
case.107 We argued that a legal system must make what we called a 'first tier' policy
decision about whether this type of case is one in which this fact constellation
represents an instance where the enrichment is to be regarded as sine causa. This is
typically a decision a legal system makes once, which then hardens into a principle and is
thereafter not easily changed.108 If the first der decision favours liability, we argued that
the courts must then take policy factors into account on a secondary level to decide
whether a claim based on unjusdfied enrichment ought to succeed 'in the particular
circumstances of the case at hand'.109 In my view, it is the policy factors on this second
level that ought to determine whether the hirer should succeed against the financial
institution.
What factors should be taken into account? On the one hand, it does seem unfair
that the hirer can escape the consequences of insolvency as a fortuitous result of having
a third party against whom to seek redress. This is not because the equilibrium between
the creditors will be disturbed as result of the claim. In fact, allowing the claim has no
impact on the amount available for distribution as it will either be the hirer or the
financial institution who ranks for the amount repayable. The unjustness arises because
the hirer can escape his contractual risks by the fortuitous act of assignation. This policy
factor emerges from the contractual relationship between the hirer and the owner.
On the other hand, it does not appear as intuitively unjust to allow the financial
institution to retain the funds received as a result of the valid assignation. In terms of
this assignation contract, the financial institution is receiving precisely what it bargained
107 Visser and Miller, 'Between Principle and Policy: Indirect Enrichment in Subcontractor and Garage
Repair Cases' (2000) 117 SAL] 594.
108 Visser and Miller, (2000) 117 SAL] 605. An example of this type of'first tier' policy decision is
whether negligent misstatements ought to attract delictual liability.
109 Visser and Miller (2000) 117 SAL] 606.
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for. As the trigger to the right to repayment is the non-performance of the charter-party
contract, it seems right in these circumstances that the two original contracting parties
are left to resolve their dispute. This is reinforced by the fact that the hirer is now in no
worse position than he would have been in had there been no assignation.
On balance, the policy factors indicate that it is more convincing to prevent the
hirer from claiming in unjustified enrichment as against the financial institution.
Although the issue here does not concern a choice between defensible doctrinal
alternatives, an analogous theme emerges. In deciding whether this enrichment claim
ought to succeed, it was argued that abstract taxonomic factors are not decisive. Instead,
clearly articulated policy factors derived from the two contractual relationships ought to
decide whether the retention of the payment is unjustified for the purposes of a
contractanfs enrichment-based restitution claim against a third party.
5.5 Doctrinal Basis of Restitution of Returnable Benefits and
Restitution of Money: A Summary
In respect of claims for restitution of returnable benefits and for restitution of
money it was argued that in the majority of cases it makes no difference whether these
restitution claims are seen as contractual or enrichment-based. The tricky case is where
the aggrieved purchaser of goods cannot return these goods to the seller in
circumstances where he is not to blame for this eventuality. As the arguments favoured
upholding the ordinary contractual risk rules in these cases, it was submitted that it
makes sense to leave it to the law of contract to resolve such cases. Accordingly, there is
no good reason to change the existing South African law which regards claims for
restitution of returnable benefits and for restitution ofmoney as contractual remedies.
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In the absence of a definitive statement regarding the doctrinal basis of these
restitution claims, it was suggested that Scots law should follow the South African law
and treat them as contractual.
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Chapter 6
Restitution of Inherently Non-Returnable Benefits
6.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider the claim for restitution of inherently non-
returnable benefits after termination for breach.1 This restitution claim is more complex
than restitution claims for money benefits or returnable benefits because it raises
particularly acute valuation problems.
As stated in the introduction to chapter four, the two critical questions that need to
be answered are: (a) when does the right to claim restitution arise and (b) when this right
arises, what is the quantum of this restitution claim. Many tricky problems lurk beneath
the surface of these questions, not least of which is the role the contract price should
play in determining the quantum of restitution.
After this introduction, this chapter is divided into three main sections. The first
section gives an overview of the doctrinal basis of restitution of inherently non-
returnable benefits in South African and Scots law. The second section deals with the
availability of this restitution claim and the third section considers its quantum. The
analysis of the doctrinal basis of restitution will be woven into the analysis of the two
questions under review.
1 As quantum meruit claims raise identical issues, these claims will also be considered in this chapter.
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6.2 Doctrinal Basis of Restitution of Inherently Non-Returnable
Benefits
The doctrinal basis of restitution in South African law presents a curious
asymmetry. The current position is that where a benefit is, by its nature, intrinsically
non-returnable, then both the aggrieved party and contract breaker have a claim in
unjustified enrichment for the value of the benefit.2 Where the benefit conferred is
money or intrinsically returnable, then restitution is a distinct contractual remedy.
Although it appears that Scots law also treats a claim for restitution of inherently
non-returnable benefits as an enrichment action, the position is not as clearly articulated
as the position in South African law. This is largely because there are few instances
where enrichment claims have actually been granted by the Scottish courts.3
6.3 Availability of a Claim for Restitution
Broadly speaking, it will be desirable to allow a restitution claim whenever the
recipient of an inherently non-returnable performance retains a benefit after termination
for breach. The key to the availability of this restitution claim is identifying precisely
what constitutes a benefit. It is necessary to deal separately with two types of inherently
2 In respect of a restitution claim for inherently non-returnable benefits, an enrichment action is said to lie
for the value of any intrinsically non-restorable performance rendered before termination. However,
where the performance takes the form ofwork done or services rendered under a contract of locatio
conductio operis or locatio conductio operarum, the action is known as the 'action for work done and services
rendered'. This is one of the established enrichment actions in South African law. Visser, 'Rethinking
Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of the Competition between Contractual and Enrichment
Remedies' (1992) A] 203 at 208 and Hutton, 'Restitution after Breach of Contract: Rethinking the
Conventional Jurisprudence' (1997) A] 201 at 206.
3 MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment and Breach of Contract' (1994) JR 137 at 162. The appropriate
enrichment action in Scots law is recompense. This action occupies a similar space in Scots law to the
action for work done and services rendered in South African law.
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non-returnable benefits. The first type is where a performance results in an end product.
This will occur, for example, where a contractor constructs a building on a landowner's
property or where a contractor digs a moat around a castle owner's property. The
second type is where the performance does not yield an end product. This occurs, for
example, in a contract to transport one party from A to B; in a contract to provide a
holiday or in a contract to provide access to the internet.4
The analysis of when a benefit is retained after terminadon for breach does not
depend on whether the aggrieved party or the contract breaker is the recipient of the
performance. The analysis that follows does not make this distinction.
6.3.1 South African Law
(i) Introduction
As stated above, South African law regards restitution of an inherently non-
returnable benefit as an enrichment claim. In order to uncover when the right to
restitution arises, it is necessary to consider the circumstances in which the requirements
for an enrichment claim are present. It was established in chapter four that there is no
doctrinal impediment to meeting the sine causa requirement when a benefit is retained
after termination for breach. This availability of a restitution claim thus turns on
establishing the fact of the recipient's enrichment.
4 The second type of benefit also includes those instances where the inherently non-returnable
performance is an incidental by-product of a contractual performance. This occurs, for example, if the
purchaser of a car validly terminates the contract for breach after having had the use of the car. Although
the purchaser can return the actual car, he cannot return the use of that car.
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(ii) Establishing the fact of Enrichment: A Subjective or an Objective Approach
There are two conflicting views in South African law about establishing a
recipient's enrichment. Firstly, Wouter De Vos argues that the fact of enrichment
should be established objectively. This means that the question whether something
constitutes a benefit is judged from the perspective of a reasonable man (i.e. the
market). According to this approach, the recipient of a benefit (where the performance
produces an end product) is regarded as automatically enriched by operation of the
principle of accessio irrespective of whether he accepts the work or makes use thereof.5 In
order to ameliorate any unfairness that this might cause to a recipient who does not
utilise the benefit, De Vos states that the recipient may, in certain circumstances,
override an objective finding of enrichment with evidence that he has rejected the
benefit.6 De Vos states that the defendant will not always be entitled to rely on this
defence of non-enrichment. According to him, it should be left to the court's discretion
to adjudicate in each case whether the defence ought to succeed with reference to
'fairness, efficacy and common sense.'7 De Vos gives the following two examples of
instances where the court might exercise this discretion to prevent reliance on the
defence: (i) where the defendant has saved some necessary expenditure and (ii) where
the defendant has realised the value of the work or where the value of this work is
readily realisable.8
According to the second approach, the fact of enrichment is established
subjectively. This means that the question whether something constitutes a benefit is
5 De Vos, Vertykingaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987), 282.
6 De Vos, Verrykingaanspreeklikheid (1987), 289.
7 De Vos, Verrykingaanspreeklikheid (1987), 291.
8 De Vos, Verrykingaanspreeklikheid (1987), 289-92.
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judged from the perspective of the particular recipient. This is evident from cases which
have held that liability for restitution only arises if there is some evidence of the
recipient's intention to accept the contract breaker's performance. From the cases
considered below, it appears that South Africa supports the subjective approach.
(a) Inherently Non-Returnable Performances Producing an End Product
The subjective approach to establishing the fact of enrichment is evident in a
series of decisions where an aggrieved employer elects not to terminate a contract of
locatio conductio opens for the contractor's breach. In these cases the employer is entitled to
repel the contract breaker's claim for payment by raising the exceptio non adimpleti
contractus. The courts recognised that this could sometimes have unfair consequences. In
a trilogy of early cases (Hauman v Nortje;9 Breslin v Hichens;w and Van Rensberg v
Straughtenn) it was held that a breaching contractor could, in certain exceptional
circumstances, claim a quantum meruit for his work. This is a claim for a reduced contract
price calculated by deducting the cost of remedying the defect (or completing the
performance) from the full contract price. The courts in the above cases appeared to
regard this claim as an enrichment remedy.12 Although there are subtle differences
between the tests used to establish the fact of enrichment in these cases, all three
required the aggrieved party to accept the defective performance in order to attract
liability.13 This acceptance was established by the aggrieved party's utilisation of the
91914 AD 293.
101914 AD 312.
11 1914 AD 317.
12 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) has subsequently held
that this claim is contractual.
13 For example, in addition to the utilisation requirement, Maasdorp AJA in Van Rensberg v Straughten
appears to include an objective element into the test when he says that the court must take into account
the increase in value to the aggrieved party's land. See Van Rensberg v Straughten 1914 AD 317 at 329-33.
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benefits conferred.
In commenting on these cases, JansenJA in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope
Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk stated that the term 'acceptance' is a slippery one and that
the prerequisite for the denying the aggrieved party the excepiio non adimpleti contractus is
rather the utilisation of the defective or incomplete performance.14
A case actually involving termination for breach is Sacher vAfrican Canvas <&Jute
Industries Etdf The contract breaker excepted (the South African equivalent of a plea to
the relevancy in Scots law) to the termination on the grounds that the aggrieved party
had not tendered restitution. The court dismissed the plea on the basis that there was
nothing to indicate that the aggrieved party had accepted the contract breaker's
performance either expressly or impliedly by taking the benefit of the contractual
performance with the knowledge of their defects.16
A difficult case for the subjective approach to establishing the fact of
enrichment is where the recipient elects not to utilise a benefit that enhances the value
of his estate. This will be considered in section 6.3.3 below.
(b) Inherently Non-Returnable Performances not Producing an End Product
The starting point is Spenser v Gostelowf Innes CJ held that an aggrieved
employer was obliged to compensate an employee for services rendered that fell outside
the accrued rights doctrine. The court considered that as the employer had benefited
For an excellent analysis of the differences between the three cases see JansenJA in BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk
v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) at 421-2 (translation).
14 BK Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering (Edms) Bpk 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) at 410 (translation).
15 1952 (3) SA 31 (T).
1(5 1952 (3) SA 31 (T) at 35-6.
17 1920 AD 617.
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from the service on a daily basis, it would be unjustifiably enriching itself if the contract
breaker was not granted a restitution claim.18 As the breach did not involve the delivery
of a defective performance, it could be argued that the employer had received what he
bargained for under the contract.
Establishing the fact of enrichment with reference to the acceptance test (as
evidenced by utilisation of the defective performance) has recently been extended to
services cases. In Masters v Thain t/alnhaca Safari the aggrieved party contracted to go on
holiday on the express undertaking that there would be scuba diving facilities available.19
On arrival at the destination, it transpired that there were no such facilities. The
aggrieved party immediately terminated the contract and requested to be flown home.
The first available flight home was four days after the date of arrival.20 The court upheld
the aggrieved party's claim for restitution of the purchase price. In so doing, the court
asked whether the contract breaker was entitled to any compensation for the aggrieved
party's use of some of the facilities whilst he was at the destination. According to
Horowitz AJ no such compensation was payable because
'[t]his was not a case in which the plaintiff [the aggrieved party], when he
ascertained that diving facilities were not available, simply adopted a complacent
attitude and accepted less than he contracted for. At the first opportunity, which
was the very evening that he and his family arrived on the island, the plaintiff
made his disapproval known to the defendant and rejected any notion of staying
on the island for a moment longer than was necessary. ... The fact that the ...
plaintiff had to wait some four days for a flight out was not the plaintiffs
problem. ... Ordinarily, in the case of cancellation of a contract, each party must
return to the other that which was received pursuant to the contract. That rule,
however, must be tempered by the corollary that, if either party ... was obliged,
against his will, to utilise some of the service rendered under the contract whilst
awaiting fulfilment by the defendant of her obligations which befell her upon
18 For a full discussion of this case in the context of accrued rights see section 3.2.1 (ii).
19 2000 (1) SA 467 (W).
20 For the facts see Masters v Tbaiti t/a Inhaca Safari 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) at 468-9.
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cancellation of the contract, then redelivery or compensation for the service thus
utilised is excused.'21
This dictum establishes that mere utilisation of the benefits under a contract is
sometimes not sufficient to attract liability for restitution. In cases where it is not
possible to reject the performance immediately, liability for restitution will be triggered if
the utilisation is coupled with a voluntary intention to accept the defective benefits.22
Intention in this context has a more limited meaning than the intention required to
establish the formation of a contract. Although the holidaymaker would not have
entered into a contract for a holiday without scuba diving facilities, they would have
incurred some liability if they had made the best of it and stayed at the resort for the
duration of the holiday.
This category also includes those cases where the inherently non-returnable
benefit arises as an incidental consequence of performance. This occurs, for example,
when a purchaser uses a defective car prior to termination for breach. Recently, the
South African courts have held that the aggrieved party's use of the car is
counterbalanced by the contract breaker's use of the purchase price and that a
'meticulous readjustment' of the economic interest between the parties was not
necessary.23 Once again, utilisation of the benefit triggers restitution. Restitution is
justified in these cases because the aggrieved party has saved an expense by having had
the use of the car.24
21 Masters v Thain 1/a Inhaca Safari 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) at 474-5. It would be unfair to expect the
holidaymaker to stay in his hotel room for the period he was at the destination. For a similar case see
Tweedie v Park TravelAgency (Pty) Ltd t/a Park Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W).
22 This aligns with the approach adopted in Ambrose &Aitken vJohnson & Fletcher 1917 AD 327 at 343
where the court said that the aggrieved party is free to reject the incomplete or defective performance and
in so doing avoid enrichment liability.
23 Kat^effv City Car Sales 1998 (2) SA 644 (C) at 654.
24 Where the contract breaker is the owner or the car, he is the proper restitution claimant. Where,
however, the purchaser has been evicted from possession by the true owner (i.e someone other than the




Although it has been stated that Scots law regards the claim for restitution of an
inherently non-returnable benefit as an enrichment remedy, there is little direct
authority.25 The cases, such that there are, deal predominately with inherently non-
returnable benefits that produce an end product. It is not settled whether Scots law
follows a subjective or an objective approach to establishing the fact of the defender's
enrichment.26
(ii) Inherently Non-Returnable Performances Producing an End Product
The point of departure in Scots law is Ramsej v Brand?1 The case involved a
building contract. It was held that as the builder's breach was minor, he was entitled to
the contract price less the cost of rectifying the defect. In an important obiter dictum,
Lord President Robertson stated as follows:
'[ijf on the other hand, the proprietor made the best of it and let the house stay,
the only claim which the contractor could have would be a claim of recompense;
and this be it observed, would be not for quantum meruit the builder, but for
quantum lucratus est the proprietor. Accordingly, when contractors do not stick to
their contracts they not only unmoor themselves from their contract rights, but
they drift into much less certain and much less definite claims.'28
25 MacQueen, (1994) JR 162 and MacQueen, 'Unjustified Enrichment' in Ashton et at (eds), Fundamentals
ofScots Law (2003), para. 8.39.
26 For a discussion of the 'enrichment' requirement in Scots law see Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment
(2003), paras 7.01-20.
27 (1898) 25 R 1212 and (1898) 35 SL Rep 927.
28 (1898) 25 R 1214. Although Lord President Robertson did not cite any authority for this statement,
MacQueen suggests that he was influenced by the following statement by Lord President Inglis: 'No
doubt, if [the builder] perform a part and then fail in completing the contract, I shall be bound in equity
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This statement can be taken as tangential authority that a restitution claim in
Scots law, like South African law, is triggered by the utilisation of the defective
performance. This utilisation might occur, for example, where the employer uses the
defective building work to complete the project. This occurred in Bank ofEastAsia Ltd v
Scottish Enterprise,29 It was pointed out in section 3.3.2(ii) that the case should have been
resolved by granting the contract breaker a restitution claim for the value of the defective
work utilised by the aggrieved party to complete the project.
In order to present a complete picture of Scots law, it is necessary to consider four
further cases. In Steele v Young a contractor used milled lime instead of the contractually
stipulated cement mortar to build a house.30 The only way of repairing the defect was to
knock the house down and to rebuild it with the correct material. The contractor instituted
a claim for the purchase price. The problem was that if the court applied the cost of cure
formula set out in Ramsey v Brand, the employer would have gained a house for free as the
cost of curing the defect was greater than the contract price. For this reason, the court was
understandably reluctant to apply Ramsey v Brand. Instead, they held that a party in breach is
prevented from suing for the contract price.31 Although the claim for the contract price
was rejected, the court was at pains to stress (obiter) that this did not preclude the contractor
from suing the employer to the extent that the latter was unjustifiably enriched by the
contractor's work.32
In Forrest v Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd a builder instituted a claim for the
outstanding part of the purchase price and the employer sought to repel this claim on the
to allow him credit to the extent to which I am lucratus by his materials and labour, but no further...'
Watson v Sbamkland (1871) 10 M 142 at 152. MacQueen, (1994) JR 153.
29 1997 SLT 1213 (HL).
30 1907 SC 360.
31 This rule derives from the principle of mutuality. For a discussion and criticism of this rule see section
3.3.2.
32 Steele v Young 1907 SC 360 at 366.
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basis that the building work was defective.33
In the lower court, Lord Hunter upheld the claim by finding that that the contract
had not been breached. He did, however, go on to say that had the contract been breached,
he would have allowed a claim in unjustified enrichment for the same amount. If the court
was referring to a situation where the contract was terminated for breach, then this obiter
dictum can be taken as authority that restitution after termination for breach is enrichment-
based.
Although the First Division upheld the builder's claim, it did so by holding that the
contractor was entitled to the contract price subject to a deduction on a the cost of cure
basis. Lord President Stathclyde stated that if there is a material breach of contract coupled
with a refusal of the work, then the claim on the contract fails. Interestingly, he does not
mention the possibility of a claim in unjustified enrichment. This is potentially problematic
as the aggrieved party might end up with an unjustifiable windfall gain.34 For present
purposes the case must be treated with caution as it did not involve a termination for
breach.31
It is clear from both decisions in Forrest and the decision in Ramsey that the courts
were at pains to let contract law provide the solution to these types of cases.
The next case is P.E.C. Barr Printers Ltd v Forth Print Ltd.36 After delivering half
of the typesetting work required by the contract, Barr Printers were unable to complete
the remainder of the work by the contractually stipulated time for performance. As a
result, Forth Print terminated the contract for breach and completed the work
33 1915 SC 115; affirmed 1916 SC (HL) 28.
34 Forrest v Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd 1915 SC 115.
35 The House of Lords decision in Forrest v Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd 1916 SC (HL) 28 does not say
anything about the difference of opinion between Lord Hunter and Lord President Strathclyde on the
availability of an enrichment claim in cases where the contractor is debarred from claiming on the
contract.
36 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 118.
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themselves. Barr instituted a restitution claim for the value of the work completed.
Forth, in turn, counter-claimed for damages. Both claims were upheld. In respect of
Barr's restitution claim, Sheriff Ireland held that it was not founded on recompense (one
of the enrichment remedies in Scots law) but was rather a quantum meruit claim. This
claim was said to be based on an implied contract to pay the market rate for the work
actually completed.37 The court justified this conclusion on the basis that Forth Print
Ltd had the choice whether to accept or reject the work completed at the date of
termination. The court distinguished this case from a case where a landowner has
defective building work constructed on his land on the basis that the landowner has no
choice but to make the best of it and is liable to pay only to the extent of his enrichment
(quantum lucratus). According to the court, this is measured by the increase in the value of
the land. This was said to contrast with a quantum meruit claim as this claim is measured
by the market value of the work. The court held that the best evidence of this market
value was the contract price between the parties.38
This judgment raises a number of points. First, as MacQueen has pointed out,
the idea behind the implied contract analysis is suspect in that it is not clear that the
parties' conduct evidences consensus ad idem. According to this reasoning, the trigger for a
restitution claim is something more than the mere utilisation of the benefit as it appears
to include an intention to accept the benefit where intention appears to mean the
intention to be bound in contract.39 This overlooks the significant damage that the
implied contract theory has inflicted on the English law of unjustified enrichment. The
authors in that jurisdiction have rightly rejected this approach and Scots law ought to
37 P.E. C. Barr Printers Ltd v Forth Print Ltd 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 118 at 122.
38 Ibid.
39 MacQueen, (1994) JR 160-1.
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avoid similar pitfalls.40
Secondly, the reason Sheriff Ireland wanted to keep the restitution claim outside
the enrichment fold was because he sought to value the benefit at the market rate
(quantum meruit) rather than the extent to which Forth Print Ltd was enriched (quantum
/ucratus). James Wolffe has pointed out that there is not necessarily a difference between
these two measures as quantum lucratus can incorporate quantum meruit. This is because a
recipient of a benefit can be enriched by the extent to which his estate has been saved
from incurring the expense necessary to procure a service.41 This establishes that Sheriff
Ireland's reason for not regarding the restitution claim as an enrichment remedy is
unconvincing.42
Even though the reasoning in this case is suspect in parts, it is not inconsistent
with the view that restitution is triggered by the utilisation of the defective or
incomplete performance. As we saw in section 6.3.1 (ii)(b), the additional requirement of
intention to accept the defective performance is only necessary when the aggrieved
party does not have the opportunity to reject a benefit forthwith.
The final case, ERDC Construction Ltd vHM Love <& Co.,43 involved a contract to
repair a building. The court confirmed that if a contract has been terminated for breach,
the aggrieved party can, as an alternative to damages, institute a quantum meruit claim to
recover for work carried out under the contract. This quantum meruit was said to be a
claim at a reasonable or ordinary rate.
Although Wolffe has noted that a claim for quantum meruit has a contractual
40 For a discussion of the implied contract theory see Birks, An Introduction to the Law ofRestitution (1989),
29-39.
41 Wolffe,'ERDC Construction Ltd v HM Love <& Co' (1997) 1 Edin LR 469. See also MacQueen, (1994) JR
161 and Whitty and Visser, 'Unjustified Enrichment' in Zimmermann, Visser and Reid (eds), Mixed Legal
Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and Obligations in Scotland and South Africa (2004), 399 at 408.
42 MacQueen, (1994) JR 161 says that it ought to have been treated as a claim for recompense.
43 1995 SLT 254.
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connotation for Scots lawyers, the matter cannot be regarded as finally settled.44 This is
for two reasons. First, the court was not forced to decide this issue as the contract in
question had not been terminated and secondly, the quantum of a quantum meruit claim
can be equivalent to what can be claimed under an enrichment action.45 This, as Wolffe
argues, makes it doctrinally possible to classify the quantum meruit claim as an enrichment
remedy.46
As quantum meruit claims deal with compensating a contracting party for work
carried out under a contract subsequently terminated for breach, it is clear that the
issues raised about its doctrinal basis and its quantum are identical to those raised in
respect of restitution claims generally. Accordingly, the conclusions reached in respect
of these issues will be taken to apply equally to quantum meruit claims.
Like South African law, Scots law has not considered the case where the benefit
increases the value of the aggrieved party's estate but is not utilised by that party.
(iii) Inherently Non-Returnable Performances not Producing an End Product
The leading Scottish case in this category is Graham v United Turkey Red.47 This
case is discussed in section 6.3.3(iv) below.
44 Wolffe, (1997) 1 Edtn LR 474.
45 As the conract in ERDC Constuction Ltd had not been terminated for breach, the court refused to award
the quantum meruit claim. For a case in which the claim was actually awarded see Fox v Hendrie 1996 GWD
27-1570.
46 Wolffe, (1997) 1 Edin LR 473-7. Indeed, MacQueen argues that this claim ought to be regarded as an
enrichment claim. MacQueen, (1994) JR 137 and MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and
Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual, Restitutionary and
Proprietary Consequences (1997), 199 at 222.
47 1922 SC 533.
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6.3.3 The Trigger for a Restitution Claim: Lessons from the Common Law
A number of points emerge from the analysis of the case law in South Africa
and Scotland. Where the inherently non-returnable performance produces an end
product, utilisation is the appropriate trigger for a restitution claim. If restitution were
not awarded in these circumstances, the recipient would unjustifiably be left with
windfall benefit after termination for breach.
In cases where the inherently non-returnable performance does not yield an
end-product, we saw that mere utilisation of the benefit is sometimes not sufficient.
This is because the aggrieved party can be in a situation where he has no choice but to
utilise some of the performance. Accordingly, restitution in these cases will only be
triggered where utilisation is coupled with a voluntary intention to accept the benefits.
On close inspection this is actually the same test that applies to inherently non-
returnable benefits yielding an end product since utilisation in these cases necessarily
incorporates a voluntary intention to accept the benefits in question.
In employment contracts restitution claims for services rendered are justified
because the aggrieved party can sometimes be said to have received what he bargained
for under the contract.48 This is unproblematic in cases, such as Spenser v Gostelow, where
the breach is unrelated to the content of the performance rendered."
An alternative justification is, however, necessary in cases such as Graham v
United Turkey Red where the breach is caused by defective performance.501 will return to
this below.
48 We are concerned here with those claims relating to performances that fall outside the doctrine of
accrued rights.
49 1920 AD 617. See section 6.3.1 (ii)(b).
50 1922 SC 533.
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Although South African and Scots law have solved some of the problems
regarding the appropriate trigger for restitution of inherently non-returnable benefits, a
number of gaps still remain. This is partly due to the fact that neither jurisdiction has
considered the notion of benefit in any great depth. In the wake of the intense interest
in unjustified enrichment in English law, much useful work has been done in this
regard. This analysis goes a long way to plugging the gaps in South African and Scots
law.
(i) Establishing the fact of Enrichment in English Law
Although it appears that English law adopts a basically subjective approach to
establishing a recipient's enrichment, this does not mean that idea of'objective benefit'
(in the market value sense) does not play an important role. Indeed, as Burrows notes,
'[tjhe outer parameters of the law of restitution have been fixed by the notion of an
objective benefit qualified by downward subjectivity only'.51 This means that only
objective benefits can enrich a recipient.
(ii) Objective Benefits
It is now well established that objective benefits can be positive or negative. The
receipt of a positive objective benefit causes an increase in a person's patrimony. A
negative objective benefit is the saving of an expense that would reasonably have been
incurred.'2
51 Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 24.
52 Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 16.
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Two issues about objective benefits have caused disagreement amongst the
commentators: first, whether pure services (i.e those which do not result in an end
product) can ever be an objective benefit and second, whether a service must actually be
received to qualify as an objective benefit.
In respect of the former, Beatson has argued that pure sendees are not objective
benefits unless they save necessary expenditure.53 This argument has been rejected,
rightly in my view, as it goes against common sense to say that a person has not
benefited when he listens to Mozart's Requiem or has his household items transported
to a new house.54
In respect of the latter, Burrows has argued that '[pjrior to receipt no-one could
reasonably consider services beneficial. No rational person would pay ... for services
that he .. .did not receive.'55 This not only accords with common sense but also creates a
clear cut off point as to when an objective benefit has been received.56 Accordingly,
'... where the services comprise the cutting of hair or the removal ofwaste or
the giving of a rock concert or the writing of a book or the building of a house
the defendant can be said to be objectively benefited when, respectively, and
subject to a de minimis threshold, locks of his hair are cut, items of waste are
removed, the rock concert commences, the first part of the book is received and
the first part of the building is erected.'3'
The establishment of an objective benefit is only the starting point. In respect of
non-monetary benefits, it is always open to the recipient of an objective benefit to argue
53 Beatson, 'Benefit, Reliance, and the Structure of Unjust Enrichment' in Beatson (ed), The Use andAbuse
of Unjust Enrichment (1991), 21 at 31ff.
54 See for example Barker, 'Riddles, Remedies, and Restitution: Quantifying Gain in Unjust Enrichment
Law' (2001) 54 CLP 255 at 265 and Burrows, The Law ofdestitution (2002), 17.
55 Burrows, The Law ofdestitution (2002), 17. For arguments which claim that the receipt of a benefit is not
strictly necessary see Birks, 'In Defence of Free Acceptance' in Burrows (ed), Essays on the Law ofdestitution
(1995), 105 at 140-1 and Barker, (2001) 54 CLP 255 at 266.
56 See also Skelton, destitution and Contract (1998), 12 who prefers Burrows' position.
57 Burrows, The Law ofdestitution (2002), 17.
197
that a benefit was of no value to him (i.e. to the particular recipient). This has been
coined 'subjective devaluation' by Birks.58
(iii) Subjective Devaluation
The critical question that arises here is when should the recipient of a benefit be
prevented from claiming subjective devaluation of that benefit. Three tests have been
developed by the English commentators to answer this question: incontrovertible
benefit, free acceptance and bargained-for benefit.
(a) Incontrovertible Benefits
The idea underlying the incontrovertible benefit test is that some benefits are so
obviously enriching that
'... any recourse to subjective devaluation would be so absolutely unreasonable
that no reasonable man would try it. Or, put more simply, no reasonable man
would say that the defendant was not enriched.'59
In respect of positive benefits, Birks originally favoured a narrow approach and argued
that only those gains that have been realised (i.e turned into money) are incontrovertibly
beneficial.60 Goff and Jones take a broader view and include realisable benefits.61 They
exclude improvements to land on the grounds that it is often not easy to realise these
gains. Burrows has criticised both approaches. The narrow view encourages recipients
58 Birks, An Introduction to the Daw ofRestitution (1989), 109.
59 Birks, An Introduction to the Daw ofRestitution (1989), 116.
60 Birks, An Introduction to the Daw ofRestitution (1989), 121-4.
61 Goff and Jones, The Daw ofRestitution (2002), para. 1-023.
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to wait until after trial to realise their gain. This problem is not sufficiently met by Goff
and Jones's realisable gains test since it excludes some cases where it may be easy to sell
land and includes some cases where it might be burdensome for a particular recipient to
realise a gain of a non-land benefit.62 Burrows argues, cogently in my view, that the best
approach is
'... to take Birks' realised test but to add that the defendant will also be regarded
as incontrovertibly benefited where the court regards it as reasonably certain that
he will realise the positive benefit. Assessment of the defendant's future conduct
is necessarily speculative but the courts commonly have to predict future
conduct in assessing damages for loss, precisely to avoid the nonsense of rigidly
cutting off loss at the date of trial.'63
(b) Free Acceptance
According to Birks, free acceptance '... occurs where a recipient knows that a
benefit is being offered to him non-gratuitously and where he, having the opportunity to
reject, elects to accept.'64 This method of overcoming subjective devaluation has proved
extremely contentious. It has been rejected both by Burrows and Garner. Burrows
argues that free acceptance establishes nothing more than an indifference to an object
benefit conferred.65 Instead, Burrows favours the 'bargained-for' test discussed below.
Garner takes an even stronger line. He argues that the elements of the free acceptance
test are very seldom present in cases where one party has rendered part performance
under a contract. The important exception is where the recipient of the part
62 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 19.
63 Ibid. Birks now appears to have been persuaded by Burrows' argument. See Birks, Unjust Enrichment
(2003), 50.
64 Birks, An Introduction to the Taw ofRestitution (1989), 265.
65 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 21. See also Burrows, 'Free Acceptance and the Law of
Restitution' (1988) 104 TQR 576.
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performance uses that performance as the basis to complete the work.66
Birks himself has stated that part performance under a contract will not
constitute a free acceptance. In response, Birks developed the concept of 'limited
acceptance' to resolve this problem. In Birks' words,
'[t]he idea behind that label was that there is in these cases a sufficient
acceptance of the part performance to bar recourse to subjective devaluation
even though it would be difficult to say that there was an acceptance from which
you could spell out an unjust factor.'67
Birks explains further that 'limited acceptance' may be the appropriate test for
enrichment when resort to subjective devaluation appears unconscionable as a result of
his own conduct in respect of the benefit received.68 A clear example of this is where the
recipient uses the part performance as a basis to complete the work.
(c) Bargained-for Benefits
In preference to the free acceptance test, Burrows has suggested the 'bargained-
for' test to overcome subjective devaluation. The essence of the idea is that where a
party has entered the market and requested a service, then
'... it can be rebuttably presumed that it [the recipient] regards itself as benefited
by what it has received and that it has been saved part of the expense that it
would otherwise have incurred.'69
66 Garner, 'The Role of Subjective Benefit in the Law of Unjustified Enrichment' (1990) 10 OJES 42 at
54.
67 Birks, 'In Defence of Free Acceptance' in Essays on the Eaw ofRestitution (1991), 105 at 139.
68 Birks, An Introduction to the Eaw ofRestitution (1989), 232. See also Birks, 'In Defence of Free Acceptance'
in Essays on the Eaw ofRestitution (1991), 105 at 140 where he states that even in the absence of such
conduct, it may sometimes be unconscionable for the recipient of a benefit to rely on subjective
devaluation. The example given is the receipt of three quarters of a house that was contracted for.
69 Burrows, The Eaw ofRestitution (2002), 23. This is similar, although not identical, to Barker's 'satisfaction'
test of enrichment. See Barker, (2001) 54 CEP at 265.
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This test is unproblematic where the recipient has received precisely what he bargained
for under the contract. Where, however, the recipient has received a defective
performance or only part of the contracted for performance, Garner has argued that
Burrows' rebuttable presumption is based on a 'fallacious jump in reasoning'.70 This is
because the recipient has bargained for complete performance. According to Garner's
approach, the mere receipt of a part performance without more does not result in a
subjective benefit. The presumption must be one of 'no benefit'.
In response to this criticism, Burrows argues that Garner's point amounts to no
more than a claim that the presumption of benefit created by the 'bargained-for' test can
sometimes be rebutted. This would occur, for example, where the cost of completing
the performance would be as much as the original contract price.71 As Skelton has
pointed out, although Garner and Burrows start with different presumptions, the fact
that both admit exceptions means that they meet in the middle ground.72 The same
point can be made about the difference between Burrows' bargained-for test and Birks'
limited acceptance test.
(iv) Analysis
It is submitted that the different tests used to overcome subjective devaluation
are particularly helpful in uncovering the principles underlying the imposition of liability
for restitution after termination for breach. Put another way, the various tests of
enrichment explain why restitution should be allowed or disallowed in different
contexts. It is important to bear in mind that we are not at this stage concerned with the
70 Garner, (1990) 10 OJLS 53 n54.
71 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 24.
72 Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998), 19.
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extent of liability for restitution but with the antecedent question whether the recipient of
a benefit should be liable for restitution to some extent.
It has been emphasised in this chapter that it is necessary to distinguish between
two situations in which the claim for restitution arises. First is the case where a
performance leaves the recipient with an end product. It is necessary here to make a
further distinction between those cases where the breach results in defective
performance and those cases where the breach does not relate to that performance. The
latter might occur, for example, if a property developer runs out of money and, as a
result, has to repudiate a construction contract. In this example, Burrows' 'bargained-
for' test provides the proper explanation for the aggrieved party's restitution claim.73
The former will most commonly occur where a contractor delivers a defective
performance. This is unproblematic where the employer uses this defective performance
as a basis to complete the work. Although there are problems at the edges of free
acceptance, Birks' limited acceptance explains the decisions in Scots and South African
law in which the courts have held that utilisation triggers a restitution claim.
The case where the employer terminates the contract and does not utilise the
defective performance is more complex. Clearly limited acceptance is excluded.
Burrows' bargained-for test is also inappropriate because the employer can legitimately
say that he has no desire, for example, for an outhouse made from wood when he
contracted for brick to be used. In these circumstances the presumption of enrichment
is rebutted.
Assuming that the benefit increases the value of the land, then these cases must
be resolved with the incontrovertible benefit test. A court will need to ascertain whether
73 Although the incontrovertible benefit test might also apply, this is not necessarily true. For example, the
construction of a moat around a house might actually decrease the value of the land.
202
it is reasonably certain that the recipient will realise the value of the benefit. This
approach will grant the courts the requisite flexibility to achieve the right balance
between preventing the imposition of liability where it is unlikely that recipient will
realise the gain and ensuring that cunning recipients are prevented from being left with a
windfall gain.
The second case is where the performance does not result in an end product.
Where the breach is unrelated to the performance, then the bargained-for test applies in
the same way as described above.74 The acute case is where the breach is caused by a
defective performance. It is necessary to make a further distincdon between those cases
where the performance results in saved expenditure and those cases where the
performance cannot be measured in money. Examples of the former are washing a car,
washing windows or removing the waste paper from a solicitor's office. Examples of the
latter are attending a piano recital or watching a film.
Where the performance has a monetary value, then the 'bargained-for' test
explains why liability for resdtudon arises. A clear example in Scots law is Graham v
United Turkey Red.75 In this case, an agent, in breach of contract, acted for the principal's
competitor.76 After the contract was terminated, the agent ought to have had a claim for
restitution against the employer for the work carried out prior to termination.77
Although he did not receive precisely what he contracted for — an agent acting
exclusively on his behalf - he did, nevertheless, bargain for an agent to carry out work
on his behalf. The point is that the 'bargained-for' test indicates why it would be unjust
74 This explains cases such as Spenser v Gostelow where an employee can claim restitution for work done in
accordance with the contract prior to termination for breach. See section 6.3.1 (ii)(b).
75 1922 SC 533.
76 For a discussion of this case in the context of accrued rights see section 3.3.2(i).
77 Although it has been held that the agent in breach could not claim on the contract, there was some
obiter suggestion that he might have an unjustified enrichment claim against the principal. See Graham v
United Turkey Red 1922 SC 533 at 550.
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to allow the principal in this case to say that he did not value that performance at all.
Accordingly, the enquiry in this case should focus on the extent to which the principal
has benefited from the agent's work. This is a matter of quantum.
Where the performance cannot be measured in money, the tricky case is where
the breach relates to the defective performance. This might occur for example, if a
concert pianist suffers an irretrievable memory lapse halfway though Bach's Goldberg
variations and, as a result, fails to complete the concert or if a cinema's film projector
burns the cinema's only copy of a movie midway through the film. In my view, none of
the tests designed to overcome subjective devaluation will result in the imposition of
liability for restitution. This is because the aggrieved party can always legitimately claim
that their satisfaction is only triggered on hearing the complete performance or on
seeing the whole film. Although the aggrieved party will have received an objective
benefit in these cases, they can always subjectively devalue this part performance to
defeat a restitution claim. The nature of the performance contracted for justifies this
result.
6.3.4 Conclusion
The focus in this section has been on the appropriate trigger for a restitution
claim in respect of an inherently non-returnable benefit. It was argued that the principles
which determine when this claim is appropriate are helpfully articulated by the tests
developed in English law to determine when a party is enriched. All that is required at
this stage of the analysis is a conclusion that a recipient of performance has benefited
from that performance to some extent. The important question about the extent of the
recipient's liability is considered in the following section.
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6.4 Quantum of a Restitution Claim
When the right to restitution arises, the next question concerns its quantum.
Herein lies the heartland of the argument about the proper doctrinal basis of restitution
of non-returnable benefits.
Once again, it is helpful to distinguish between those cases where a performance
leaves the recipient with an end product and those cases where the performance does
not yield an end product. It is also helpful to deal separately with cases where the
performance is defective and cases where the performance (although not complete)
accords with the contract. In certain instances it is also necessary to deal separately with
the contract breaker's restitution claim and the aggrieved party's restitution claim. This
can impact on the relative moral blameworthiness of the parties and, as a result, can
have a bearing on the extent to which each party ought to be made liable for restitution.
As we shall see below, many of the difficulties that arise relate to the role of the
contract price in determining the quantum of restitution.
6.4.1 Contract Breaker's Claim for Restitution of a Performance Resulting in
a Defective End Product
Restitution claims for defective performances which yield an end product arise
most commonly where a contractor has delivered defective building work.78 The
following example illustrates the issues at stake. Assume that a builder breaches a
78 As pointed out in sections 6.3.1 (ii)(a) and 6.3.2(ii), there is little case law directly in point in either South
African or Scots law. Many cases that could have been resolved by restitution claims have instead been
resolved with the exceptio non adimpleti contractus or the right of retention.
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contract after having completed only 30 percent of the work. What is the appropriate
quantum of the contract breaker's restitution claim in these circumstances?
In the majority of cases, the aggrieved developer will get another contractor to
complete the work. It is critical that the aggrieved party can set off his damages claim
against the contract breaker's restitution claim. Accordingly, if the aggrieved party has to
spend more than the original contract price to complete the work, the original
contractor will not receive anything from a restitution claim.79 In fact, he will be liable to
make up the difference between the total amount spent and the original contract price.
This might occur because it is costly to rectify the original contractor's defects or
because the original contractor entered into a losing contract.
If the cost of completing the work is less than the contract price, the maximum
the original contractor will receive is the difference between the original contract price
and the amount paid to the second contractor. If the sum of the amount paid to the
second contractor and the quantum of restitution (on all methods of calculation) is
greater than the original contract price, then the contract breaker will only receive the
difference between the total contract price and the amount paid to the second
contractor. The availability of the aggrieved party's damages claim means that his
maximum exposure is the total contract price. This is the right result in principle.
The method of calculating the contract breaker's restitution claim will only
affect the quantum recoverable in cases where (a) this method causes the sum of the
quantum of restitution and the amount paid to the second contractor to exceed the
original contract price (in circumstances where other methods would not have this
effect) and in cases where (b) the sum of the quantum of restitution and the amount
79 This assumes that the original contractor has not been paid for the work carried out.
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paid to the second contractor is less than the original contract price. The latter will
occur when the contract breaker has entered into a winning contract.
One argument used to justify the enrichment nature of the contract breaker's
restitution claim is that any reference to the contract price will unjustifiably include an
element of the contract breaker's profit.80 It should not be overlooked, however, that if
the enrichment is calculated by ascertaining the cost of similar services in the market,
this will also include a profit element.
There are three measures that can be used to quantify the contract breaker's
restitution claim. First, the contract breaker's restitution claim can be calculated as a
percentage of the contract price which equates to that relationship that the work actually
carried out bears to the work required for complete performance (i.e. by the pro rata
contract price). Secondly, restitution can be calculated by ascertaining what a similar
contractor would have charged to do the work carried out (i.e the market value of
services rendered) and thirdly, restitution can be calculated as the increase in the value
of the aggrieved party's property.
In a winning contract, the pro rata contract price will in all probability yield a
better result for the contract breaker than a measure which focuses on the increase in
the value of the land or on the market value of the services rendered. As the contract
breaker is more morally blameworthy than the aggrieved party for the breach, it seems
justified to use the measure which is more advantageous to the aggrieved party.
Accordingly, it is arguably correct that the contract breaker's restitution claim ought to
be quantified with reference to the extent of the aggrieved party's enrichment rather
80 MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in Failure
ofContracts: Contractual, Kestitutionaiy and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 216.
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than the pro rata contract price.81
For the same reason, the contract breaker's enrichment claim should be
measured according to the method that yields the lower amount. Thus, if the market
value of the services rendered is greater than the increase in the aggrieved party's
patrimony, the latter's liability should not exceed the lower amount.82
6.4.2 Aggrieved Party's Restitution Claim for a Performance Resulting in a
Non-Defective (but incomplete) End Product
A typical example of a case in this category is where the aggrieved party carries
out building work on his co-contractant's property. A number of tricky problems
relating to the role of the contract price in determining the appropriate quantum of
restitution arise here. In order to unpack these problems, it is necessary to answer five
questions. First, should the aggrieved party's restitution claim be restricted by his
contractual expectation interest? Secondly, should the contract price stipulated for full
performance operate as an upper limit on the aggrieved party's restitution claim in bad
bargain cases? Thirdly, should the aggrieved party's restitution claim be limited to that
portion of the contract price that the work actually carried out bears to the work
required for complete performance? Fourthly, should the aggrieved party be entitled to
use restitution to escape completely from a bad bargain? Fifthly, should the aggrieved
party be able to claim the objective market value of his performance?
81 This is the position adopted by the Principles of European Contract Law. See PECL Art 9:309 and
Lando and Beale (eds), Principles ofEuropean Contract Law (2000), comment on Art 9:309. This measure
should be used to resolve cases such as Steel v Young 1907 SC 360; Forrest v Scottish County Investment Co. Ltd
1916 SC (HL) 28 and P.E.C. Barr Printers Ltd v Forth Print Ltd 1980 SLT (Sh Ct) 118.
82 Englard, 'Restitution of Benefits Conferred without Obligation' in Schlechtriem (ed), International
Encyclopaedia ofComparative Law (1991), §152. This is the position in South African law. See section
4.2.2(iii).
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(i) Should the Aggrieved Party's Restitution Claim be Limited by his
Expectation Interest?
The issue that arises here is best illustrated by a practical example. Say that a
building contractor contracts with a property developer to carry out building work on a
development project. The contract price is R5 million. It turns out that the market value
of the work is R12 million. Assume that after the contractor had completed half the
work, the developer ran out ofmoney and, as a result, breached his winning contract.
The contractor terminates the contract. The question is whether the aggrieved party's
restitution claim ought to be restricted by the net loss that he would have made had the
contract run its course. For the sake of argument assume that this loss is the difference
between the market value of the work and the contract price i.e. R7 million.83
Accordingly, the question is whether the aggrieved party's restitution claim for R6
million (assuming that half the work is worth half the value of the completed work)
ought to be reduced to zero (R6 million - R7 million = -R1 million).
(a) South African and Scots Law: A Lack of Authority
As there is no direct authority in South African or Scots law dealing with this
question, it must be approached as a matter of principle.
83 Depending on how the benefit is measured, this might in reality be a lesser amount. It is important to
bear in mind that the realisable market value of the benefit is not directly related to the net loss the
contractor would have incurred on the contract. Instead, the focus is on the relationship between the
contract price and the contractor's cost of producing the work.
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(b) The Position in Principle
In the above example, the aggrieved contractor cannot claim restitution for any
of the work carried out under the contract. This will occur in all cases where the overall
expectation loss exceeds the value of the benefits conferred. This has two consequences:
the aggrieved party is prevented from escaping the consequences of his losing bargain
and the contract breaker receives a benefit without paying anything for it. The latter
seems intuitively unjust.84 The arguments about restricting the aggrieved party's
restitution claim by his expectation interest were considered in the context of claims for
restitution of money. The conclusion reached there is that the arguments, while not
watertight, favoured allowing the aggrieved party to escape the consequences of his
losing contract by claiming restitution of the full purchase price.85 The same arguments
justify the conclusion that the aggrieved party's claim for restitution of inherently non-
returnable benefits should not be restricted by his expectation interest.86 Accordingly,
the law should not countenance a rule which can have the effect of preventing the
aggrieved party from claiming restitution and allowing the contract breaker to retain a
benefit without having to pay for it.
In the context of the claim for restitution ofmoney, the refusal to limit
restitution by the expectation interest means that the aggrieved party gets full escape
from the bad bargain. As money benefits cannot be valued in the same way as inherently
non-returnable benefits, the same point is not true in this context. Put another way,
84 See Treitel, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (1988), 104 who argues that it is wrong for the contract breaker
to get half the work for nothing as result of his own breach.
85 See section 5.3.1 (iii)(c).
86 Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998), 63 and Burrows, The haw ofRestitution (2002), 346. For a
libertarian argument that the part performing aggrieved party should be limited to his expectancy damages
see Mather, 'Restitution as a Remedy for Breach ofContract: The Case of the Partially Performing Seller'
(1982) 92 Yale LJ14.
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there are a number of intermediary positions where the aggrieved party is granted some,
but not complete, escape from his losing contract. The exact extent of the aggrieved
party's entitlement to restitution is addressed in subsequent subsections.
(ii) Should the Total Contract Price Cap the Aggrieved Party's Restitution
Claim in Bad Bargain Cases?
The issues raised by this question are best illustrated by Boomer vMuir?1 In this
case, the plaintiffs recovered $258,000 by way of a quantum meruit claim for work done in
building a dam even though they would only have been contractually entitled to another
$20,000 had the losing contract run its course. The leading authors regard this as an
indefensible result.88 In response, one suggestion is that the aggrieved party's restitution
claim should be capped by the full contract price.
(a) South African and Scots Law: Limited Authority
There is no direct authority in South African law on this point. In Scots law the
parties in Thomson vArchibald agreed to calculate a builder's restitution claim as the
market value of the work done multiplied by a fraction of the total contract price over
the market value of the completed work.89 This was explained by Sheriff Bell on the
87 24 P 2d 570 (1933). See also Lodder v Slowej [1904] AC 442 affirming (1900) 20 NZLR 321 and, most
recently, Renard ConstructionsME Pty Ltd vMinisterfor Public Works (1992) NSWLR 234.
88 See for example Visser, (1992) A] 203 at 229; Goff and Jones, The Law ofRestitution (2002), paras 20-021
to 20-022 and Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 346-7. According to Englard, most legal systems are
not prepared to award restitution completely divorced from the contract price. For a comparative
overview see Englard, 'Restitution of Benefits Conferred without Obligation' in InternationalEngclopaedia
ofComparative Law (1991), §141-2. For an argument as to why Boomer vMuir creates economic
inefficiencies see Kull, 'Restitution as a Remedy for Breach of Contract' (1994) 67 j' CatLR 1465 at 1472.
89 Thomson vArchibald 1990 GWD 26-1438 at 17-18 (Transcript).
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basis that the recipient of a benefit should not be liable for more than a proportionate
part of the price he agreed to pay.90 The key point is that if the relationship between the
value of the work actually carried out and the value of the total work represents the
relationship between the proportion that the work actually carried out bears to the
complete work, restitution will never exceed the contract price.91 The authority is
limited, however, as the method of calculating the claim was not in issue before the
court and it is clear the judge regarded it sceptically. Furthermore, the case involved a
claim by a contract breaker.
(b) Justifications and Criticisms of the Total Contract Price Restriction
Limiting restitution to the total contract price is favoured by Goff and Jones and
by Visser as the most appropriate way of preventing the aggrieved party claiming an
amount in excess of the contract price.92
Goff and Jones defend this argument on the basis that it protects both parties'
contractual expectations.93 The contract breaker's expectations are respected because the
total contract price is the maximum exposure to which he consented. The aggrieved
party's expectations are respected because the total contract price is the maximum
amount he would have anticipated receiving from the contract breaker.94
Restricting restitution claims to the total contract price has been criticised on
90 Ibid.
91 MacQueen, (1994) A] 137 at 163.
92 Goff and Jones, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), para. 20-021 to 20-022 and Visser, (1992) AJ 229. Birks
originally favoured this position but has subsequently changed his view. See respectively, Birks, An
Introduction to the Taw ofRestitution (1989), 288 and Birks, 'In Defence of Free Acceptance' in Essays on the
Taw ofRestitution (1991), 136.
93 Goff and Jones, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), paras 20-021 to 20-022.
94 Beatson, 'What Can Restitution Do for You?' in Beatson (ed), The Use andAbuse ofUnjust Enrichment
(1991), 14. For a similar argument see Kull, (1994) 67 CalTR 1478-84.
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four grounds. First, Burrows argues that this restriction is inconsistent with the
approach to claims for restitution ofmoney where the aggrieved party is allowed a
complete escape from a bad bargain.95 Indeed, anything short of allowing the aggrieved
party to claim the full cost of his performance will not allow the complete escape from
the bad bargain. This will be discussed below.96
Secondly, both Burrows and Skelton raise the doctrinal argument (encountered
in claims for restitution ofmoney) that the law of unjustified enrichment, as an
independent cause of action, should not be subject to restrictions which cannot be
justified with reference to the internal rules of enrichment law.97 The total contract price
limitation is problematic because it imposes a restriction on recovery that does not focus
on the extent to which the contract breaker has been enriched. This argument has
already been dismissed as unconvincing.98
Thirdly, Beatson has argued that this limitation produces an indefensible
arbitrary 'disequilibrium' between parties claiming restitution because the extent of the
limitation depends arbitrarily on the amount ofwork carried out relative to the
relationship between the objective market value and the contract price of the work.99
For example, say that A agreed to build a 10 mile road for £10 million (£1 million per
mile). It turns out that the market value of the road (and the cost to A of building this
road) is £2 million per mile.100 On these facts only contractors who happened to have
built more than 5 miles of road would suffer a limitation to their restitution claim.
Fourthly, Treitel has argued that it is incongruous that the aggrieved party
95 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 346.
96 See section 6.4.2(iii)(b).
97 Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 346 and Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998), 68.
98 See section 5.3.1 (iii)(c).
99 Beatson, 'What Can Restitution Do for You?' in The Use andAbuse ofUnjust Enrichment (1991), 14-5.
100 The example was originally suggested by Treitel. See Treitel, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (1988), 104.
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should get more for carrying out half the work than he would have got for carrying out
all his contractual obligations.1"1 By parity of reasoning, it could be said that it is unfair
for the aggrieved party to claim the full contract price for less than complete
performance.
In light of the third and forth arguments, I agree with Beatson's conclusion that
'the contract price limit is a compromise which, while attractive on pragmatic grounds
... is not an ideal solution.'102
(iii) Should the Pro Rata Contract Price be used to Quantify the Aggrieved
Party's Restitution Claim?
Thus far it has been established that the aggrieved party's restitution claim
should not be limited by his expectation interest or by the full contract price. Another
suggestion is that the aggrieved party's restitution claim ought to be limited to that
percentage of the contract price which equates to that relationship that the work actually
carried out bears to the work required for complete performance (i.e. by the pro rata
contract price).103
(a) South African and Scots Law: Limited Authority
There is limited authority in South African and Scots law for the use of the pro
rata contract price to measure a restitution claim. When the claim for a reduced contract
101 Treitel, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (1988), 104. See also Goff and Jones, The Taw ofRestitution (2002),
paras 20-021 to 20-022.
102 Beatson, 'What Can Restitution Do for You?' in The Use andAbuse ofUnjust "Enrichment (1991), 15.
103 See for example Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 346-7; Treitel, Remediesfor Breach ofContract
(1988), 104 and Birks, 'In Defence of Free Acceptance' in Essays on the Taw ofRestitution (1991), 135-7.
214
price was thought to be an enrichment remedy in South African law, it was said that
. this question of the actual enrichment of the owner is a matter of such
difficulty that justice is generally done between the parties by reference to the
contract price and the portion of the work that has been left incomplete. This is
not done on the understanding that the contract is still enforced, but merely to
ascertain what in the estimation of the parties themselves is the relative value of
the completed work and the portion still to be completed.'104
This authority is, however, limited as the contract in question had not been
terminated for breach.
In Scots law, Thomson vArchibald provides very limited authority for restricting
restitution according to the pro rata contract price.105
(b) Justifications and Criticisms of the Pro Rata Contract Price Restriction
In cases where the parties have entered into the bargain at the market rate
there is much to be said for the view that the aggrieved party's claim for restitution
should be the pro rata contract price.
The tricky case is where the aggrieved party has entered into a bad bargain.
According to Treitel, limiting restitution to the pro rata contract price is the right result
as it achieves a middle ground between preventing the contract breaker from retaining a
benefit without having to pay for it and preventing the aggrieved party from making a
windfall gain from the contract breaker's breach.106
104 1Van Rxnsburg v Straughan 1914 AD 317 at 333. See also Hauman vNortje 1914 AD 293 at 296-9.
105 See section 6.4.2(ii)(a).
106 Treitel, Remediesfor Breach ofContract (1988), 104. See also Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 344.
This is also the solution adopted by the Principles of European Contract Law. See PECL Art 9:309 and
Lando and Beale (eds), Principles ofEuropean Contract Taw (2000), comment on Art 9:309.
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The pro rata contract price restriction is supported on doctrinal grounds by
those who argue that restitution is an enrichment action. These commentators are
anxious to ensure that any check on the result in Boomer vMirir does not compromise the
doctrinal integrity of the enrichment nature of restitution. For them, the solution lies in
subjective devaluation. In Burrows' words,
'[i] f one overcomes subjective devaluation by regarding the defendant as having
been benefited because he received part of what he bargained for, the pro rata
contract price should form the upper limit in assessing the defendant's benefit:
for to allow the claimant the objective market price in excess of this would be to
re-encounter subjective devaluation in that the defendant can validly argue that
it was only willing to pay at the contractual rate.'107
The idea is that the contract is not invoked qua contract but rather qua
evidence of the value of the benefit to the recipient.108 This is doctrinally
satisfactory to the enrichment camp as the restriction is consistent with an internal
rule of enrichment law.
In line with my central thesis, this doctrinal justification is not sufficient to
support the argument that restitution should be restricted to the pro rata contract
price.
In any event, if restitution is limited to the pro rata contract price then it
looks very much like the law of contract is providing the solution to these cases. If
this is true, then why not leave it to the law of contract to regulate this claim?
The question is whether this approach accurately reflects the principles of
recovery underpinning restitution in these cases. Two arguments have been made
against the pro rata contract price restriction. First, it has been argued that it can be
107 Burrows, The Taw ofdestitution (2002), 346.
108 Birks, 'In Defence of Free Acceptance' in Essays on the Taw ofdestitution (1991), 136-7.
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unfair to limit this restitution claim to the pro rata contract price if the contract price
was agreed upon in exchange for full performance as this would in all likelihood have
taken account of the fact that the earlier part of the work would be more expensive than
the later part of the work.109 In cases where the pardes have entered into the contract at
the market rate, the aggrieved party's damages claim takes care of this concern. When
the aggrieved party has entered into a bad bargain, he will not have a damages claim and
the issue becomes a live one. As a matter of policy it is right to favour the aggrieved
party. Accordingly, it seems right that the aggrieved party can claim a sum greater than
the strict pro rata contract price. If the contract breaker can subjectively devalue the
performance according to the contract price, it will be necessary to grant the court the
power to adjust the award upwards to account for the fact that the early performance is
more expensive than the later performance. There is recent tangential authority in South
African law supporting this discretionary approach. In the context of awarding a claim
for a reduced contract price, Nienaber JA has stated that where it is not possible to
quantify objectively what is required to bring the contractor's defective performance up
to standard, the court has discretion to reduce the contract price by an amount required
to do justice between the parties. Furthermore, the court stated that although it will
sometimes be possible to prorate the defective performance with reference to the
contract price in a precise way, this will not always be possible and will require the court
to exercise its judgment in order to do justice between the parties.110
Secondly, it has been argued that the pro rata contract price restriction
does not take into account the reasons that the aggrieved party might have agreed
109 This is because of the contractor's fixed costs and economies of scale. See Beatson, 'What Can
Restitution Do for You?' in Beatson (ed), The Use andAbuse ofUnjustTLnrichment (1991), 14 and Skelton,
Restitution and Contract (1998), 66.
110 Thomson v Scho/t% 1999 (1) SA 232 (SCA) at 248-50.
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to a losing bargain. For example, a new contractor might agree to a losing bargain
in order to gain market exposure or to procure future work from a large client.111
Although contract law is not usually concerned with pardes' motives for
contracting, it is arguable that restricting the aggrieved party's restitution claim
strictly according to the pro rata contract price (or the total contract price for that
matter) is unfair when the contract breaker knew or ought reasonably to have
known the reasons that the contractor agreed to the losing bargain.112 In Gordon
and Frankel's words:
'[i] f the other party [the contract breaker] had agreed to receive the discount
price and had notice of the supplier's [the aggrieved party] expectations, that
party should be permitted to take advantage of the discount without meeting the
expectation if and only if the party performs its part of the bargain. If that party
breaches the contract, the discount — which was premised upon the promise of
contract completion — should no longer be available to it.'113
Accordingly, it does seem unjust to restrict the aggrieved party's restitution claim
with reference to the contract price when this price is closely connected to the
contract running its course. In these cases, it seems right to allow the aggrieved
party to unhinge himself, at least to some extent, from the fetters of the original
contract price.
Gordon and Frankel make a convincing economic case for supporting this
position. They argue that contracts containing such discounts may be value-
maximising and are more likely to take place if the contractor knows that he will
111 Skelton, "Restitution and Contract (1998), 67.
112 Where this is not the case, it seems right to allow the contract breaker to subjectively devalue the
performance. It follows that it would be wrong to award the aggrieved party a restitution claim with
reference to the objective market value in these cases.
113 Gordon and Frankel, 'Enforcing Coasian Bribes for Non-Price Benefits: A New Role for Restitution'
(1994) SCa/LR 1519 at 1570.
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recover the discount if the contract does not run its course.114 They also claim that
this soludon provides incentives for newcomers to enter new markets.115
In essence, the argument is that it is sometimes right to protect the aggrieved
party's non-price expectations. The question now is how should these expectations be
protected or, put another way, how much can the aggrieved party claim in these cases.
This is not easily resolved. If the aim is to protect these non-price expectations, then it is
right that the focus should be on the aggrieved party's loss rather than on the contract
breaker's gain.116 This loss is not easy to quantify and will of course involve some
speculation by the court. Justice will probably be done by adopting Gordon and
Frankel's suggestion that the aggrieved party should be entitled to the lesser of the cost
of performance and the market value of that performance.117 Unless the contractor is
incompetent, it is likely that the cost of his performance will be less than the market
value of that performance. It is right that the market value measure should serve to
protect the contract breaker from the contractor's incompetence.
In all cases where the aggrieved party is awarded the cost of his performance he
will escape from the bad bargain. If his cost of performance is greater than the market
value of this performance, it is justified that he is not granted complete escape from the
losing contract. This will ensure that in respect of escaping from bad bargains, claims
for restitution of money and returnable benefits and claims for restitution of inherently
non-returnable benefits are only different where this is justified.
The next question is whether the law of contract or the law of unjustified
enrichment is best placed to achieve this result. The problem with the law of enrichment
114 Gordon and Frankel, (1994) S CatLR 1542-9.
115 Gordon and Frankel, (1994) S CalLR 1544.
116 Gordon and Frankel, (1994) S CalLR 1552.
"7 Gordon and Frankel, (1994) S CalLR 1551-2.
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is that it suffers from a fundamental perspective limitation: it can only view matters in
this regard from the recipient's perspective. In order to overcome this limitation Skelton
argues that the recipient's enrichment must be measured subjectively and that in order
to assess the true subjective value of the benefit to the contract breaker, it is necessary
to
'... take into account not just the terms of the contract relating to the contract
price, but all the other terms of the contract (express or implied) and the facts
known or perceived by the defaulting party whilst he was engaged in the
bargaining process.'118
With respect, this is not convincing. No matter how one chooses to value
enrichment, the question remains the same: to what extent has the recipient been
enriched at the other party's expense? From a doctrinal point of view there is no room
for focussing, as Skelton does, on the reasons why the aggrieved party accepted a
contract price lower than the market rate or on the extent of his loss.119 Accordingly, the
fact that the developer knew that the aggrieved contractor was entering into a losing
contract does not reveal very much about the subjective value that the contract breaker
places on the contractor's performance.120
The upshot is that unjustified enrichment will only achieve the right result in
cases where the cost of performance exceeds the market value of the performance. If
the aggrieved party's restitution claim is always quantified by calculating the increase in
the value of the developer's estate, this will leave it to chance whether the right result
118 Skelton, Restitution and Contract (1998), 78.
119
Miller, 'Review of Skelton, A. Restitution and Contract (2001) 5 Edin LR 106 at 107.
120 In any event, it might well be difficult for the aggrieved contractor to overturn the developer's claim
that he was only prepared to undertake the development if he found a similarly good bargain. This
demonstrates that it is probably difficult to prevent the developer from subjectively devaluing his
enrichment according to the terms of the contract. If this is true, it appears that the law of contract is
providing the solution to these cases.
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will be achieved.
The only enrichment measure which is useful here is the saving made by the
contract breaker. This will invariably be calculated by looking at the cost of attaining
similar services in the market place and serves as the protection mechanism against
contractors whose cost of performance exceeds the market value of that performance.
As unjustified enrichment will only achieve the right result in all but a small
number of these cases, it is suggested that the courts should be left to develop a
contractual rule designed to achieve the right result.
This indicates that the law of contract is, or can be adapted to be, more
sensitive to the principles of recovery underlying the restitution claims under review
than the law of unjustified enrichment. This is because contract law is constituted by a
broader and more complex set of normative principles than the law of unjustified
enrichment.
6.4.3 Restitution Claims for Performances that do not Result in End
Products
This claim for restitution will occur in all cases where a contractant has rendered
a service to the other party. Once the right to restitution has been established, these
restitution claims raise similar quantification problems to restitution claims that yield an
end product. The following analysis highlights additional points.
(i) Contract Breaker's Claim
It was stated in section 5.3.1 (ii)(a) and (c) that the aggrieved party is under a
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corresponding duty to make counter-restitution when claiming restitution of the
purchase price. The South African courts have a discretionary power to reduce the
aggrieved party's claim for restitution ofmoney if that party made use of the defective
performance.121 Although the courts have yet to exercise this discretion, it is clear that
there is no hard and fast way of determining the appropriate level of compensation. For
example, how should the court decide the extent of a holidaymaker's liability when the
contract provided for a scuba diving holiday and the holidaymaker, in absence of these
facilities, decided to make the best of it and learn tennis at the same resort? In my view,
it is necessary to grant the court flexibility to do justice between the parties in these
cases.
It is suggested that in the absence of equivalent case law, Scots law should
follow the South African law in allowing the courts a similar discretion.
Similar issues arise in cases where the aggrieved purchaser uses a defective car
prior to termination for breach. Originally, the South African courts stated that the
court could modify the amount that the seller had to repay to the purchaser.122 Recently,
the courts have said that justice will be done if the aggrieved purchaser's use of the car is
set off against the seller's use of the purchase price and that a 'meticulous readjustment'
of the economic interest between the parties was not necessary.123 In all likelihood, the
expense saved by the aggrieved party by having the use of the car will be greater than
the interest earned on the purchase price. This reflects the policy of favouring the
aggrieved party when winding up a contract after termination for breach. However, in
this instance it can be argued that it is unfair to the contract breaker and there is a case
121 Masters v Thain t/a Inhaca Safaris 2000 (1) SA 467 (W) and Tweedie v Park TravelAgeng (Pty) Ltd 1/a Park
Tours 1998 (4) SA 802 (W).
122 Alpha Trust v Van der Watt 1975 (3) SA 734 (A) at 749.
123 Katyffv City Car Sales 1998 (2) SA 644 (C) at 654.
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for granting the courts the flexibility to modify the award in appropriate cases to do
justice between the parties. In this regard, South African law would do well to follow the
flexible approach in Scots law where the buyer's right to reclaim the purchase price can
be reduced in order to take into account any use of that has been made of the goods.124
When the contract breaker's breach is unrelated to the content of the
performance, then it is right to award restitution according to the pro rata contract
125
price.
(ii) Aggrieved Party's Claim
In line with the approach to restitution of inherently non-returnable benefits
yielding an end product, the aggrieved party's restitution claim for restitution in this
context should not be limited by his expectation interest or by the full contract price
and only sometimes by the pro rata contract price. The approach advocated above
should apply equally in this context.
6.5 Doctrinal Basis of Restitution of Inherently Non-Returnable
Benefits: A Summary
The existing law in Scotland and South Africa is that restitution of non-
returnable benefits is an enrichment action. There is no doubt that enrichment concepts
play an important and useful role in determining when the right to claim restitution of
124 This only applies to the termination of a contract under the new Pt 5A of the Sale of Goods Act 1979
(as amended). See section 48C. This section was added by the Sale and Supply of Goods to Consumers
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/3045). For a discussion of these new provisions see Hogg, 2003 ALT (News),
277.
125 This would occur in a case such as Spenser v Gostelow 1920 AD 617. See section 3.2.1 (ii).
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inherently non-returnable benefits arises. In this regard, helpful work has been done in
English law on the notion of benefit. It does not follow, however, that restitution must
necessarily be an enrichment action. In the context of a claim for a reduced contract
price, the South African courts have stated that this claim is triggered by utilisation and
that it is a contractual remedy.126 As there is an overlap between the tests used to trigger
a restitution claim and the test used to trigger a claim for the reduced contract price, it is
clear that contract law can accommodate the analysis of what constitutes a benefit.127
In respect of the quantum of restitution, it is necessary to distinguish between
the contract breaker's restitution claim and the aggrieved party's restitution claim.
When the contract breaker is claiming restitution, it is critical to bear in mind
that the aggrieved party has a damages claim against the contract breaker. If the
aggrieved party has to spend more than the original contract price to complete the work,
then the original contractor will not receive anything by way of a restitution claim. In
fact, he will be liable to make up the difference between the total amount spent and the
original contract price.
If the cost of completing the work is less than the contract price, the maximum
the original contractor will receive is the difference between the original contract price
and the amount paid to the second contractor.
The method of calculating the contract breaker's restitution claim will only
affect the quantum recoverable in cases where (a) this method causes the sum of the
quantum of restitution and the amount paid to the second contractor to exceed the
126 Tooling (Edms) Bpk v Scope Precision Engineering 1979 (1) SA 391 (A) and Thomson v Scholt\ 1999 (1) SA
232 (SCA).
127 This is in line with MacQueen's suggestion — outlined in section 4.4.3(iv)(b) - that a contractual view
of restitution does not necessarily mean that enrichment concepts are irrelevant. His approach calls on the
courts to look to enrichment considerations in appropriate circumstances without necessarily importing
wholesale enrichment analysis.
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original contract price and in cases where (b) the sum of quantum of restitution and the
amount paid to the second contractor is less than the original contract price. The latter
will occur when the contract breaker has entered into a winning contract.
In a winning contract, it was argued that the contract breaker's restitution claim
should be quantified by calculating the extent of the aggrieved party's enrichment. This
should be the lesser of the increase in the aggrieved party's patrimony and the cost of
procuring similar work in the market place (i.e. the market value of the services).
I argued that the aggrieved party's restitution claim should not be restricted
by his expectation interest or by the total contract price and only sometimes by the
pro rata contract price. In cases where the aggrieved party has not articulated the
reasons for entering into the losing contract and the contract breaker should not
have reasonably known these reasons, it seems right to measure the aggrieved
party's restitution claim with reference to the pro rata contract price making the
adjustment, when necessary, for the fact that early performance can be more
expensive than the later performance. This result will not be achieved if the
aggrieved party is entitled to a restitution claim measured with reference to the
objective market value of his performance. Accordingly, it looks very much as
though the law of contract is actually providing the solution to these cases. This
solution achieves the right balance between ensuring that the contract breaker does
not get a benefit without having to pay for it and ensuring that the aggrieved party
does not gain a windfall benefit as a result of the contract breaker's breach.
In cases where these reasons are articulated or ought reasonably to have
been known, it seems right to allow the aggrieved party to claim more than the pro
rata contract price. The right balance in these cases is probably achieved by
granting the aggrieved party a restitution claim for the lesser of the cost of his
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performance and the market value of that performance. It was argued that as
unjustified enrichment can only achieve the right result in a small number of cases,




The Claim to Redress Economic Imbalances after Termination for
Supervening Impossibility of Performance/Frustration and Restitutio in
Integrum after Termination of a Contract that is Voidable by Reason of
Improperly Obtained Consent
7.1 Introduction
The aim of this chapter is to consider the analytical implications of the doctrinal
arguments made about restitution after termination for breach for the claim to redress
the economic imbalances after supervening impossibility of performance/frustration
and for restitutio in integrum after termination of a contract that is voidable by reason of
improperly obtained consent. The point of connection between the three species of
contractual failure is that they all involve contracts which were initially valid but have
subsequently been terminated. One significant difference between contracts terminated
for supervening impossibility/frustration and the other two species of contractual
failure is the incidence of fault in the circumstances leading to the contractual failure. It
will be demonstrated that this difference has an important role to play in distilling the
principles of recovery underpinning the claims under review in this chapter. In terms of
the approach advocated in this thesis, this, in turn, informs the question about the
proper doctrinal basis of these claims.
7.2 The Claim to Redress Economic Imbalances after Termination for
Supervening Impossibility of Performance/Frustration
Although South African law calls their doctrine 'supervening impossibility' and
Scots law calls its equivalent doctrine 'frustration', this is nothing more than a semantic
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difference.1 Both terms will be used interchangeably.
Frustration describes the failure of a contractual relationship where it has
become objectively impossible for one or both contracting parties to perform a
contractual obligation. There are numerous reasons, often listed under the general
categories of vis major and casusfortuities, which cause an obligation to be discharged by
supervening impossibility/frustration. Examples include lightning, earthquakes,
unprecedented floods, acts of state legislature and the outbreak of war.2
As the focus in this chapter is on the consequences of frustration, it will be
assumed throughout that the circumstances exist which trigger the valid operation of
the doctrine. The aim of this chapter is not to attempt a comprehensive study of the
consequences of frustration but rather to focus on the following two narrower
questions. First, is the law of unjustified enrichment the appropriate doctrinal basis to
regulate the consequences of frustration and secondly, if the answer to the first question
is in the negative, which principles ought to guide the law in regulating these
consequences?
7.2.1 South African Law: Current Law and Academic Views
In respect of redressing the economic imbalances in frustration cases, South
' The precise effect that frustration has on the contractual nexus between the parties ought to be
equivalent to the effect that termination for breach has on this nexus. The effect of frustration on the
contractual nexus does not, unlike cases of termination for breach, need to accommodate contractual
damages. Although there are no cases in Scots law or South African law dealing with the survival of
accrued rights in frustration cases, there is no reason why the same rules described in chapter three should
not apply here. Cf Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Etd v Caterna Etd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at 201 where the
court says that supervening impossibility of performance extinguishes the contractual nexus between the
parties. This is understandable as the current South African law states that each party's liability is limited
to the extent of their enrichment. For a discussion of the Scottish authorities see Evans-Jones, Unjustified
Enrichment (2003), paras 4.53-5.
2 See generally Hutchison et at., Wille's Principles ofSouthAfrican Eam (1991), 498-9 and Gloag and
Henderson, Eaw ofScotland (2001), para. 13.16.
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African law limits each party's liability to the extent of their unjustified enrichment.
Until recently, this view rested on some old authority and De Vos's view that where the
performance received is either a specific thing or money, then the action to recover this
performance is the condictio sine causa in the form of the condictio ob causamfinitam and
where the performance takes the place of a factum, an ad hoc enrichment action is said
to lie.3 Building on De Vos's work, Ramsden has argued that there is historical support
for using the condictiones in this context in South African law.4
This enrichment nature of the claim to redress the economic imbalances in these
cases has now been confirmed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Kudu Granite
Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd.s In referring to the choice between the condictio ob
causamfinitam and the condictio causa data causa non secuta and specifically to Evans-Jones'
argument about the latter, Navsa JA and Hefer AJA stated that
'[t]he essential point is that ... [the] claim is covered by one or the other remedy
for unjust enrichment. It follows that to assess that claim one has to consider
whether the following general enrichment elements are present.'6
This reiterates the argument, articulated in the context of termination for breach,
that the historical development of a particular enrichment action or the precise identity
of the enrichment remedy should not be used as a threshold criterion for choosing
between defensible doctrinal alternatives.7
3 For the old authorities see Wiley NO vMundinch and Co. (1902) 19 SC 447 at 452; Holtshausen vMinaar
(1905) 10 HCG 50 and Hughes vLety 1907 TS 276. For De Vos's view see De Vos,
Verykingsaanspreeklikheid in die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg (1987), 159. The majority of authors in South African
law follow De Vos' view. See, for example, Lubbe and Murray, Lartam and Hathaway-Contract: Cases,
Materials and Commentary (1988), 769-70.
4 Ramsden, 'Some Historical Aspects of Supervening Impossibility of Performance ofContract' (1975) 38
THRHR 153, 284 and 370. See also Buckland, 'Casus and Frustration in Roman Law' (1933) 46 HLR
1281 at 1281-300.
5 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA).
6 Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at 202.
7 See section 4.4.4(ii)(d).
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Given the twin facts that Visser and Hutton consider restitution after
termination for breach to be enrichment-based and that they desire doctrinal symmetry
in regulating the consequences of contractual failure, it is unsurprising to find that both
support the prevailing position in South African law.8 In my view, symmetry is not by
itself a sufficiently good reason for maintaining the existing law. Rather, the critical
question is whether the rules and principles of unjustified enrichment law accurately
reflect the principles of recovery underpinning the claim designed to redress the
economic imbalances between the parties after supervening impossibility of
performance. This will be explored in section 7.2.3 below.
7.2.2 Scots law
(i) Current Law
The leading frustration case in Scots law is Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding
and Engineering Co. Ctd? Cantiere relied extensively on Watson v Shankland,'° Watson v
Shankland concerned the recovery of a freight payment. The case was decided on the
basis of the distinction between a payment of the contract price and an advance against
payment of the contract price. This distinction is discussed in section 3.3.3(i) and is not
directly relevant here. What is important, however, is the following dictum by Lord
President Inglis:
8 Visser, 'Rethinking Unjustified Enrichment: A Perspective of the Competition between Contractual and
Enrichment Remedies' (1992) A] 203 at 225 and Hutton, 'Restitution after Breach of Contract:
Rethinking the Conventional Jurisprudence' (1997) A] 201 at 214.
9 1923 SC (HL) 105.
10 (1871) 10 M 142 and (1873) 11 M (HL) 51.
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'[t]here is no rule of the civil law, as adopted into all modern municipal codes
and systems, better understood than this — that ifmoney is advanced by one
party to a mutual contract, on the condition and stipulation that something shall
be afterwards paid or performed by the other party, and the latter party fails in
performing his part of the contract, the former is entitled to repayment of his
advance on the ground of failure of consideration. In the Roman system
demand for repayment took the form of a condictio causa data causa non secuta or a
condictio sine causa or a condictio indebiti according to the particular circumstances.
... There seems no ground in reason or general legal principle why the rule
should not apply to an advance made by a charterer to the master of a ship of a
part of the stipulated freight, the consideration of the advance being the
performance of the contract work of carrying and right delivery of the cargo. If
the consideration on which the advance is made fails by the non-completion of
the voyage, the advance is pari ratione repayable to the charterer.'11
This formed the doctrinal background to Cantiere. The facts of this case were
simple. A Scottish engineering firm contracted with an Austrian shipbuilding company
to build and supply the latter with marine engines. The contract stated that the first
instalment of the price was payable on conclusion of the contract. After the conclusion
of the contract and payment of the first instalment, the contract was frustrated as a
result of the outbreak of the First World War. After the war, the purchasers claimed the
return of the first instalment subject to a deduction of any incidental outlays or expenses
incurred by the sellers. At first instance, Lord Hunter upheld the purchaser's claim for
the return of the purchase price subject to the deduction. Relying, inter alia, on the
dictum in Watson v Shankland, Lord Hunter stated that where money is paid under a
contract for a consideration which fails because the contract has become incapable of
fulfilment due to the outbreak ofwar, a right of repetition arises under the principle
condictio causa data causa non secuta for failure of consideration.12
Although Lord Hunter's decision was overturned by the First Division, it was
reinstated by the House of Lords and represents the existing law in Scotland.
11 Watson v Shankland (1871) 10 M 142 at 152-3.
12 Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ltd 1923 SC (HL) 105 at 112.
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The upshot is that the claim for the recovery of a performance rendered under a
frustrated contract is the enrichment-based condictio causa data causa non secuta. The causa is
non secuta because the claimant has not received the anticipated contractual reciprocation.
(ii) Academic Views
Despite the clear judicial pronouncement that restitution after frustration in
Scots law is an enrichment remedy, the academic commentators have remained
scepdcal. Cantiere has been subjected to three separate strands of criticism.
First, it has been argued that the judges misunderstood the use of the condictio
causa data causa non secuta in Roman law, the ius comtnune, the Scottish institutional writers
and Watson v Shank/and, with the result that the remedy was incorrectly applied in a
contractual context. This argument focuses on the scope of the condictio causa data causa
non secuta. The main claim is that it is doctrinally inappropriate and historically inaccurate
to use this condictio in a contractual context.13
Evans-Jones and MacCormack have argued that the House of Lords extended
the scope of the condictio causa data causa non secuta beyond the ambit envisaged by Lord
President Inglis in Watson v Shankland.u The argument here is that Watson v Shankland
did not apply the condictio causa data causa non secuta directly in a contractual context in the
sense that the condictio was applicable where the reciprocal counter-performance had not
been received (failure of consideration).15 It is clear, however, that the judges in Cantiere
13 Evans-Jones, 'The Claim to recover what was transferred for a lawful purpose outwith contract (condictio
causa data causa non secutdf (1997) AJ 139 at 157 and MacCormack, 'The Condictio Causa Data Causa Non
Secuta' in Evans-Jones (ed), The Civil Taw Tradition in Scotland (1995), 253 at 266.
14 Evans-Jones, (1997) AJ 157 and MacCormack, 'The Condictio Causa Data Causa Non Secuta' in The Civil
Taw Tradition in Scotland (1995), 253 at 266.
15 Evans-Jones, (1997) AJ 139 at 148-9. See also Evans-Jones, Unjustified Enrichment (2003), paras 4.51-2.
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interpreted the causa for the purposes of the condictio causa data causa non secuta to mean
failure of consideration.
According to Evans-Jones, the historical and doctrinal problem is that this
interpretation does not square with the aim of making a contractual performance in the
civil law tradition. In terms of this approach, a party does not perform a contractual
obligation in order to receive the reciprocal counter-performance but in order to
discharge a contractual obligation.16 This means that condictio causa data causa non secuta is,
by definition, inapplicable in frustration cases as the purpose of making the initial
transfer is always achieved and hence always secuta}1 This is essentially the same
historical argument encountered about the scope of this condictio after termination for
breach. The point made there applies equally here: the historical development of a
particular enrichment action should not be used as a threshold criterion for deciding
between defensible doctrinal alternatives.18
Secondly, it is argued that the law of unjustified enrichment is unnecessary in
this context as there are already contractual rules which deal adequately with the
consequences of frustration. For example, it is argued that there are contractual risk
rules which determine who should bear the loss if the frustrating event damages or
destroys the subject matter of the sale.19 According to Evans-Jones, this demonstrates
that the law of contract is sufficiently flexible to apportion 'losses depending on what is
fair in light of the agreement between the parties.'20 With respect, contractual risk rules
16 As stated in section 4.4.3(ii)(b), the purpose ofmaking the contractual performance is the 'aim' and not
the fact of discharging a contractual obligation.
17 Evans-Jones, 'Unjust Enrichment, Contract and the Third Reception of Roman Law in Scotland'
(1993) 109 LQR 663 at 678; Evans-Jones, (1997) AJ 141-3; 153 and 154 and Evans-Jones, 'Roman law in
Scotland and England' (1999) 115 LQR 605 at 612-3.
18 For a similar point see also Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) Ltd v Caterna Ltd 2003 (5) SA 193 (SCA) at 202.
19 Buckland, (1932) 46 HLR 1286 and Evans-Jones, (1993) 109 LQR 668-9.
20 Evans-Jones, (1993) 109 LQR 679.
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cannot effect loss apportionment because a risk rule operates in an all or nothing way
and simply determines which one of the contracting parties bears the entire loss.
Thirdly, it is contended that Cantiere is flawed because the law of unjusdfied
enrichment is ill-equipped to apportion losses between parties.21 The problem is most
keenly felt in cases where one party incurs expenses preparing to perform his side of the
bargain in such a way that this expenditure does not confer a benefit on the other
party.22 As the law of unjustified enrichment only allows claims where one party has
actually been enriched at another's expense, the party who incurs expenditure in preparing
to perform will bear the entire loss in respect of that expenditure. In response, there is a
suggestion that unjustified enrichment can effect loss apportionment through the
change of position defence.23 In my view, there are two reasons why this is not a
principled way to apportion losses in frustration cases. First, as loss of enrichment can
only be pleaded as a defence to an unjustified enrichment claim, it is only useful to the
party who incurred losses whilst preparing to perform if he has received a contractual
performance from the other party. If no contractual performance has been received by
the party who incurred the loss, the other party will not institute a claim for the return
of the performance (or its value). As a result, there will be nothing for the defence to
latch onto. The problem is that loss apportionment will thus depend arbitrarily on
whether one contracting party happens to have performed under the contract.24
21 MacQuecn and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (2000), para. 4.110.
22 This occurred in Cantiere when the engineering firm incurred expenses in preparing for their
performance. See also Fibrosa Spolka Akqjna vFairbairn Lawson Combe BarbourLtd [1943] AC 32 (HL).
23 McKendrick, 'Frustration, Restitution, and Loss Apportionment' in Burrows (ed), Essajs on the Law of
Restitution (1991), 147 at 151 and Stewart and Carter, 'Frustrated Contracts and Statutory Adjustment: The
Case for a Reappraisal' (1992) 51CLJ 66 at 77-8.
24 This problem can be illustrated with reference to the English case of Gamerco v ICM/Fair Warning
(Agency) Ltd [1995] 1 WLR 1226. In this case, both parties had incurred expenses in preparing to perform
their side of the bargain prior to termination. When the contract was frustrated, A had paid a sum to B. In
English law, section 1(2) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943 grants the courts the power
to make equitable adjustment to a claim for the return of a money payment. The problem is that the
courts are only empowered to adjust for B's losses and not for A's losses. This is identical to the problem
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Secondly, even where a contractual performance has been received by the party
who incurred the loss, the availability of the defence does not necessarily lead to loss
apportionment. Assume that B has made an advance payment of £1000 to A and that A
has spent that £1000 whilst preparing to perform his side of the bargain. On these facts,
A can successfully repel B's claim for the return of his advance payment by pleading
change of position. This establishes that in all cases where A's wasted expenditure is
equal to or less than B's advance payment, there is no loss apportionment between the
parties as B bears the full cost of frustration. The only cases where there would be some
loss apportionment is when A's wasted expenditure exceeds B's advance payment. This
is an arbitrary way to apportion losses between the parties as the extent of loss
apportionment will depend on the difference between A's wasted expenditure and B's
advance payment.
This analysis establishes that the law of unjustified enrichment is indeed ill-
equipped to ensure a principled form of loss apportionment in frustration cases. This is
only problematic if some form of loss apportionment is desirable.
7.2.3 The Case for Apportioning Losses: Lessons from the Common Law
In 1943, English law enacted the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act to
regulate the consequences of frustration. Although the Act can be seen as resting on the
principles of unjustified enrichment, the fact that the courts are empowered to make
equitable adjustments in some cases means that unjustified enrichment in its pure form
that would be encountered if loss apportionment was left to the loss of enrichment/change of position
defence. For a call for Gamerco to be decided according to a more flexible approach based on clear
principles see Barker, 'Riddles, Remedies, and Restitution: Quantifying Gain in Unjust Enrichment Law'
(2001) 54 CLP 255 at 262-3.
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is excluded.25 This equitable power is limited to cases where one party has received a
benefit under the contract.26
Other common law jurisdictions have seen this inability to apportion losses in all
cases as a weakness in the Act and have chosen to enact legislative provisions which
provide for loss apportionment across the board."7
Given the divergent approaches to loss apportionment in the common law, it is
unsurprising to find that academic opinion on the desirability of loss apportionment is
divided. Ewen McKendrick, who favours loss apportionment, argues that it is best
defended on the basis that it is just and reasonable to apportion losses caused by
frustration because neither party is at fault and neither party has taken the risk of the
joint enterprise failing.28
Other commentators are more sceptical about accepting this as a watertight
justification for loss apportionment.29 In a comprehensive study of the common law,
Stewart and Carter conclude that 'it is neither desirable nor feasible to adopt a scheme
which seeks to apportion between the parties losses occasioned by the frustration of
25 Different views have emerged regarding the Act's theoretical foundation. On the one hand, some
authors argue that the Act gives the courts a flexible discretionary power to adjust losses between the
parties. See Haycroft and Waksman, 'Restitution and Frustration' (1984) JBL 207. Others, however,
believe that the Act enacts a scheme of mutual restitution based primarily on the principles of unjustified
enrichment. See, for example, GoffJ in B.P. Exploration Co. (Libja) Ltd v Hunt (No. 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783
at 799 and Burrows and McKendrick, Cases and Materials on the Law ofRestitution (1997), 249. Cf Lawton LJ
B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v Hunt (No. 2) [1982] 1 All ER 925 at 983 and McKendrick, 'Frustration,
Restitution, and Loss Apportionment' in Essays on the Law ofRestitution (1991), 154. McKendrick argues
that it is not entirely certain that the purpose behind the Act is the prevention of unjustified enrichment.
26 Section 1(2) of the Law Reform (Frustrated Contracts) Act 1943.
27 British Columbian Frustrated Contracts Act 1974; New South Wales Frustrated Contracts Act 1978 and
South Australian Frustrated Contracts Act 1988. Although American scholars favour loss apportionment
and suggest that the law is moving towards this approach, this is not yet the unequivocal position. For an
overview see Englard, 'Restitution of Benefits Conferred without Obligation' in Schlechtriem (ed),
InternationalEnyclopaedia ofComparative Law (1991), §174-177.
28 McKendrick, 'Frustration, Restitution, and Loss Apportionment' in Essays on the Law ofRestitution
(1991), 168-9. Jaffey, The Nature and Scope ofRestitution: Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts and Disgorgements
(2000), 68-75 argues for loss apportionment on the basis that this is the most appropriate way to protect
both parties' reliance on the contract. See also Englard, 'Restitution of Benefits Conferred without
Obligation' in International Encyclopaedia ofComparative Law (1991), §178.
29 Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 365-6.
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their contract.'30 Instead, they advocate liability based purely on the principles of
unjustified enrichment. They defend this position on four grounds. First, they claim that
the rules of unjustified enrichment can resolve the majority of cases.31 This, the authors
argue, is because in cases in which one party has prepared for performance and this
preparation is contemplated by the parties, it is likely that such preparation will confer a
benefit on the other party. When this is not the case and one party of his own accord
chooses to prepare for their performance, then that party should shoulder the resulting
loss.32 This is not entirely convincing as there are cases where such contractually
contemplated preparation does not confer a benefit on the other party. For example, it
seems fair to assume that it was implicit in the contract in Cantiere that the parties had
envisaged that the engineers would incur expenses planning for the production of the
marine engines. At least some of the work correlating to these expenses (such as work
carried out preparing design diagrams) probably conferred no benefit on the purchasers.
Thus if an argument can be made for apportioning losses in these cases, then the rules
of unjustified enrichment will not produce a just result.33
Secondly, Stewart and Carter argue that as the law of contract is largely based on
individualistic ideas, contracting parties ought to be seen as pursuing their own goals
and thus taking the risk of loss in incurring expenditure preparing for performances.34
This does not sit comfortably with the fact that the doctrine of frustration is only
triggered when neither party is responsible for the frustrating event. In my view, it
30 Stewart and Carter, (1992) 51 CLJ 67.
31 Stewart and Carter, (1992) 51 CLJ 68 and 76-7.
32 Stewart and Carter, (1992) 51CL/77-8.
33 As this claim does not involve restoring a performance received prior to contractual failure, it is not a
claim for restitution. It is nevertheless important to consider these claims in order to evaluate the
argument that unjustified enrichment is the proper basis on which to redress the economic imbalances in
frustration cases.
34 Stewart and Carter, (1992) 51CLJ 87-8. See also Burrows, The Taw ofRestitution (2002), 365.
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would be normatively preferable to ensure that the loss caused by the unforeseen
frustrating event is shared between both contracting parties.
Thirdly, in attacking the justice based defence of loss apportionment, the
authors say that
'[ajbsent procedural unfairness, no accepted principle of distributive justice
dictates that a bad bargain be rewritten and that the profits or losses be shared.
It is hard to see why loss arising out of frustration, which is neither party's fault,
should be treated any differently.'35
This argument fails on one very important count. The idea underlying the claim in the
first sentence is that bargains that have been freely entered into will be respected by the
courts. This finds expression in the phrase 'pacta sunt servanda!. In my view there is a
material difference between this claim and the claim that the courts ought to distribute
losses when a contract has been prematurely terminated as a result of neither party's
fault. The only circumstance in which their argument has currency is where it can be
shown that the party incurring the expenditure would not have recovered this
expenditure even if the contract had run its course. Their argument fails, however, in all
cases where the party incurring the loss can show that they would have at least broken
even had the contract run its course.
Finally, the authors argue that even if the law of unjustified enrichment
sometimes produces unsatisfactory results in hard cases, it has the benefit of being
reasonably certain and this will shield the courts from potentially lengthy and difficult
litigation.36 This argument overlooks the fact that it can be very complex to quantify
35 Stewart and Carter, (1992) 51 CLJ 88.
36 Stewart and Carter, (1992) 51 CLJ 107-8. See also Burrows, The Law ofRestitution (2002), 366. Burrows
also argues that even if loss apportionment is appropriate, 'it is a sensible discipline to clarify where the
firm land of restitution runs out and the shifting sands of loss apportionment begin.' Burrows, The Law of
Restitution (2002), 366. CfJaffey, The Nature and Scope ofRestitution: Vitiated Transfers, Imputed Contracts and
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unjustified enrichment claims in frustration cases.37 In addition, the fear that loss
apportionment brings with it too much uncertainty ought to be allayed by the fact that
the circumstances which give rise to terminadon by frustration are narrowly
circumscribed and relatively rare in practice.
Furthermore, because the economic impact in these cases can be severe,
flexibility at the expense of certainty can be justified on the basis that it is more
important to get the few hard cases right than to have a clear rule which can cause
unjust results.38 This suggests that an approach in terms of which the courts are granted
the power to apportion losses according to a clear set of principles is preferable to a
model based exclusively on the law of unjustified enrichment.39
(i) Principles underlying Loss Apportionment in Frustration Cases
The question that now arises is which principles ought to guide the courts in
deciding whether to apportion losses in frustration cases? First, the courts must test
whether the expenditure incurred is actually wasted as a result of the supervening
impossibility. The critical factor is whether the party who incurred this expenditure
retains a realisable benefit as a result of such expenditure. This would occur, for
example, if the engineers in Cantiere were left with design drawings for marine engines
that could be — and were likely to be - used for subsequent orders. If this expenditure
Disgorgements (2000), 75 where he says that 'Burrows's firm land is something of a mirage to most
explorers in this area'.
37 See for example the problems encountered in the complex case of B.P. Exploration Co. (Libya) Ltd v
Hunt (No. 2) [1979] 1 WLR 783.
38 Cf Burrows, The Haw ofRestitution (2002), 366.
39 For a similar argument made in the context of indirect enrichment claims see Visser and Miller,
'Between Principle and Policy: Indirect Enrichment in Subcontractor and 'Garage-Repair' Cases' (2000)
117 SAL] 594 at 596.
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was the subject of loss apportionment, then the engineers would be compensated
unjustifiably for expenditure that was in fact not wasted.
However, if it turns out that such expenditure is actually wasted, then it appears
intuidvely correct to apportion losses between the parties. The following example will
be used to tease out the principles at stake. Assume that a lessee enters into a contract
with a restaurant owner in order to lease a restaurant. In advance of the lease, the
restaurant owner agrees that he will make the necessary changes to convert the
restaurant into a kosher restaurant. The lessee agrees to an increased rental as a result.
The lessee takes over the restaurant as agreed per contract and begins to pay the
increased rental. Shortly thereafter, the restaurant is destroyed by lightning. Neither
party's insurance covers the losses resulting from the extra expenses incurred in order to
change the restaurant. What principles are important to decide whether losses relating to
the cost of changing the restaurant should be apportioned between the parties? The
following proposals seem intuitively correct.
1) If the restaurant owner would not have benefited from the conversion had the
frustrating event not occurred and the contract had run its course, then this
suggests that losses should be apportioned. In our example, assuming that the
restaurant owner does not want to run a kosher restaurant, then it would appear
that he would not have benefited from modifying his restaurant.
2) If the restaurant owner would not have agreed to the conversion had he not
been contracting with this lessee in particular, then the loss should be
apportioned. The point here is that as the restaurant owner has incurred a loss
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because he has agreed to the terms of a contract as a result of a specific request
by the lessee, it appears just to apportion this loss.
3) If the restaurant owner would only have agreed to the conversion because he
was contracting with this lessee in particular, and would not have agreed to a
similar development with parties other than this lessee or someone qualitatively
similar to this lessee, then the loss should be apportioned. The underlying point
is that if it can be shown that in order to conclude a lease, the restaurant owner
would have had to spend some money on his restaurant in any event and that
this expenditure would not have resulted in a benefit to him, then these losses
ought not to be apportioned. Similar considerations might apply, for example, to
residential landlords who frequently have to redecorate their properties in order
to attract tenants. These costs are probably best seen as part of a landlord's trade
and, all things being equal, should not form part of a loss apportionment
exercise.
These propositions show that there are some instances where it does seem
justified to apportion losses. The example is illuminating precisely because the rules of
unjustified enrichment cannot achieve this result.
7.2.4 Frustration and Loss Apportionment: Theoretical Possibilities
Having established that unjustified enrichment is not the appropriate basis for
the claim designed to redress the economic imbalances in frustration cases, the question
that now arises is how best to incorporate a loss apportionment rule into South African
and Scots law.
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The House of Lords in Cantiere established each party's liability after frustration
was limited to the extent of their unjustified enrichment.40 This authority was potentially
weakened because the House of Lords also approved Lord Hunter's interlocutor in the
court of first instance. As stated in section 7.2.2(i), the purchaser's right to reclaim the
purchase price was said to be subject to a counterclaim by the recipient for work done.41
If this counterclaim is not based on unjustified enrichment, then there is a potential
inconsistency between what was decided by the House of Lords and Lord Hunter's
interlocutor. This is because it is theoretically possible that the counterclaim might allow
for the recovery of expenses incurred which do not enrich the other contracting party.4"
This has led some authors to suggest that the Scottish courts have the requisite power to
make equitable adjustments between the parties in frustration cases.43 Lord Atkin has
explicitly stated, however, that despite the House of Lords' approval of Lord Hunter's
interlocutor in Cantiere, the Scottish courts do not have the power to apportion losses.44
It is accordingly not settled whether the courts will allow such equitable adjustments to
account for expenses incurred or stick instead to the tenor of the House of Lords
decision in Cantiere and limit recovery to the extent of each party's enrichment.
In any event, the more lenient interpretation of Cantiere will not achieve a
40 Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Etd 1923 SC (HL) 105 at 111.
41 Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Etd 1923 SC (HL) 105 at 112.
42 Fibrosa SpolkaAk/yjna vFairbairn Eawson Combe BarbourEtd [1943] AC 32 (HL) at 54. See also Evans-
Jones, (1997) A] 159-61. Unfortunately, it is not clear from Lord Hunter's interlocutor what he
considered the basis of the counterclaim to be. All that is known is that he gave permission to the
defendants to amend their pleas in respect of the counterclaim. See Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding
and Engineering Co. Etd 1922 SC 723 at 728.
43 Lord Cooper of Culross, 'Frustration ofContract in Scots Law' in Lord Cooper of Culross, Selected
Papers 1922-54 (1957), 124 at 128. Evans-Jones, McBryde and Hellwege also appear to favour this view of
Cantiere. See respectively Evans-Jones, (1999) 115 EQR 613; McBryde, The Eaw ofContract in Scotland
(2001), para. 21-48; and Hellwege, 'Unwinding Mutual Contracts: Restitutio in Integrum v. The Defence of
Change ofPosition" in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative
Perspective (2002), 243 at 254. See also Head Wrightson Aluminium Etd v Aberdeen Harbour Commissioners 1958
SLT (Notes) 12 where it was mentioned obiter that the party who has done work might be remunerated
quantum meruit for such work. See also McQuarrie v Crawford 1951 SLT (Sh Ct) 84.
44 Fibrosa SpolkaAkyjna vFairbairn Eawson Combe BarbourEtd [1943] AC 32 (HL) at 54.
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principled form of loss apportionment. This is because Lord Hunter's interlocutor only
granted the recipient of a contractual performance the right to counterclaim for his
expenses when faced with a claim for the return of a performance received.
Accordingly, as a principled means of apportioning losses between the parties, this
approach suffers from the same defects as the change of position defence.45 The upshot
is that neither interpretation of Cantiere will achieve a satisfactory loss apportionment
regime. Given that Cantiere is so well entrenched in Scots law, it will probably be
necessary to introduce a loss apportionment rule into Scots law by statute.46
As Kudu has recently confirmed that each party's liability after supervening
impossibility is limited to the extent of their enrichment, similar legislative intervention
will be required to introduce loss apportionment into South African law.
7.3 Restitutio in Integrum after Termination of a Contract that is
Voidable by Reason of Improperly Obtained Consent
In this species of contractual failure, one party's consent to contractual liability is
improperly obtained. Important instances found in both South African and Scots law
include duress, undue influence and misrepresentation.47 It is trite law in both legal
45 See section 7.2.2(ii). See also Evans-Jones, (1999) 115 CQR 614.
46 Evans-Jones has suggested that the principle of good faith might be used to fashion the requisite rule in
contract law. Evans-Jones, (1999) 115 CQR 614. Were it not for the fact that Cantiere is so well established
in Scots law, this might well be a viable alternative.
47 Although Scots law does not use the term 'duress', it has an equivalent doctrine called 'force and fear'.
See MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Caw in Scotland (2000), paras 4.21-6. Despite the large overlap
between the instances of improperly obtained consent in South African and Scots law, the overlap is not
complete. For example, South African law does not recognise the ground of invalidity known in Scots law
as 'facility and circumvention'. For an overview of the position in South African and Scots law see
respectively, Van der Merwe et ah, Contract: GeneralPrinciples (2003), 89-136 and McBryde, The Caw of
Contract in Scotland (2001), chapters 13-14 and 16-17. For informadve historical and comparative studies on
aspects of the use of unjustified enrichment after termination of a contract which is voidable by reason of
improperly obtained consent see Du Plessis, Compulsion and Restitution: A historical and comparative studj ofthe
treatment ofcompulsion in Scottish private law withparticular emphasis on its relevance to the law of restitution or
unjustified enrichment (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1997) and Du Plessis, 'Fraud,
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systems that when these voidable contracts are terminated, both parties are under a duty
to restore any performances received under the contract. South African law and Scots
law use the term restitutio in integrum to describe this process of restitution following
termination of these voidable contracts.48
Although both legal systems restrict the aggrieved party's right to terminate the
contract if exact restitution cannot be made, there have been sensible calls for an
approach that allows restitution by financial substitute.49 This will allow the courts
greater flexibility to evaluate, in a more principled way, the extent to which each party
ought to be liable for restitution.50
7.3.1 Doctrinal Basis of Restitutio in Integrum
(i) Current Law and Academic Views
Although there is no judicial authority in Scots law on the doctrinal basis of
Duress and Unjustified Enrichment: A Civil Law Perspective' in Johnston and Zimmermann (eds),
Unjustified Enrichment: Key Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 194.
48 It is not definitively settled in South African law whether the term restitutio in integrum refers merely to
the process of restitution following termination of a contract which is voidable by reason of improperly
obtained concent or whether it refers, in addition, to the instrument by which the contract is avoided. See
Lambiris, Orders ofSpecific Performance and Restitutio in Integrum in South African Eau> (1989), 180-1 and 291-2;
Van der Merwe et at, Contract: General Principals (2003), 122-3 and Visser, (1992) AJ 203 at 211 n31. This
question has not been directly addressed in Scots law. It appears from the discussions in the leading
textbooks that Scots law regards restitutio in integrum as referring merely to restitution of performances. See
Gloag, The Law ofContract (1929), 456 and 532-3; McBryde, The Eaw ofContract in Scot/and (2001), para. 13-
17 and MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Eaw in Scotland (2000), para. 4.9.
49 For Scots law see Boyd& Forrest v Glasgow <& South-Western Railway Co. 1915 SC (HL) 20. The House of
Lords in Spence v Crawford 1939 SC (HL) 52 has stated that the requirement of restitution in integrum should
not be interpreted too literally. Cf MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Law in Scotland (2000), para. 4.9. For
South African law see Feinstein vNigg/i 1981 (2) SA 684 (A). For the argument that a more flexible
approach ought to be adopted see Scottish Law Commission, Defective Consent and ConsequentialMatters
(Memorandum No. 42,, 1978), vol. 2 pt IV; Chen-Wishart, 'Unjust Factors and the Restitutionary
Response' (2000) 20 OJES 557 at 566-8 and Hogg, Obligations (2003), para. 4.79. See also the encouraging
comments by Farlam J in Bouygues Offshore v Owner of theMT Tigr 1995 (A) SA 49 at 63-5 where the court
was prepared to award substitutionary financial restitution for the receipt of services.
50 The same point was made in respect of restitution after termination for breach. See sections 5.2.2(i)(c)
and 5.3.1 (ii)(c).
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restitutio in integrum, the weight of academic opinion points to it being a contractual
remedy.51 In South African law, the courts have explicitly stated that restitutio in integrum
'is a contractual remedy flowing from the cancellation of the contract.'52 This is in line
with the leading academic view put forward by Wouter de Vos. He argues that restitutio
in integrum is a contractual remedy because there are two good reasons for excluding it
from the law of unjustified enrichment.53 These are as follows: first, with a restitutio in
integrum claim an innocent loss of enrichment does not excuse either party from the duty
to restore the actual goods or their value. This contrasts with unjustified enrichment
remedies where only negligent or intentional loss of enrichment requires
reimbursement.54 Secondly, with a restitutio in integrum claim interest is calculated from
the date that the contractual payment was due. This contrasts with an enrichment claim
where interest is calculated from the date when the enrichment claim is perfected {litis
contestatio),55 The point underlying De Vos's analysis is that classifying restitutio in integrum
as an enrichment remedy would lead to unjust results. This analysis is consistent with
my approach to choosing between defensible doctrinal alternatives since it considers the
51 Whitty, 'The Taxonomy of Unjustified Enrichment in Scots Law' (essay prepared for a seminar on the
law of unjustified enrichment, University of Edinburgh, October 1993), 17; Stewart, The Lair ofRestitution
in Ssotland (1992), 2D; Du Plcssis, Compulsion and Restitution: A historical and comparative study of the treatment of
compulsion in Scottishprivate law withparticular emphasis on its relevance to the law ofrestitution or unjustified enrichment
(unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Aberdeen, 1997) and Hogg, Obligations (2003), paras 4.78-9.
52 Johnson vJainodien 1982 (4) SA 599 (C) at 605. See also Davidson vBonafede 1981 (2) SA 501 (C) at 510 and
Yorkshire Insurance Co. Ltd v Ismail 1957 (1) SA 353 (T) at 364.
53 De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 158. Although De Vos does not expressly state that restitutio in
integrum is a contractual remedy, it seems safe to assume that this is his view from the fact that he
categorically excludes it from the law of unjustified enrichment. Subsequent authors have all taken De
Vos' view to be that restitutio in integrum is contractual. See for example Cockrell, 'The Hegemony of
Contract'(1998) 115 SAL] 286 at 294 n44 and Vtsser, (1992) AJ2W.
54 De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikbeid (1987), 158-9.
55 De Vos, Verrykingsaanspreeklikheid (1987), 159. This has now been superseded by section 2A of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 7 of 1997, which states that every unliquidated debt will bear interest at
the rate determined by the Minister ofJustice. Although the matter cannot be regarded as finally settled,
there is authority in Scots law that interest in an enrichment claim is calculated from the date of payment.
See Countess ofCromertie v LordAdvocate (1871) 9 M 988 at 991; Gwdyr v LordAdvocate (1894) 2 SLT 260 and
Duncan, Galloway and Co. Ltd v Duncan, Falconer and Co. 1913 SC 265. For a full discussion see Scottish Law
Commission, Recovery ofBenefits Conferred under Error ofLaw (Discussion Paper No. 95, vol. 2, 1993), paras
2.126-35.
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principles underlying the remedy and the consequences of imposing liability according
to a set of doctrinal rules. Although the analysis is not complete, it is a welcome
platform.
Unsurprisingly, restitutio in integrum has not gone unnoticed by those who see an
increased role for unjustified enrichment after contractual failure. Recently, Daniel
Visser has argued that restitutio in integrum ought to be reclassified as an enrichment
remedy.56 One of the main reasons cited in support of this argument is that restitutio in
integrum is doctrinally more closely aligned to an enrichment acdon than to a contractual
action. This, he contends, is because restitutio in integrum is not aimed at fulfilling the
parties' contractual expectations but is aimed instead at restoring both parties to the
positions they would have occupied prior to the enriching event (the rendering of the
contractual performances).57 This is identical to the abstract taxonomic argument
encountered in respect of restitution after termination for breach. The point made there
applies equally here: although it is doctrinally possible to classify restitutio in integrum as an
enrichment remedy, this does not preclude the possibility of classifying it as contractual.
Indeed, a contractual analysis represents the current law in South Africa. Accordingly,
this represents another instance where South African and Scots law have a choice
between two doctrinally defensible alternatives.
(ii) Restitutio in Integrum: Contract or Unjustified Enrichment?
In line with my central thesis on the appropriate method of choosing between
56 Visser, (1992) AJ 211-25. For Scots commentators who also favour an enrichment approach see Give,
JudicialAbolition ofthe Error ofLaw Rule and itsAftermarth, (Appendix to Scottish Law Commission,
Discussion Paper No 99, 1996), rules 2(3) and 5(3) and Thomson, 'Obligations Ordinary' in Lomnicka
and Morse (eds), Contemporary Issues in Commercial Law: Essays in Honour ofProfessorA G Guest (1997), 195 at
198-9. Cf MacQueen, 'Contract, Unjustified Enrichment and Concurrent Liability: A Scots Perspective' in
Rose (ed), Failure ofContracts: Contractual, Restitutionary and Proprietary Consequences (1997), 199 at 222-3.
57 Visser, (1992) AJ 209-10.
246
defensible doctrinal alternatives, it is necessary to be guided by the principles of
recovery underpinning restitutio in integrum and the consequences of imposing liability
according to a particular doctrinal set of rules. Once again, this is most effectively
achieved by testing these doctrinal alternatives against real and hypothetical cases and
gauging which set of rules most accurately reflects the principles of recovery underlying
restitutio in integrum.
In order to uncover these principles of recovery it is useful to start with the
stated aim of restitutio in integrum. One of the difficulties in this area is that this aim is
expressed in two subtly different ways. On the one hand, it is said that restitutio in
integrum aims to restore both parties to the positions they would have occupied status ante
quo the conclusion of the contract.58 On the other hand, it is also said that restitutio in
integrum aims to 'put the parties ... into the position in which they would have been had
the contract not been concluded.'59 Although both formulations will frequently produce
the same results, the fact that the two formulations have different perspectives means
that this is not necessarily true. The first formulation is entirely backward looking and
focuses exclusively on the parties' pre-contractual positions. The second formulation
focuses instead on the position the parties would presently have been in had the
contract not been concluded. The following example from Davidson v Bonafedea) neatly
illustrates the point. The truncated facts were as follows. The purchaser entered into a
contract to buy the seller's house. The purchaser paid the purchase price partly with
money withdrawn from a fixed deposit account and partly with money borrowed from a
bank. As a result of the seller's fraudulent misrepresentation, the purchaser terminated
58 Davidson vBonafede 1981 (2) SA 501 (C) at 511. See also Van der Merwe et at, Contract: Genera! Principles
(2003), 122 and MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Daw in Scotland (2000), para. 4.9.
59 Bonne Fortune Beleggings Bpk v Kalahari Salt Works (Pty) Ltd 1973 (3) SA 739 (NC) at 743.
60 1981(2) SA 501 (C).
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the contract and tendered the return of the house. In order to place the purchaser in the
position he would have been in before the contract was concluded, the seller would
need (a) to return the purchase price to the purchaser and (b) to reimburse the
purchaser for all his wasted expenses incurred as a result of entering into the transaction.
This would include the interest paid on the bank loan. However, in order to place the
purchaser in the position he would have been in presently had he not entered into the
contract, the seller would, in addition, have to reimburse the purchaser for the interest
he lost by withdrawing money from his fixed deposit account.
Although the first formulation accurately reflects the aim of restitutio in integrum
from the guilty party's perspective, the second formulation more accurately expresses
the aim of restitutio in integrum from the aggrieved party's perspective. With this in mind,
it now becomes necessary to separate those cases in which the facts giving rise to the
right to terminate the voidable contract also disclose a cause of action in delict from
those cases where the facts giving rise to the right to terminate the contract do not, in
addition, disclose a cause of action in delict. This is important because it affects the
moral blameworthiness of the party whose conduct gave rise to the right to terminate
the contract and, as such, can be a significant indicator of the just outcomes that ought
to be reached in both types of cases.
(a) Restitutio in Integrum with Delictual Claims
When the facts which give rise to the right to terminate the contract also satisfy
the requirements for a delictual claim, South African and Scots law are identical: the
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aggrieved party is granted a delictual claim in addition to a claim for restitutio in integrum.61
Common examples are cases involving fraudulent and negligent misrepresentations. In
these cases, a just outcome will be achieved if three principles are followed: first, that all
the financially deleterious effects of the misrepresentation are reversed; secondly, that
the aggrieved party is not left in a better position now that the contract has failed than
he would have been in had he not entered into the contract and thirdly, that the guilty
party is made to bear the loss resulting from accidental damage to, or destruction of, the
subject matter of the sale.62 The question that arises is whether classifying restitutio in
integrum as an enrichment remedy accurately reflects these principles.
In terms of the existing law, the aggrieved party has two choices. First, he could
institute a claim exclusively in delict. From this claim he would recover the amount by
which his patrimony has been diminished as a result of the guilty party's wrongful
conduct.63 This would include the right to reclaim any performance rendered under the
contract (or a monetary substitute thereof). Secondly, the aggrieved party could institute
a claim for restitutio in integrum. The amount he would receive from this claim is identical
to the amount recoverable in delict. This is because the claim for restitutio in integrum
allows recovery for all sums (or the return of property) required to place the aggrieved
party in the position he would have occupied presently had he not entered into the
contract.
Irrespective of whether the aggrieved party institutes a claim in delict or a claim
for restitutio in integrum, he is obliged to return to the guilty party any performance he
61 For a discussion of the remedies after termination of a contract which is voidable by reason of
improperly obtained consent see Van der Merwe et at., Contract: General Principles (2003), 120ff and
MacQueen and Thomson, Contract Ean> in Scotland (2000), paras 4.3-9 and 4.60-6.
62 The analysis assumes that but for the misrepresentation the aggrieved party would not have entered
into the contract.
63 Trotman vEdwick 1951 (1) SA 443 (A) at 449.
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received under the contract. If there was no such obligation, then the aggrieved party
would be left unjustifiably in a better position now that the contract had failed than if he
had not entered into the contract.
Crucially, neither solution relies on unjustified enrichment to give effect to the
principles underlying recover}' in these cases. In fact the desired result would actually be
precluded if restitutio in integrum was an enrichment remedy. For example, if the purchaser
in Davidson v Bonafede had been limited to an enrichment claim, then he would not have
been able to claim the interest he lost as a result ofwithdrawing funds from his fixed
deposit account. Instead, his claim would have been limited to the amount, if any, by
which the guilty party had been enriched by his use of that money. This is because the
law of unjustified enrichment suffers from a perspective limitation and cannot take into
account the aggrieved party's impoverishment that does not also enrich the recipient. In
order to achieve the desired result, it would be necessary to grant the aggrieved party a
claim in delict for the difference between this enrichment claim and the amount by
which he is thereafter still left financially worse off by the misrepresentation/'4 It seems
unnecessary to go through the extra step of initially quantifying an enrichment claim
when there are already two direct solutions that achieve the desired result.
This demonstrates that the aggrieved party's restitutio in integrum claim ought not
to be an enrichment action. However, the more limited aims of unjustified enrichment
accurately reflect the extent to which the aggrieved party ought to be liable to the guilty
party in these cases. As the guilty party is morally responsible for causing the loss to the
aggrieved party, the law ought not to be concerned that the guilty party might be left in
64 The principles of recovery underpinning the aggrieved party's claim also dictate that he ought not to
bear the risk of accidental damage to, or destruction of, the subject matter of the sale. Even if restitutio in
integrum is classified as an enrichment remedy, this would be unproblematic as the aggrieved party's
delictual claim would negate the effects of the change of position defence.
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a worse position after termination than he would have been in had he not entered the
contract. I f the purchaser in Davidson v Bonafede rather than the seller had made the
fraudulent misrepresentation, then it seems right that he should not to be allowed to
claim the interest he lost by withdrawing part of the purchase price from his fixed
deposit account. Instead, his claim ought to be restricted to the exact amount by which
the aggrieved party had been enriched by his use of that money.65
Furthermore, one of the principles underlying the imposition of liability in these
cases is that the guilty party should bear the loss resulting from accidental damage to, or
destruction of, the subject matter of the sale. This suggests that the aggrieved party
ought to have recourse to the loss of enrichment defence to repel (or partially repel) the
guilty party's claim.66 The potential clash between the availability of the loss of
enrichment defence and the contractual risk rules in breach cases is avoided in cases
where voidable contracts are terminated. This is because voidable contracts which have
been terminated are treated as if they never existed and this justifies setting aside any
contractual allocation of risk.
This analysis demonstrates that the claims of the aggrieved party and the guilty
party after the termination of a voidable contracts in this category ought to rest on
different doctrinal bases. Although this is not doctrinally symmetrical, the principles
underpinning the imposition of liability in these cases reveal that there are good reasons
why symmetry ought not to matter.
65 This would usually be the amount of interest that the aggrieved party had earned by depositing the
money in a bank account.
66 The effective use of the loss of enrichment defence means that the guilty party will not be put into the
position he would have occupied presently had he not entered into the contract. This is unproblematic as
the important principle underlying recovery in these circumstances is that the guilty party ought to bear
the loss resulting from accidental damage to, or destruction of, the subject matter of the sale.
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(b) Restitutio in Integrum without Delictual Claims
In these cases, the facts which justify termination do not simultaneously disclose
a cause of action in delict. This arises most commonly in cases of innocent
misrepresentation. South African law and Scots law grant the misrepresentee the right to
terminate the contract and thereafter, the right to claim restitutio in integrum?1
As the misrepresentation in these cases is innocent, the misrepresentor is less
morally culpable than someone who made a negligent or fraudulent misrepresentation.
The question that arises is how, if at all, this effects the extent of each party's liability.
In respect of the misrepresentee's claim, there are two possibilities. First, it
could be argued as the misrepresentee has nonetheless suffered a misrepresentation, the
fact that it is innocent ought not to matter. If this is accepted, then the principles
underlying the imposition of liability dictate that the aggrieved party ought not to be left
in a worse position than he would have been in presently had he not entered into the
contract.68 This means that there would be no relevant distinction between a fraudulent,
negligent and innocent misrepresentation.69
Alternatively, it could be argued that as both parties are morally blameless (the
misrepresentor having made neither a careless nor a dishonest misrepresentation), this
67 Boyd <& Forest v Glasgow and South-Western Railway Co. 1915 SC (HL) 20 and Glass vHyde 1932 WLD 19.
For a detailed discussion of the South African law see Hutchison, DamagesforNon-Fraudulent
Misrepresentation in English and South African Eaw (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge,
1979), 96-108. For a discussion of the law in Scotland see McBryde, The Eaw ofContract in Scotland (2001),
para. 15-53ff.
68 It is once again assumed that but for the misrepresentation the aggrieved party would not have entered
into the contract.
69 The question about an appropriate doctrinal basis of awarding damages for innocent misrepresentation
has caused considerable difficulty in South African law. See Hutchison, DamagesforNon-Fraudulent
Misrepresentation in English and SouthAfrican Eaw (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge
1979), 167-73.
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justifies leaving any consequential loss to lie where it falls.70 If this is accepted, then the
principles underlying the imposition of liability incline towards limiting the
misrepresentee's claim to the extent of the innocent misrepresentor's enrichment.71
Although both arguments are defensible, on balance, it seems slightly harder to
justify why the misrepresentee should suffer any loss, given that it was the
misrepresentor's error that induced the misrepresentee to enter into the contract in the
first place. The important point is that if this is accepted, then limiting the
misrepresentee's restitution claim to the extent of the misrepresentor's unjustified
enrichment is out of line with the principles underlying the imposition of liability in
these cases.
For the same reason that it is harder to justify why the misrepresentee ought to
bear any loss in these cases, it is probably correct to limit the misrepresentor's claim
against the misrepresentee to the extent of the latter's unjustified enrichment.
70 Phame v Paiges 1973 (3) SA 397 (A) at 402. See also Hutchison, DamagesforNon-Fraudulent
Misrepresentation in English and SouthAfrican Haw (unpublished Ph.D. Thesis, University of Cambridge,
1979), 167-73.
71 See Olivier, 'Aedilisie Aksies Weens Verborge Gebreke' (1963) 26 THRHR 173 and Olivier,




This thesis concentrated on selected consequences of contractual failure in
South African and Scots law in comparative perspective. Three species of contractual
failure were under review: terminadon after breach; termination after supervening
impossibility/frustration; and termination of a contract which is voidable by reason of
improperly obtained consent. The nine questions considered and the conclusions
reached were as follows.
8.1 What effect does termination for breach have on the contractual
nexus between the parties?
In order to explain the effect of termination for breach, I argued that the real
substantive work is done by the disparate doctrines that make up this effect rather than
by abstract generalisations about the overall effect of termination on the contractual
nexus between the parties. It is accordingly critical that both South African and Scots
law clearly articulate these doctrines and the relationships between them. I suggested
that it was necessary to formulate the following six rules, supplemented by one
definition, to achieve this aim.
Rule One
Anyperformance obligation which is unperformed at the time of terminationfor breach is
extinguished by termination if the right which is correlative to this unperformed obligation
does notfall within the doctrine ofaccrued rights.
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Rule Two [the corollary of rule one]
Anyperformance obligation which is unpeformed at the time of terminationfor breach
survives terminationfor breach if the right which is correlative to this unperformed
obligationfalls within the doctrine ofaccrued rights.
Rule Three
A contractingparty (X) has a duty to restore to the other contractingparty (Y) any
contractualpeformance (or its value) receivedprior to terminationfor breach unless Y's
right to demand the exact reciprocalperformancefrom X would havefallen under the
doctrine ofaccrued rights butfor thefact that X has alreadyfulfilled the obligation that is
correlative to Y's right.
Rule Four
A contractingparty (X) also has a duty to restore to the other contractingparty (Y) any
contractualperformance (or its value) receivedprior to terminationfor breach unless Y's
right to demand the exact reciprocalpeformancefromX survives terminationfor breach
because itfalls within the doctrine ofaccrued rights
Rule Five
All clauses designed to have effect after terminationfor breach are enforceable after
terminationfor breach subject to the restrictions relating to publicpolity and liquidate
damages clauses.
Rule Six
Ifthe aggrievedparty has suffered a loss as a result ofa breach ofcontract, he is entitled to
an award ofcontractual damages to place him in theposition he would have occupied
presently had there been no breach.
Definition of an Accrued Right
An accrued means those rights that survive terminationfor breach. [See chapter three
for a comprehensive analysis of when this occurs].
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The following table depicts the first four rules:
UNACCRUED ACCRUED
UNPERFORMED Rule 1 Rule 2
PERFORMED Rule 3 Rule 4
It was established that termination sometimes operates retrospectively only,
sometimes retrospectively as well as prospectively, and sometimes prospectively only.
Importantly, the retrospective effect does not mean that the contractual nexus is treated
as if it never came into being. According to the transformation theory, it means that
only the primary performance obligations are annulled by termination. These are
replaced by secondary obligations to restore performances received and to pay damages.
The prospective effect of termination means that the contractual nexus is
severed only in so far as this nexus is not represented by obligations whose correlative
rights (i) fall under the doctrine of accrued rights and/or (ii) would have fallen under the
doctrine of accrued rights but for the fact that these obligations have been validly
discharged by performance. Termination for breach operates prospectively only if all
rights to contractual performances whose correlative obligations have been discharged
by performance fall under (ii) and if all rights to contractual performances due and
enforceable fall under (i).
8.2 When does a right to a contractual performance survive
termination for breach and termination for supervening
impossibility of performance/frustration?
It was demonstrated that Scots law has much to learn from South African law
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about accrued rights. It is settled that a right will survive termination for breach in South
African law if it is, immediately prior to termination, accrued, due and enforceable and
independent of the executory part of the contract. This doctrine has two limbs. According
to the first limb, the holder of a right must, at the time of termination, have been able to
insist that the other contracting party perform that right's correlative obligation. Although
the right of retention/exceptio non adempleti contractus is not directly applicable after
termination for breach, it was established that the relationship between these defences and
and the 'enforceability' requirement of the first leg of the accrued rights test is encapsulated
in the following principle: if the aggrieved party could have raised the right of
retention/exceptio non adimpleti contractus against the contract breaker immediately prior to
termination, then the right to the performance repelled by this defence will not fall under
the doctrine of accrued rights.
The second leg of the test is best explained by the twin concepts of reciprocity and
severability. For a right to survive termination for breach it must be counter-balanced by a
reciprocal obligation (i.e an obligation that is reciprocal to that right's correlative obligation)
that is capable of being severed from other unperformed reciprocal obligation couplets.
Despite the conceptual clarity of South African law, it was demonstrated that it can
be problematic to work out which contractual obligations are reciprocal to each other. The
analysis of Shelagatha Property Investments revealed that it can sometimes be helpful to
enquire whether policy factors favour a particular conclusion. In this regard it is
particularly important to see whether the survival of an accrued right would negatively
prejudice the aggrieved party. Analysis demonstrated that this can become an issue in
the case of insolvency.
It was demonstrated that Scots law would make the following improvements by
adopting South African law's formulation of accrued rights. First, Scots law would avoid
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interpreting the principle of mutuality to mean that the party in breach cannot, in any
circumstances, sue on the contract. Secondly, Scots law would not allow the right of
retention to be used after termination for breach. Thirdly, Scots law would jettison the
distinction between the payment of the contract price and an advance payment against a
subsequent liability to pay the contract price to resolve cases that ought to be resolved by
applying the doctrines set out in the rules.
Adopting this proposal will not involve a big step for Scots law as Gibson v
McNaughton, Turnbull vMcLean, and Lloyds Bankpic v Bamberger can be taken to support
South African law's formulation of accrued rights.
8.3 When does the right to restitution arise after termination for
breach?
In order to answer this question, it is necessary to distinguish between the
following contexts in which the right to restitution arises: (i) restitution of a returnable
benefit; (ii) restitution ofmoney from a co-contractant; (iii) restitution ofmoney from a
third party; and (iv) restitution of an inherently non-returnable benefit. In addition, it is
sometimes necessary to consider the contract breaker's claim and the aggrieved party's
claim independently.
8.3.1 Restitution of Returnable Benefits
It is right in principle that both the aggrieved party and the contract breaker
have the right to claim restitution of returnable benefits after termination for breach.
The fact that the aggrieved party cannot make exact restitution should not prevent the
termination of the contract. Both South African law and Scots law should allow
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restitution by way of financial substitute. This will clear the way for a principled
evaluation of the critical issue that arises in this context: who should bear the risk of
accidental loss of, or damage to, the subject matter of the sale? It was argued that on
balance the argument favours respecting the ordinary contractual risk rules (i.e. that the
purchaser bears the risk of accidental damage to, or destruction of, the goods). It
follows from this that the change of position defence is inappropriate in these cases and
that the law of contract should regulate restitution of returnable benefits in South
African and Scots law.
8.3.2 Restitution of Money from a Co-Contractant
(i) Aggrieved Party's Claim
It is right in principle that the aggrieved party can claim restitution ofmoney
after termination for breach. This is uncontentious in South African law. Only the
problematic Connelly v Simpson stands in the way of Scots law following the position in
principle. It was argued that Scots law should reject this case and follow the other cases
that support the position in principle.
It was argued that the receipt of a counter-performance should not affect the
aggrieved party's claim for restitution ofmoney. This requires the recognition that the
inability to make exact counter-restitution should not prevent the aggrieved party from
terminating the contract. The court should always be prepared to award restitution by
way of a financial substitute. Finally, the courts should recognise a correlation between
the aggrieved party's claim for restitution ofmoney and the contract breaker's
restitution claim for the value of his inherently non-returnable performance. In other
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words, the courts must recognise that the aggrieved party is under a corresponding duty
to make counter-restitudon when claiming restitution himself.
(ii) Contract Breaker's Claim
In line with the view that the aggrieved party is under a corresponding duty to
make counter-restitution when claiming restitution himself, it is correct in principle that
the contract breaker has the right to claim restitution ofmoney.
8.3.3 Restitution of Money from a Third Party
Restitution claims from third parties have arisen in the context of assignations in
freight cases. I argued that Scots law and South African law should support the 'first
tier' policy decision that the transfer ofmoney satisfies the sine causa requirement for an
enrichment action. It was argued that policy factors on the 'second tier' should then
determine whether the enrichment action should succeed in any particular case. In the
context of assignations in freight cases, it was argued that although the case is not
watertight, the policy factors indicate that it is better not to allow the hirer of a ship an
enrichment action against a third party financial institution.
Although the issue here does not concern a choice between defensible doctrinal
alternatives, an analogous theme emerges. In deciding whether this enrichment claim
ought to succeed, it was argued that abstract taxonomic factors are not decisive. Instead,
clearly articulated policy factors derived from the two contractual relationships ought to
decide whether the retention of the payment is unjustified for the purposes of the
enrichment-based restitution claim against the third party.
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8.3.4 Restitution of Inherently Non-Returnable Benefits
The claim for restitution of an inherently non-returnable benefit yielding an end
product is most commonly triggered by the utilisation of that benefit. When the
performance does not yield an end product, the right to restitution will arise where
utilisation is coupled with a voluntary intention to accept the benefits. There is no
substantive difference between these tests as utilisation of a performance yielding an end
product necessarily incorporates a voluntary intention to accept that performance.
I argued that the tests used to overcome subjective devaluation in English law
are useful in articulating the reasons why the right to restitution arises. The
'incontrovertible benefit' test explains those cases where it is unconscionable for the
recipient to argue that the benefit is not worth anything to him. This occurs, for
example, where the aggrieved party does not utilise the benefit in circumstances that
benefit increases the value of his land in a way that this increase is readily realisable. The
'bargained-for' test explains those cases where the recipient received part of what he had
contracted for in circumstances where it is unfair for him to say that he has not
benefited from that performance. This test is particularly useful when the breach does
not affect the quality of the part performance. Finally the 'limited acceptance' test
explains those cases where the recipient utilises the performance. This test is useful, for
example, when a developer/employer uses a contractor's part performance to complete
the work.
It was pointed out that it does not follow from using the tests of enrichment to
determine when the right to restitution arises that this remedy is necessarily an
enrichment action. It was demonstrated that this analysis can be accommodated by
contract law.
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8.4 When the right to restitution arises after termination for breach,
what is the quantum of this claim?
8.4.1 Restitution of Returnable Benefits
In these cases both parties are under an obligation to return the specific thing
received. Where this is not possible the value of the returnable benefit must be restored.
8.4.2 Restitution of Money
In these cases both parties are entitled to reclaim the full contract price. The
tricky case is where this will allow the aggrieved party to escape the consequences of a
bad bargain. It was argued that the policy of the law should favour the aggrieved party
rather than the contract breaker even if this means that the aggrieved party sometimes
escapes a bad bargain. Accordingly, the aggrieved party's claim for restitution ofmoney
should not be limited by his expectation interest.
8.4.3 Restitution of Inherently Non-Returnable Benefits
(i) Contract Breaker's Claim
As the aggrieved party is entitled to set off any contractual damages against the
contract breaker's restitution claim, the method of calculating the contract breaker's
restitution claim will affect the quantum recoverable where (a) that method causes the
sum of the quantum of restitution and the amount paid to the second contractor to
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exceed the original contract price (in circumstances where other methods would not
have this effect) and (b) where the sum of the quantum of restitution and the amount
paid to the second contractor is less than the original contract price. The latter will
occur when the contract breaker has entered into a winning contract.
In a winning contract, it was argued that the contract breaker should be entitled
to claim a sum equal to the extent of the aggrieved party's enrichment. This should be
the lower of the market value of this performance and the increase in the aggrieved
party's patrimony.
(ii) Aggrieved Party's Claim
It was argued that the aggrieved party's restitution claim should not be
restricted by his expectation interest or by the total contract price and only
sometimes by the pro rata contract price. In cases where the aggrieved party has
not ardculated the reasons for entering into the losing contract and the contract
breaker should not reasonably have known these reasons, it seems right to measure
the aggrieved party's restitution claim with reference to the pro rata contract price
making the adjustment, when necessary, for the fact that early performance can be
more expensive than later performance. This result will not necessarily be achieved
if the aggrieved party is entitled to a restitution claim measured with reference to
the objective market value of his performance. I argued that it looks very much as
though the law of contract is actually providing the solution to these cases. This
solution achieves the right balance between ensuring that the contract breaker does
not get a benefit without having to pay for it and ensuring that the aggrieved party
does not gain a windfall benefit as a result of the contract breaker's breach.
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In cases where these reasons are articulated or ought reasonably to have
been known, it seems right to allow the aggrieved party a restitution claim greater
than the pro rata contract price. The right balance in these cases is probably
achieved by grandng the aggrieved party a restitution claim based on the lesser of
the cost of his performance and the market value of that performance. It was
argued that as unjusdfied enrichment can only achieve the right result in a small
number of cases, it should be left to the courts to develop a contractual rule to
achieve this right result.
8.5 Should restitution after termination for breach be regulated by
the law of contract, the law of unjustified enrichment, or
sometimes by the law of contract and sometimes by the law of
unjustified enrichment?
In respect of claims for restitution of returnable benefits and for restitution of
money it was argued that in the majority of cases it makes no difference whether these
restitution claims are seen as contractual or enrichment-based. The tricky case is where
the aggrieved purchaser of goods cannot return these goods to the seller in
circumstances where he is not to blame for this eventuality. As the arguments favoured
upholding the ordinary contractual risk rules in these cases, it was submitted that it
makes sense to leave it to the law of contract to resolve such cases. Accordingly, there is
no good reason to change the existing South African law which regards claims for
restitution of returnable benefits and for restitution of money as contractual remedies.
In the absence of a definitive statement regarding the doctrinal basis of these restitution
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claims, it was suggested that Scots law should follow the South African law and treat
these claims as contractual.
In respect of claims for restitution of inherently non-returnable benefits, I
argued that the principles underlying the contract breaker's restitution claim will be met
if this claim is an enrichment action.
It was argued that the aggrieved party's restitution claim should not be an
enrichment action. This was for two reasons. First, if restitution is limited either by the
total contract price or by the pro rata contract price (even in the valuation sense), then it
looks very much as though the law of contract is actually providing the solution to these
cases. Secondly, if it is right to take into account the fact that the aggrieved party's early
performance can be more expensive than his later performance and that it is sometimes
desirable to take into account the reasons why an aggrieved party deliberately entered
into a losing bargain, the law of unjustified enrichment cannot achieve just results in
these cases. This is because the law of enrichment suffers from a fundamental
perspective limitation: it can only view matters in this regard from the viewpoint of the
recipient of a benefit.
8.6 Is unjustified enrichment the appropriate doctrinal basis for
redressing the economic imbalances after supervening
impossibility of performance/frustration?
It was argued that the rules of unjustified enrichment do not accurately reflect
the principles underpinning the claim designed to redress the economic imbalances
between the parties after supervening impossibility of performance/frustration. This is
because of the twin facts that the rules of unjustified enrichment are ill-equipped to
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apportion losses between the parties and that it is normatively desirable to apportion
these losses in some cases. As a result, the courts in South Africa and Scotland should
be granted the power to apportion losses according to a clear set of principles.
It was argued that the following principles should guide the courts when
deciding whether to apportion losses. First, losses should not be apportioned where the
party incurring this expenditure retains a realisable benefit as a result of that
expenditure. Secondly, losses should be apportioned if the party incurring the loss
would not have benefited from the expenditure leading to the loss had the frustrating
event not occurred. Thirdly, losses should be apportioned if the party incurring the loss
would not have incurred the expenditure leading to the loss if he had not been
contracting with his co-contractant in particular. Finally, losses should be apportioned if
the party incurring the loss only incurred the expenditure leading to the loss because he
was contracting with his co-contractant in particular and would not have agreed to
similar expenditure with parties other than that co-contractant or someone qualitatively
similar to that co-contractant.
It was pointed out that neither the 'pure enrichment' nor the 'equitable
adjustment' interpretation of Cantiere San Rocco v Clyde Shipbuilding and Engineering Co. Ctd
supports a principled means of loss apportionment. Given that Cantiere is so well
entrenched in Scots law, it will probably be necessary to introduce loss apportionment
by statute.
As Kudu Granite Operations (Pty) L,td v Caterna Ctd has confirmed that each party's
liability after supervening impossibility is limited to the extent of their enrichment,
similar legislative intervention will be required to introduce a loss apportionment rule
into South African law.
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8.7 Should restitutio in integrum be regulated by the law of contract,
the law of unjustified enrichment, or sometimes by the law of
contract and sometimes by the law of unjustified enrichment?
It was argued that when restitutio in integrum is combined with a delictual claim,
jusdce will be achieved if three principles are followed: first, all the financially
deleterious effects of the misrepresentation are reversed; secondly, the aggrieved party is
not left in a better position now that the contract has failed, than he would have been in
had he not entered the contract; and thirdly, the guilty party is made to bear any loss
resulting from accidental damage to, or destruction of, the subject matter of the sale. It
was demonstrated that the law of unjustified enrichment cannot ensure that the first
principle is upheld. This is because the law of unjustified enrichment cannot
compensate the aggrieved party for any impoverishment that does not simultaneously
enrich the guilty party. In order to achieve the desired result, the aggrieved party would
have to institute a delictual claim for the shortfall. It was pointed out that it seems
unnecessary to go through the extra step of quantifying an enrichment claim when
instituting a delictual claim or a claim for restitutio in integrum achieves the desired result.
It was argued that the more limited aims of unjustified enrichment accurately
reflect the extent to which the aggrieved party ought to be liable to the guilty party. This
will ensure that the third principle is upheld.
Although the innocent misrepresentor is less morally blameworthy than his
negligent or fraudulent counterpart, it was argued that the misrepresentee should not be
made to bear any loss as a result of the misrepresentation. Accordingly, the doctrinal
basis of both parties' claims should be identical irrespective of whether the facts which
support a claim for restitutio in integrum also disclose a cause of action in delict.
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8.8 Should the consequences of contractual failure be regulated by
the law of contract, the law of unjustified enrichment, or
sometimes by the law of contract and sometimes by the law of
unjustified enrichment?
It is clear from the answers to questions four to seven that my view is that the
consequences of contractual failure should not have a unitary basis.1 Although the law
of contract and the law of unjusdfied enrichment will frequently yield the same solution,
this is not always the case. The thesis has highlighted those areas where it makes a
material difference which solution is chosen.
8.9 When regulating the consequences of contractual failure, how
should a legal system make the choice between defensible
doctrinal alternatives?
This broad question underpins questions three to eight. It was pointed out that
the commentators have suggested four approaches to this question. First, a number of
South African and Scottish commentators, relying partially on their English
counterparts, have argued that the law of unjustified enrichment should play an
increased role after termination for breach. This view has relied primarily on abstract
taxonomic arguments. Although this scholarship has successfully established that it is
theoretically possible to classify these remedies as arising in unjustified enrichment, this
1 Cf Hellwege, 'Unwinding Mutual Contracts: Restitutio in Integrum v. The Defence ofChange ofPosition' in
Johnston and Zimmermann (eds), Unjustified Enrichment: Kej Issues in Comparative Perspective (2002), 243 at
262f£ It is clear from the tenor of the argument presented in this thesis that I disagree with Hellwege's
claim that the consequences of contractual failure should be treated in a uniform way.
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finding does not preclude the theoretical possibility of classifying these remedies as
contractual. This demonstrated that there is no argument based on prior logic that
determines the doctrinal basis of the remedies under review.
Secondly, the transformation theory was used to support a contractual analysis
of restitution after termination for breach. It was pointed out that although the
transformation theory can provide a useful theoretical explanation of this contractual
analysis, it suffers from the same defects as the abstract taxonomic enrichment
argument.
Thirdly, the contractual explanation of restitution and the claim to redress the
economic imbalances after frustration is supported by an historical analysis of the
condictio causa data causa non secuta. It was argued that as both South African law and Scots
law are moving towards a more generalised approach to enrichment liability, the precise
scope of the specific condictiones diminishes in importance in favour of a more principled
and conceptual approach.
Fourthly, the comparative approach demonstrated that various legal systems
can, and in fact do, legitimately differ in their approach to the doctrinal basis of the
remedies under review. This demonstrated that both in practice and in logic these
remedies can arise in either contract or unjustified enrichment.
As none of the above approaches yielded a satisfactory answer to the doctrinal
basis of the claims under review, I argued that the choice between doctrinal alternatives
ought to be made after careful consideration of the principles of recovery underpinning
a particular remedy and the consequences of imposing liability according to a particular
doctrinal set of rules. In my view, the proper doctrinal basis of a particular remedy is the
one which, having due regard to the consequences of imposing liability according to a
doctrinal set of rules, most accurately reflects these principles of recovery. It was
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demonstrated that our intuitions about the just results that ought to be reached in real
and hypothetical cases indicated that three general factors were critical in distilling the
principles of recovery underpinning the remedies under review: the role of the contract
price in determining the quantum of recovery after contractual failure; the contractual
allocation of risk; and the incidence of fault in the circumstances leading to contractual
failure. The last of these factors is also a key feature in distinguishing between contracts
terminated for supervening impossibility of performance/frustration and the other two
species of contractual failure. This indicated that the features which differentiate the
three species of contractual failure also played an important role in distilling the
principles of recovery underpinning the claims under review.
In respect of the consequences of imposing liability according to a particular set
of doctrinal rules, it was demonstrated that two considerations were critical. First,
unjustified enrichment law necessarily brings with it the change of position/loss of
enrichment defence and secondly, once impoverishment of the pursuer is established,
unjustified enrichment law suffers from a perspective limitation in that it is restricted to
viewing matters exclusively from the perspective of the recipient of a benefit.
I argued that the law of unjustified enrichment is in many cases insufficiently
sensitive to the principles of recovery underpinning the claims under review. This is for
two reasons. First, unjustified enrichment is tied to imposing liability according to a
single principle, namely, that no one should be unjustifiably enriched at another's
expense. Secondly, where liability ought to rest on other principles, the unjustified
enrichment doctrines that buttress the general principle are often too blunt or narrow to
take these other principles into account. I argued that in the majority of cases contract
law is, or can be adapted to be, more sensitive to these principles of recovery than the
law of unjustified enrichment. This is because contract law is constituted by a broader
270
and more complex set of principles than the law of unjustified enrichment.
Furthermore, even where liability does rest on the principle that no one should be
unjustifiably enriched at another's expense, this can often be accommodated by contract
law. Accordingly, where a legal system has a choice between a contractual solution and
an unjustified enrichment solution, contract law will often enable a more just solution
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